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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of Turkey-EU relations on Turkey's domestic 
political evolution in the 1990s and 2000s, with a focus on the evolution of the religious 
political parties, the changing position of the military and Turkey’s new energy politics.  
Although Turkey-EU relations resemble non-progressive affairs to many, in reality, 
they are as productive as any other relations that have resulted in the expected goal. 
Both Turkey and the EU made significant gains from this long lasting relationship. 
However, this thesis focuses more on the impact of these relations on Turkey. While 
engaging with the EU, Turkish domestic politics underwent a major evolution 
especially concerning the religiously motivated political parties; they were founded on 
anti-Western and pro-Islamic principles. However their attempt to come to power was 
continuously prevented by the secular forces, most importantly the army. In 2000s, 
realizing the importance of Europeanisation to help avoid the military’s intimidation, 
they became the real champions of Westernisation, contrary to their founding principles. 
Under Erdoğan’s leadership they started the accession negotiations with the EU.  
While Islamic political thinking was evolving, the position of the Turkish Armed 
Forces, who, directly or indirectly, drove Turkish politics since the 1960s, was also 
changing in favour of civilian control. Thanks to the EU initiated reform programs 
which were implemented by the religiously rooted JDP after 2002, the Turkish army’s 
heavy presence in civilian politics was reduced almost to zero.  
Again, close relations with the EU encouraged Turkey to become proactive within 
Eurasian energy politics. As well as the good relations with the West, Turkey also 
started utilizing its geostrategic positioning by trying to become the energy bridge, and 
perhaps energy hub, between the energy producers on its eastern borders with energy 
hungry Europe on its western borders.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of Turkey-EU relations on 
Turkey's domestic political evolution in the 1990s and 2000s, with a focus on the 
position of the military, the religious political parties and energy politics.  
While it may seem like an endless road or an unprogressive relationship, in reality, 
Turkey-EU relations are progressing. There is no doubt that during this long lasting 
relationship, where the weight of historical memories is felt greatly, the EU is having a 
major influence over Turkey’s domestic politics either directly or indirectly. Of course, 
Turkey has also impacted the EU in some ways. More than anything the EU became a 
tool of Turkish domestic politics. However, all these issues cannot be evaluated under 
one study alone and, therefore this thesis will focus on certain key aspects only that are 
linked to each other. These include: 
1- The impact of Turkey's relations with the EU on Turkey's domestic politics, 
with a focus on civilian-military relations 
2- The impact of Turkey's relations with the EU on the ideological evolution of the 
religious political parties and leaders in Turkey 
3- The impact of Turkey's relations with the EU on Turkey's economic 
transformation, with a focus on the energy sector 
 
So far there has not been a study conducted that specifically focuses on these topics 
with the goal of identifying the EU’s, and to an extent other external agencies, impact 
on them. The external agencies including the EU, US, regional actors such as Iran and 
Russia as well as financial agencies like the IMF and WB, rather than putting pressure 
on Turkey, which is what these actors are usually perceived to do, were actually seen as 
an opportunity and in fact an excuse to justify internal reforms that certain political 
factions in Turkey already wanted to push for. For example, the long-term negotiations 
with the EU provided the longer framework need to not only justify but also implement 
some of these reforms. Although it is often described as a long term EU candidate with 
few chances for getting in, Turkey has in fact been incredibly successful at using the 
negotiation process as a way to build up power, regionally and reform itself internally.  
11 
 
As mentioned in detail below, end of the Cold War was seen as a direct threat to 
Turkey’s position as a western ally. However, after 1990s, regional dynamics, including 
the end of the Cold War dynamics, were such that Turkey found itself in a particularly 
powerful position. In 1990s,  economic and political forces came together in a very 
unique confluence to make it possible for Turkey to reform and grow in a particular 
direction that otherwise may not have been possible. It should be noted that Turkey did 
majority of this economic, political and social manoeuvres by its own choice, in many 
ways, instead of being necessarily forced in that direction. However, it should also be 
noted that, without the guidance, close cooperation and financial assistance of the 
external agencies these changes would not take place. 
Apart from the choice of topics, what makes the research unique in the field is that 
while the majority of prior studies that focus on this relationship consistently identify 
the problems, while offering no solutions, this thesis is dedicated to explaining the 
impact of the EU on key issues in Turkey without leading a ‘witch-hunt’ into the causes 
of the problems and delays that have come to define Turkey-EU relations. In many 
ways, this thesis is trying to identify the progress made within the relationship – 
especially on the Turkish side – that may seem to have not moved fast enough, while 
asking and of course answering the question: “if it is not a properly accomplishing and 
progressive relationship, then what do Turkey and the EU really want from each other 
and how much impact has this relationship had on the evolution of domestic politics in 
Turkey? 
This study, which sees the historical legacies as major catalysts at the fore front of 
the advancement of Turkey-EU relations will deliberately avoid plunging into those 
well-known policy issues and topical debates such as religion, security dimensions, 
immigration, human rights, the Armenian and Cyprus issues, and Greek-Turkish 
disputes. Instead, it will try to identify and explain the impact of this endless 
relationship on Turkey’s domestic political evolution, an issue which was identified as a 
gap in the literature. While explaining the chosen topics the research will also try to 
answer the main question mentioned above, as well as to conclude whether the 
relationship is in fact a negotiation over membership, or something else entirely. 
Therefore, one of the main reasons for the choice of the topic was to fill a gap 
recognized in this field of research. 
One of the main hypotheses in this study is that historical perceptions on both sides, 
as well as the rhetoric deployed by political leaders, has had a great impact on Turkey-
12 
 
EU relations. Due to increasingly problematic discourses and actions by political elites 
who are fed by negative historical memories, already thorny issues between the EU and 
Turkey have become more complicated. During national elections especially, the 
rhetoric deployed by the politicians both in Turkey and the EU member states generally 
undermines the accession process. However, it should be noted that during the last 
decade in particular, the Justice and Development Party Governments (JDP [Tr.: Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi] sometimes referred to as the ‘AKP’ or AK Parti) have cleverly 
outmaneuvered at least some of the negative perceptions against the Turks and Turkey 
on the way to opening up formal accession negotiations.   
The second hypothesis is that religious political parties in Turkey underwent a great 
identity shift in order to fit in with the criteria that ‘secularist’ (and ‘Kemalist’) forces in 
Turkey, such as the army, demanded; this placated their ability to intervene in politics 
on the grounds that JDP were “too religious”. This ideological evolution was observed 
when the prominent religious political leader Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party (WP 
[Tr.: Refah Partisi, RP] split in the late 1990s, giving birth to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 
reformist JDP which had a more modern stance. Between 1970 and 2000 Erbakan’s 
parties were dissolved several times. Each time the Islamist party was dissolved, its 
successor claimed to be more moderate and less Islamist.1 Once in power, the JDP and 
Erdoğan adopted a more Westernized outlook; a move that weakened one of the most 
important arguments in the hands of the secularists. After this, EU reforms were passed 
one after the other, bringing major Turkish institutions up to EU standards which 
directly helped the civilian authority to subdue anti-religious establishments such as the 
military and focus on other major international dynamics such as energy issues which 
are closely connected to the development of the domestic institutions.  
In light of the above hypothesis, this thesis believes that the successive JDP 
governments wanted to remove the Turkish army’s customary heavy presence in 
civilian politics using EU regulations. As a result – and contrary to many of their 
members’ traditional positions – during the last decade they acted as the main champion 
of EU membership, due to their need for the EU as cover and protection against 
possible aggression from the military. They have been very successful in doing this, as 
the military’s presence in politics has been reduced almost to zero at the time of 
completion of this thesis. However, this was a beneficial change for the majority of the 
                                                          
1 Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: the Quest for Identity, (Oxford: One World Publishers, 2003), p.172 
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people in Turkey, as the reforms forced on Turkey by the EU gave people more rights 
and increased their standard of living. In fact, the continuing process of “peaceful 
solution to the Kurdish issue” program would never have been put in place in Turkey if 
the EU backed reforms did not ferment vital changes in public opinion towards the 
“Kurdish issue”, something which has been traditionally seen as a security problem. 
This is now seen as a political matter and the guns are almost silenced. 
The military’s stance against religious and conservative parties has not been 
welcomed by the majority of the Turkish public, 99% of which is considered Muslim. 
The majority of them saw the army’s presence in politics as anti-religious and 
oppressive. In 2002 the religiously motivated JDP won the elections, though they were 
initially worried about what the military would do when they tried to run the 
government. This study argues that JDP’s solution was to take the army’s main 
instrument from it – the notion that it was the only proper “westernizing force” – by 
getting closer to the EU than any of their predecessors had ever done. This obviously 
encouraged the EU to establish warmer relations with Turkey as it had wanted the 
departure of the army from civilian politics since the beginning. This clearly suited the 
JDP but not the army. In that sense many comments arose indicating that the JDP were 
using the EU to implement its own agenda.2 For example, Mehmet Kılıç, a Green Party 
MP in Germany, argued that: 
[The] JDP used the EU reforms to strengthen itself and now it does not need the EU as it is 
moving away from it.3 
 
The EU clearly states that it wants Turkey to be a modern, democratic, secular 
republic that respects human rights and the rule of law. But the EU does not want 
Turkey to be modernized by the army, which had long been seen as the leading 
modernizing power in Turkey.4 As Yıldırım states: 
                                                          
2 Erol Manisalı, Bekleme Odasında Igfal, (Istanbul: Derin Yayınları, 3rd Edition, 2007), p. 58, Şule Toktaş 
and Ümit Kurt,’The Turkish Military’s Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: 
An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF)’,Turkish 
Studies Vol. 11, No. 3, Sept. 2010,  pp. 387-403 and Ozgur Muftuoglu, “AKP, ‘AB'yi ideolojik aygıtı 
olarak kullanıyor..!’, Evrensel, Feb. 14, 2013. 
3 RPP EU Representation Bureau, ‘Avrupa’da ‘AKP bizi kullandı’ tartışması!’ (In Europe “the JDP used 
us” debate), Oct. 10, 2012 
 http://chp-avrupabirligi.org/2012/10/10/avrupada-akp-bizi-kullandi-tartismasi/, retrieved Nov. 8, 2012. 
National news channels in Turkey Jul. 6, 2012. 
4 European Commission, Turkey Progress Report 2011, pp. 12-17, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/keydocuments/2011/package/trrapport2011en.pdf  retrieved Mar. 23, 
2013. 
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One of the crucial political factors stipulated by Brussels for obtaining full membership has been 
the democratic control of the military.5 
 
Therefore, intentionally or not, the impact of the EU on the changing identity of the 
religious parties and their leaders, as well as the process of removal of the army’s 
presence from politics, is considered to be crucial. 
The third hypothesis is that military’s intervention into civilian politics on four 
different occasions was backed up by Western allies, most importantly by the US, either 
directly or covertly to keep the country secular – especially during the Cold War – and 
therefore it should be evaluated within the merits of the time. Turkish coups were totally 
different from many other coups. As explained in detail in Chapter 3, the Turkish 
military saw itself as the guardians of the secular nature of republic. When it perceived 
that the civilian government was unable to protect it; they gave themselves 
responsibility to deal with the threat by taking over the authority from the civilians.  
The superpower rivalry after the Second World War divided the world into two 
ideological camps where Turkey remained on the side of the USA by becoming a 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Throughout this 
period, the Turkish army was heavily supported by the USA in case of Soviet 
aggression. During the coups in Turkey, the USA kept quiet, or even supported, the 
army. To a certain extent, European countries also remained quiet when there was a 
military takeover due to the hysteria over the communist threat, thanks largely to the 
influence of the USA. Therefore, it was very difficult during the Cold War for the 
Turkish civilian authorities to tackle the army’s presence in politics. The end of the 
Cold War can be seen as the key turning point for the EU’s support for civilian politics 
against the military’s presence there. Consequently, the JDP took advantage of the 
contemporary political situation where the West did not need the Turkish army as much 
as they had done during the Cold War, and also the EU’s political conditionality 
requirements, whereby the army’s presence in politics was seen as an obstacle to the 
progress of relations.    
The fourth hypothesis is that Turkey, where since late 1990s religious political 
parties stopped being openly anti-Western and then the civilian politics freed from 
army’s dominion, has been trying to utilize its geopolitical position to become an 
                                                          
5 Çagrı Yıldırım, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics and European Union Membership 
Negotiations’, Dec. 2, 2010, http://www.balkanalysis.com/turkey/2010/12/02/the-role-of-the-military-in-
turkish-politics-and-european-union-membership-negotiations/ retrieved Jun. 18, 2012. 
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energy corridor between energy rich regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus and 
energy hungry Europe. This was only possible if Turkey has Europeanised its financial 
and political standards as well as it has good relations with Europe and the Energy 
producer countries.  
When the Cold War ended in 1991 there was a sense that (in the West at least) 
Turkey’s location has become more important than its army. After getting closer to the 
EU in the late 1990s and again in the 2000s, Turkish foreign policy has changed 
dramatically and is now trying to define itself as an internationally active, model 
democratic Muslim country. Due to this new-found confidence in its foreign affairs, 
thanks to the EU backed reforms and domestic political stability that followed those 
reforms, Turkey is moving from being an almost “neutral”6 country to a dynamic 
regional player in political and economic issues.  
The successive JDP governments, having freed themselves first from the religiously 
motivated anti-western mindset and then the fear of army’s involvement in its 
businesses, try to utilize Turkey’s geostrategic positioning by getting closer to EU. To 
the JDP, Turkey being close to EU would boost democratisations of Turkey and 
therefore this would open up new alternatives in Turkey’s international trade especially 
concerning the energy sector as internal developments are closely linked with its 
international relations. Firstly producer countries would not be afraid to sign hefty deals 
with a democratic Turkey that has a westernized outlook and a candidate to the largest 
economic union in the world. Secondly, Turkey, a close partner of the EU would 
equally not be afraid to undertake substantial energy projects that links producers with 
the consumers such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC). Of course, at the epicenter 
of this ideal of Turkey being a key country in international energy games by becoming 
both an energy corridor and an energy hub stands the continuous EU backing. As 
explained in detail below, after 1999 Turkey-EU relations developed significantly 
positive. Consequently Turkey took serious steps to assert itself as an important player 
in Post-Cold War Eurasian energy politics.  
                                                          
6 Peace at Home Peace in the World (in Turkish ‘Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh’) was the foreign policy vision 
of the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. During the process of building the New Turkey, 
Atatürk wanted to keep Turkey away from international conflicts thus promoting it to be neutral. This 
became the official motto for Turkey almost until the end of the Cold War. Especially with Erdoğan and 
Davutoğlu Turkey started following an active politics in international stage.  For more information related 
to Turkish foreign policy after 1923, see William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2002). 
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This thesis strongly believes that the three developments mentioned above are 
closely linked to each other and these progressive changes should be credited to 
Turkey’s desire to become full member of the EU. It is very clear from the findings of 
this research that the developments within these three dynamics are interlinked and 
complimentary to each other which mean that if one did not take place the others would 
not occur. If the religiously motivated parties did not change their rhetoric they could 
not come to power and get the EU backing to reform Turkey’s domestic institutions. 
Closely linked to this, if it was not for the EU backed reforms the military would not go 
back in to their barracks and religiously motivated parties could not effectively be in 
charge of Turkish politics. Moreover, if it was not for the reforms that brought Turkey 
closer to the EU membership and the achievement of domestic stability, Turkey could 
not effectively participate in Eurasian energy games.  
After reading the available literature, following the media closely, exploring public 
opinion and interviewing people, it has become clear that Turkish-EU relations are 
about much more than a political relationship based on EU membership. This idea is in 
opposition to what most people think. The main hypothesis, therefore, is that this 
relationship has a major impact, especially on Turkish domestic politics, and both 
Turkey and the EU are using each other to achieve independent goals. The EU wants 
Turkey to develop further and become more democratic and remain a Western ally, 
while Turkey, especially under JDP governments which are portraying themselves (or 
to some people pretending) as Muslim Democrats, wanted EU guidance to overcome 
the army’s influence and also to become an energy bridge between the West and the 
East. Therefore, in reality, the EU does not really want Turkey to become a full 
member; Turkey also knows this to be the case. Thus their relationship is only 
ostensibly about the accession process while in reality about something else entirely. 
Therefore Turkey is not expected to become a member of the Union in the near future. 
However their relationship as mentioned above have a great influence on Turkey’s 
domestic and international affairs. This impact and the dynamics between the major 
actors and agencies within this relationship therefore can be illustrated in this diagram 
to be able to clarify what the thesis is trying to achieve as a whole: 
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This thesis, which tries to explain the impact of Turkey-EU relations on Turkey's 
domestic political evolution and to clarify the arguments put forward and to assess the 
validity of the hypothesis mentioned above, strongly asserts that without seeing the 
underlying historical reasons, one cannot understand Turkey-EU relations and/or public 
opinion in Europe towards Turkey.  
Undoubtedly, history plays a great part in Turkey-Europe relations. Due to its culture 
and religion – while ignoring the history of relations – Eurosceptics see Turkey as an 
“alien country”. As Aurélie Lacassagne argues, the peculiar relationship between 
Christendom and “the Turk”7 is a key element in understanding the reluctant behavior 
of Europeans in accepting Turkey in the EU.8 Although, a deeper understanding of this 
complex relationship requires a recounting of historical issues since the Middle Ages, it 
                                                          
7 Martin Wight, Systems of States, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p.120, Cited by Aurelie 
Lacassagne, Cultures of Anarchy as Figurations: Reflections on Wendt, Elias and the English School, 
Laurentian University, Vol.1, No.2, Jul. 2012, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0001.207, 
retrieved Jan. 18, 2013. 
8 Ibid. 
EU offers democracy and 
prosperity- it’s a major pull 
factor for Turkey. 
Internal dynamics in Turkey does not 
allow Turkey-EU relations to progress.  
Religious parties are anti-EU and army 
regularly involves in civilian polittics. 
This weakens Turkey's position in 
international relations and it cannot utilize 
its geostrategic location. A major 
transformation of domestic institutions  
necessarry  
late 1990's Religious parties started 
changing their anti-Western outlook to 
be able to come to power without the 
secularist army’s intimidation. 
Eventually by being supporters of EU, 
the JDP took army’s main tool- the 
modernizer- from its hand.
As a result  in early 2000's of the major 
change in the religious parties' stance 
and the EU backed reforms Army’s 
involvement in civilian politics reduced 
to nil. The civilian actors started 
focusing on international relations. 
By 2005, progress in its democracy 
and domestic institutions brought 
Turkey closer to the EU. This made 
Turkey more confident in 
international relations and it started 
playing active role in Eursasian 
energy game. 
Turkey is now richer, more 
democratic, more developed and 
more assertive in international 
politics. However still not a 
memeber of the EU.  EU has safer 
southeastern borders and a closer 
partnenr in many aspects especially 
in energy issues. But both Turkey 
and EU are winners.
Turkey-
EU 
relations 
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is impossible to go beyond twentieth century within this research as it would occupy 
such a vast space. Therefore this thesis will only give a brief account of Turkey-Europe 
relations in the twentieth century to be able to clarify at least some of the 
misconceptions.  
A Historical Background to Turkey-Europe Relations in twentieth century 
With the abolishment of the monarchy in 1922 and the creation of the modern 
Turkish Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal, who took charge of Turkey, decided to take 
the country entirely westward. He carried on with reforms initiated by the Ottoman 
sultans in terms of westernization of the country. Finally, in 1926, the Republic of 
Turkey was declared a secular state, with religious and state affairs fully separated. 
Following that, the Latin alphabet replaced the Arabic one and the Swiss civil code was 
adopted. Many other reforms were introduced to make Turkey “a European country” 
during Kemal’s (later to be known as the Atatürk or ‘Father of the Turks’) time as 
president. 
Turkey stayed neutral during World War II almost until the end. Finally, just before 
the war finished, it symbolically entered the war with the Allied Powers, thus making 
known its stance against the Axis Powers. This was a choice that kept Turkey on the 
side of the Western powers for many decades, as the Cold War followed World War II 
and Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This cemented its 
desire to side with United States and its allies against the communist Soviet Union.  
However, the unique historical interaction between Turkey and Europe since the 
Middle Ages helped create a very particular, often threatening (the “Muslim invader”) 
view of Turkey as “the other”.9 However, importantly, after Turkey became part of the 
Western alliance system this was translated into merely a ‘religious and backwardness’ 
threat as opposed to a military and security threat. After the 1950’s though, some 
decision makers in Europe who wanted to keep the country away from Europe, 
deployed rhetoric that was related more to Turkey’s religion and history (such as 
Armenian Question and Islamic revivalism)10 as they did not expect any military threat 
                                                          
9 Mark Coppenger, Moral Apologetics for Contemporary Christians: Pushing Back Against Cultural and 
religious Critics, (Nashville and Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2011), p.225 
10 It is widely accepted that Armenian genocide claims became an issue only after Turkey signed the 
Ankara Agreement. The leaders of Europe such as Valeria d'Estaing who were against Turkish entry at 
the time thought this could be a good catalyst in front of Turkey. Later on Cyprus and then the human 
rights issues were added to this debate. 
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from Turkey. Therefore, so far among a good chunk of people, Turkey-sceptics have 
successfully built an image of Turkey as a threatening ‘other’ that needs to be contained 
and kept away from ‘Europe’. 
Nevertheless, relations were not always thorny between Turkey and EU. When the 
Cold War begun to heat up in the 1950’s, the two sides realised that it was a good idea 
to have closer relationship as both felt threatened by the same enemy, namely the 
communist Soviet Union. Moreover, other engagements, such as Turkey’s decision to 
contribute to the Korean War with a major force and then deciding to join NATO in 
1952, also helped Europe, and especially the USA, to consider that Turkey was no 
longer a threat to Europe but instead was a reliable ally.  
During the Cold War the USA stood as the defender of Western democracy against 
the ‘Communist threat’. Turkey, one of the receivers of funding as part of the Marshall 
Aid program was pushed by the USA to take a more active part in Western European 
affairs. During the heated times of the Cold War, the Soviet threat also pushed Turkey 
to have closer relations with the West. Put simply, Turkey begun to get closer to Europe 
and Europe reciprocated, something that was seen as the mutually beneficial thing to do. 
As a result of the positive perception, the media and the public also supported the 
relationship and the ‘otherness’ was put aside until the Cold War had ended! 
Turkey-EEC relations: 
With the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, Turkey’s 
relationship with Europe took another turn. As can be seen from the aforementioned 
summary, Turkey had been part of European affairs since the early medieval period. It 
had very close relations with European countries before and after World War II Turkey 
first applied for associate membership of the EEC in July 1959, shortly after the its 
creation. The EEC responded by suggesting the establishment of an association as an 
interim measure leading to full accession. This led to negotiations which resulted in the 
signature of the Association Agreement (commonly known as the Ankara Agreement) 
on September 12, 1963. It was the beginning of Turkey’s never ending official 
relationship with the EEC and is considered to have been the first step on the path to full 
membership.11  
                                                          
11 http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations-linksdossier-188294 , retrieved Aug. 29, 
2011. 
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The agreement, which was in force from December 1, 1964, had three stages:12 
 a preparatory stage 
 a transitional stage 
 a final stage13 
 
Although the Association Agreement did not mention democracy, human rights or 
even politics14 during the signature ceremony, the president of the commission, Walter 
Hallstein, strongly suggested that in the future Turkey was going to be a full member of 
the EEC. He said: 
Turkey belongs to Europe. One day the final step will be taken as well. Turkey tied its destiny 
and future to the European Community.15 
 
The Ankara Agreement “determined to establish ever closer bonds between the 
Turkish people and the peoples brought together in the European Economic 
Community”.16 The same agreement also recognized that, 
The support given by the European Economic Community to the efforts of the Turkish people to 
improve their standard of living will facilitate the accession of Turkey to the Community at a 
later date.17 
 
Article 2 of the Association Agreement stated that in order to attain the objectives of 
this agreement, a customs union would be progressively established between the 
European Community and Turkey.18 According to this agreement, the Customs Union 
was to be established within no less than twelve years. The Association Agreement was 
supplemented by an Additional Protocol, which was signed on November 23, 1970, and 
came into force on January 1, 1973, establishing a timetable of technical measures to be 
                                                          
12 Ayse Ceyhan, Avrupa Toplulugu Terimleri Sozlugu, (Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1991), p. 23. 
13 Official Journal of the European Communities, Vol. 16, No. C113/4, Dec. 24, 1973, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf retrieved Dec.16, 2011. 
14 Thomas W. Smith, ‘The Politics of conditionality: the European Union and human rights reform in 
Turkey,  in Paul J. Kubicek (ed.), The European Union and Democratization, (London: Routledge, 2003), 
p. 111. 
15 Michael A. Rupp, AB Mevzuatina Uyumun Ekonomik, Sosyal ve Siyasi Yasama Etkileri: Turkiye’nin 
Avrupa birligine Katilim sureci. (Istanbul: IKV Yayınları, 2001), Vol.1, p.1.  
16 Official Journal of the European Communities, No. C113/4, Dec. 24, 1973, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf  retrieved Aug.29, 2011, 
p.3. 
17 Ibid., p.3. 
18 Ibid., p.5. 
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taken to attain the objective of the customs union within a period of twenty-two years.19 
However, EEC-Turkey relations did not work out well during the 1970s and for most of 
the 1980s due to a variety of reasons, such as military coups and Turkey’s Cyprus 
policy. 
As a result of political and economic crises, the 1970s are considered, like the 1990s, 
to be troubled and “lost” years for Turkey.20 There were student demonstrations and 
deadly clashes between opposition groups, as well as financial crises and weak 
governments bringing chaos and hardship. The army’s intervention in 1971 was 
therefore welcomed by the Turkish public as they expected it to end the chaotic 
atmosphere. It also reinforced the officers’ own sense that they were the guardians of 
the secular republic and that the people were behind them. By the end of the 1970s, 
Süleyman Demirel’s government was in charge, but economic and social hardships 
were rising significantly. However, some bureaucrats such as Turgut Özal were working 
very hard to find the core roots of these problems. 
Turgut Özal and the New Turkey: 
Özal worked in the State Planning Organization (SPO) between 1967 and 1971 for the 
Demirel government. During his time in the SPO, Özal began to think that Turkey 
needed to reorganize its economic structure according to the rules of Western 
economies. In January 1980, a package of economic stability measures known as the 
“January 24 Decisions” was adopted to overcome the worsening problems that had 
emerged in the late 1970s.21 In addition to restoring the Turkish economy, the “January 
24 Decisions” also introduced radical changes in economic modeling and preferences.  
With those decisions, Turkey switched its economic policy from an “import 
substituting industrialization” (ISI) to an “export-led growth strategy” which brought 
about the introduction of liberalization in financial markets and more emphasis on 
foreign trade. These reforms associated with the free market economic ideas of the 
Washington Consensus (WC) that is supported by prominent economists and 
international organisations, such as the IMF, the World Bank, the EU and the US 
                                                          
19 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, 1998, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/turkey_en.pdf , retrieved Aug.5, 2011. 
20 Chris Morris, The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe, (London: Granta Books, 
2005), p.2. 
21 Andrew Mango, The Turks Today, (London: John Murray, 2004), p.79. 
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intended to integrate the Turkish Economy to the world economy through WC.22 Özal 
perhaps looked at the successful examples of export led growth strategies as export 
driven growth has a better track than ISI. For example ISI failed in Latin America in 
1970s while export driven growth has worked very well for the Asian Tigers.23 In this 
context, the import regime was liberalized to a great extent, export-promoting incentives 
were initiated, and supply and demand systems in foreign exchange markets were put 
into practice.24 Thus the Turkish lira became a convertible currency and it was allowed 
to float in a controlled monetary environment. Previously, a Turkish citizen could be 
arrested if he/she carried foreign currency. Now people could open dollar accounts at 
home or abroad.25  
Since Turkey was restructuring its economy according to Western models, joining 
the EEC was seen as favorable. In Turkey it was considered that this would stimulate 
economic growth. Again it was largely seen as a win economically for both as the EEC 
was keen to get cheaper Turkish exports while Turkey wanted to move towards a 
producing and exporting economy. 
Nevertheless, before these decisions gave any fruition, the coup d'état of September 
12, 1980, took place. The high command of the armed forces suspended the 
constitution, dissolved the parliament and all political parties and substituted itself as 
the government.26 All political leaders were imprisoned and later on banned from active 
politics. As a result, the EEC first decided to curtail and then in 1982 to completely 
freeze relations with Turkey. The EEC expected the army to respect human rights, treat 
political prisoners well and transfer power to the civilians as soon as possible. Relations 
were gradually normalized after the restoration of a civilian government in 1983. 
The National Security Council (NSC) headed by Kenan Evren declared at the time 
that the goals of the military intervention were to stop the fighting “between brothers”27 
to prevent a  possible civil war, guard the secular republic and re-establish the state’s 
                                                          
22 Rana Eskinat, ‘Application of post-Washington Consensus policies in Turkey’ 
http://www.asecu.gr/files/10th_conf_files/eskinat.pdf retrieved July 29, 2015. 
23 John SL McCombie, ‘Criticism and Defences of the Balance of Payments Constraint Growth Model: 
some old some new,’ in Elias Soukiazis and Pedro André Cerqueira, (ed.),  Models of Balance of 
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24 Brief Historical Background for the Turkish Economy, Business Guide to Turkey, Foreign Economic 
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retrieved Aug. 29, 2011. 
25 Mango, ibid., 
26 Ibid., p.80. 
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lost authority.28 About a week after the military intervention, on September 20, 1980, a 
new government was formed and Özal was chosen as minister of the economy as well 
as the deputy prime minister.29 This was a clear sign that the army was also happy with 
the new model of market economy. Evren toured the country to justify his intervention 
in politics. In his speech in Izmit on November 2, 1982, he also clarified that his 
intervention had stopped a possible Marxist and Leninist takeover of the country. In 
Izmit while praising Western democracy, he strongly denounced Communist regimes.30 
In his other speeches Evren clearly stated that Turkey would continue with the grand 
ambition of westernization during his time while promising to transfer the power to 
civilian authority as soon as calm was established. 
Finally, when the army chiefs felt confident that whichever political party they 
supported would win the elections, the election date was announced for November 6, 
1983. However political parties supported by the military regime could not gain much 
support. Conversely, the newly established Motherland Party (MP [Tr:. Anavatan Partisi 
or ANAP) of Özal, which had a conservative program and contained many politicians 
with different political backgrounds, won the election with an overwhelming majority.  
However, the army’s control over the civilian authority, human rights violations and 
Greece’s fearsome opposition to Turkey’s membership delayed the progress towards 
EEC accession. Relations between Turkey and the EEC were progressively normalized 
by 1986, after the MP scored a win in the 1983 general elections. Distancing itself from 
Turkey during military rule, the EEC clearly signaled that it did not want the army to be 
the modernizing power in Turkey. The decision to restart relations with Turkey in 1986 
also clarified that the EEC had nothing against Turkey or the Turkish people but that the 
way Turkey was run needed to meet European standards in order for the relations to 
continue as normal.  
Under Özal’s leadership, Turkey was applying for full membership. Nevertheless, 
West Germany opposed removing restrictions on labor movement which was, according 
to former agreements, supposed to be given to the Turks in 1986. Greece was also 
blocking any rapprochement between Turkey and the EEC, especially regarding 
bureaucratic meetings that were planned to discuss Turkey’s relationship with Cyprus. 
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On the other hand, the accession of Portugal and Spain to the EEC encouraged 
Turkey to carry on with the reforms required by the EEC. Finally, on September 16, 
1986, the EEC-Turkey Joint Committee met and reactivated the process of the relations 
which had been almost completely frozen since September 12, 1980. 
After that, Turkey hastened its reform programs and organized a mass campaign both 
within and outside the country to prepare Turkey to apply for full membership. 
However, leaders of European countries such as Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher 
were warning Turkey not to rush its application. They were (Germany especially) 
worried about the freedom of labor and a mass migration of workers from Turkey to 
their countries. Of course political bans on former politicians and human rights 
violations were also commonly mentioned in their rhetoric. On the other hand Özal, 
who strongly argued that Turkey had always been part of Europe because European 
civilization was born on its territory31 (referring to the ancient Anatolian civilizations), 
was determined to make the application while Leo Tindemans (Belgian’s foreign 
minister) was the president of the EEC’s Council of Ministers, as he was known to be 
rather friendly towards Turkey. Disregarding the advice of the German Chancellor Kohl 
that neither Turkey nor Europe was ready,32 on April 14, 1987, Ali Bozer, Turkey’s 
minister in charge of relations with the EEC officially handed Tindemans Turkey’s 
request for membership in the ECC, under article 237 of the Treaty of Rome33 rather 
than according to the Ankara Agreement.34 The decision was taken despite objections 
from the Greek government, with Tindemans insisting that the Treaty of Rome required 
the twelve EEC countries to refer every new application to the commission for study.35 
Özal was proven right about the Belgian minister. Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent 
Turkish journalist, thanked the Belgian foreign minister in his column by stating, “We 
should thank Tindamans for the EEC’s decision.”36 
Although the political leadership in Turkey knew that they were not ready for the 
application they were making, Özal realised that the end of the Cold War meant a lot for 
Turkey. Since the end of World War II and especially with the Truman Doctrine in 
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1947, Turkey was part of the Western alliance acting as a buffer state between the 
United States’ interests and those of the Soviets.37 The US kept some of its nuclear 
missiles on its base at Incirlik, Southern Turkey. Turkey was also allowed to join 
NATO – the only Muslim nation during the Cold War – due to its contributions to the 
Korean War on the side of the US and the United Nations (UN). For all of these 
reasons, Turkey became an important ally to the West. However, by the second half of 
the 1980s it was very clear that the US was winning the Cold War and the Soviet Union 
was about to collapse. Perhaps Özal thought that the importance of Turkey for the West 
would reduce with the end of the Cold War as the West would no longer need a buffer 
state. He wanted Turkey to apply for EEC membership before the superpower rivalry 
ended so some distance would be covered towards becoming a member. He was not 
proven wrong with his predictions about the end of the Cold War as it ended with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.38 However, what he did not predict was that the 
US would need Turkey in other ways, such as to reach Central Asia’s energy resources 
and, most importantly, he did not anticipate the scale that international terrorism would 
reach by 2001, a development that would secure Turkey’s key place among Western 
powers. 
As pointed out earlier, the accession process was used by Özal for a political purpose 
rather than to reach the accession goal itself. His aims included repositioning Turkey at 
the end of the Cold War by utilizing its strategic location, speeding economic 
liberalization reforms and creating an export led economy. This could only be achieved 
if Turkey stayed close to EEC. He knew very well that the Turkish application would be 
rejected but he also knew that it was better to make it clear that Turkey wanted to stay 
within the Western alliance system. It was purely a strategic choice.   
On April 27, 1987, in Luxembourg, the foreign ministers of the twelve EEC 
countries agreed to refer Turkey’s application for EEC membership to the commission 
for a protracted study of the problems involved. This reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility, 
given that the EEC had turned down a similar application by Morocco on the grounds 
that Morocco was not a European country.39 This was a clear indication that the EEC 
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was officially recognizing Turkey within European geographical borders. However, the 
commission was not convinced. After taking two years to examine the Turkish 
application, it adopted its opinion on December 18, 1989, and the council accepted it on 
February 5, 1990. It concluded that, “Even though Turkey has legitimate reasons to 
become a member, at the present time, Turkey and the community cannot be easily 
integrated.”40 The commission gave both economic and political reasons. It also noted 
“the negative effects” of the dispute between Greece and Turkey and “the situation in 
Cyprus.”41 However, it promised to reassess the Turkish application for full 
membership in the future by stating: 
The opinion states that the Commission does believe, however, that the Community should 
pursue its cooperation with Turkey, given that country’s general opening towards Europe. The 
Commission also considered that the Community has a fundamental interest in intensifying its 
relations with Turkey and helping it to complete as soon as possible the process of political and 
economic modernization.42 
 
Özal was disappointed but not surprised. As it put off Turkey’s accession to an 
indefinite future date, Europe had at least recognized that Turkey was eligible for 
membership. Özal’s finance minister, Adnan Kahveci, on the other hand, analyzed the 
result differently when he spoke to Andrew Mango, by stating that: 
The reason we applied for membership was to attract foreign investors who would be more 
likely to come to Turkey if they believed that we abided by European business rules and 
practices.43  
 
On February 5, 1990, the Council adopted the general content of the commission 
opinion and asked it to make detailed proposals developing the ideas expressed in the 
opinion on the need to strengthen EEC-Turkey relations.44 
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Turkey-EEC relations after 1990: 
On June 7, 1990, the Commission adopted a set of proposals called “the Matutes 
Package.”45 The package was purely designed to contribute to the modernization of 
Turkey’s economy and to allow Turkey to move as close to the community as possible. 
Following this, the Association Council meeting in November 1993 agreed on the 
completion of the Customs Union by 1995.46 It also included the resumption and 
intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological 
cooperation and the strengthening of political and cultural ties. This package was not 
approved by the Council.47 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many people thought Turkey would lose 
its significant geostrategic position for the West. However, the energy resources of the 
newly independent Turkic states of Central Asia assured Turkey that it would remain an 
important country for the Western world – especially for the US. Even though many 
people complained that Turkey would be the “Trojan Horse” for American policies in 
Central Asia and perhaps, in the future, in the EU as well, Turkey did become one of the 
most important actors in the region.48 With clever steering by Özal, the end of the Cold 
War did not push Turkey aside but rather positively affected relations and brought it 
closer to Europe. 
Furthermore, the worry about Turkey’s declining importance for the West after the 
Cold War was lessened with the Turkish involvement in the first Gulf War against 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, where Turkey actively participated in liberating Kuwait from 
the Iraqi invasion. The end of the Gulf War did hurt the Turkish economy severely, but 
allowed Turkey to ask for American support for the policies it pursued in Central Asia 
and in Europe. As a result, the BTC, one of the greatest political and engineering 
achievements for Turkey in the 20th century, received full American support.49 As 
explained in Chapter five, Turkey now uses the successful case of BTC as a model 
when it pursues its grand aim of being an energy corridor for the West transporting the 
eastern hydrocarbon resources via a network of pipelines. 
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On the other hand, Turkish domestic politics did not vary much from those of the 
1980s. For decades, elite of “White Turks”50 were indisputably in charge of politics, 
business and, in particular, the military. And throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, 
as global forces began to change the lives of ordinary people beyond recognition, the 
“system” remained resolutely the same.51 Özal, who was trying to change the way 
Turkey functioned, from politics to economics and from social life to the army’s 
position, died unexpectedly and one could say suspiciously, on April 17, 1993. 52 
The heavy presence of the military in civil politics in Turkey worried the EU far 
more than anything else, as it was definitely against the values and norms of Western 
democracy. However, the military’s position in Turkish politics is complicated. 
Moreover, its direct interference in civilian life on three occasions is very different from 
other examples of similar situations in Europe such as those in Greece, Italy and Spain. 
The major difference is that the army in Turkey is considered a “secular” nationalist 
body with left wing tendencies rather than just nationalist right wing. It also sees itself 
as the guardian of the secular republic, and whenever secularism is threatened it feels 
the responsibility to protect it.53 
Nevertheless, this attitude is contradictory to the EU’s understanding of democratic 
values and norms. Therefore, although the EU wants Turkey to be a secular and modern 
state, it does not want Turkey to be modernized through the hands of the military. But 
the current European norm here is that armed forces are unambiguously subordinate to 
the lawfully elected government-in-office and the armed forces’ leadership has no voice 
in public affairs beyond its professional domain.54 
As mentioned above, the army’s presence in Turkish politics was substantial and it 
did not satisfy the conditions set out by the Copenhagen Criteria. Again, Turkey’s 
economy was weakening and Kurdish separatism – at times manifesting in terrorist 
attacks – grew in size and scale, with the army’s response resulting in major human 
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rights violations that had to be resolved. As a result, practically the EU and Turkey 
could not have closer relations in the first half of the 1990s.  
However puzzling the domestic politics in Turkey were, the Customs Union, which 
was one of the main goals of the 1963 Association Agreement, was finally established 
with the Turkey-EU Association Council Decision 1/95 of March 6, 1995.55 
On March 4, 1998, following the request of the Luxembourg European Council, the 
European Commission adopted its Communication on a European Strategy for Turkey. 
The main elements of the pre-accession strategy for Turkey included the approximation 
of legislation and the adoption of the acquis. The Communication also contained initial 
operational proposals for implementing the strategy. The strategy was welcomed by the 
Cardiff European Council, which was held on June 15 and 16, 1998, where it was felt 
that the Communication, “taken as a package ... provides the platform for developing 
our relationship on a sound and evolutionary basis.” 56 
The Cardiff European Council of 1998 welcomed the commission’s confirmation 
that it would submit its first regular reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession at 
the end of 1998. “The Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,” published in 
November 1998, followed the same methodology as that used for the opinions on the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs).57 
Finally, the groundbreaking event for Turkey-EU relations took place during the 
Helsinki summit in December 1999. There, the European Council gave Turkey the 
status of candidate country for EU membership, following the commission’s 
recommendation in its second Regular Report on Turkey. This was a major achievement 
for Turkey as it had been rejected as a candidate country in the 1997 Luxemburg 
summit. However, many political analysts insist that this progress would never have 
occurred if it were not for US support for Turkey. 
Even though the US backing was perceived as a cunning American policy to use 
Turkey to reach the former Soviet Republic’s rich energy resources, the US’s genuine 
support for Turkish candidacy cannot be underestimated. On a personal level, President 
Clinton’s visit to Turkey and Greece after major successive earthquakes hit both 
countries in the summer of 1999 showed Western solidarity with Turkey. 
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Both Greece and Turkey, forgetting the ongoing political crisis between them, rushed 
to help each other with sincerity which led to significant improvement in Turkish-Greek 
relations. The so called “Earthquake diplomacy” calmed tensions between the two, who 
were on the brink of a war on many occasions such as in 1987, 1995–96 and again in 
1998. Consequently, Greece lifted its policy of vetoing any real approachment between 
Turkey and EU. This momentous change in Greek attitude towards Turkey led to the 
above mentioned Helsinki decisions that paved the way for the formal accession 
negotiations to be started with Turkey in October 2005. Therefore, 1999 can be 
identified as a watershed year in Turkey-EU relations as it signaled for the new 
millennium to start with a “real” and conceivable hope for Turkey to become a full 
member of the EU. 
Turkey-EU relations after the 2000s: 
The years between 2000 and 2012 have been seen by many scholars as 
transformative years in Turkey’s history in terms of political, economic and social 
developments. In the 2000s, the push for EU membership strengthened. As a result, 
reform packages were passed one after another, trying to bring Turkey ever closer to EU 
norms and regulations by enforcing democratization in almost every aspect of life. For 
example, capital punishment was abolished even though the majority of Turkey’s public 
was in favor of it and, most importantly, the military’s presence in politics was lessened 
and religiously rooted parties changed their rhetoric towards the EU. This boosted 
Turkey’s involvement in international affairs especially concerning energy issues. 
While democratisation was taking place, economically speaking Turkey was also 
doing much better than most other countries in the world; it moved from being the 
twenty-sixth largest economy in the world to number sixteen by 2011.58 It also started 
utilizing its geostrategic positioning by trying to become and energy corridor between 
the energy producers of the east and the consumers of the west with the aim of finally 
becoming an influential energy hub. Additionally, politically speaking Turkey’s sphere 
of influence expanded significantly as it started pursuing multidimensional and 
independent –of western dominated- international policies by forming good bilateral 
relations with other influential regional and global powers like Iran, China and Russia. 
                                                          
58 Mustafa Koc, ‘Food Banking in Turkey: Conservative Politics in a Neo-Liberal State,’ in Graham 
Riches and Tiina Silvasti (ed.), First World Hunger Revisited: Food Charity Or the Right to Food?, 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, Second edition, 2014), p.154 
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Nonetheless, it started acting like an appropriate regional power which dedicated itself 
to safer international trade, human rights, peace and democratization. 
When Erdoğan’s moderate Islamic JDP came to power in 2002, progress towards 
Europeanization gained further momentum in Turkey. Some experts perceive the JDP 
as a new force that is trying to take over the role of the army as the sole secular-
modernizing power. They thought of the JDP as doing this in order to get rid of the 
military’s traditionally heavy presence in Turkish politics so that they could pursue their 
own agenda. These analysts do not think that the JDP is trying to modernize Turkey to 
get into the EU; they believe that the party is using EU support to keep the generals 
quiet while secretly working towards the Islamization of Turkey. Most secular 
republicans share this distrust.59  
However, others see the JDP as the only political party after Özal’s MP that truly 
wanted to modernize Turkey in line with EU standards. They claim that it is impossible 
to bring democracy to a country when the military is considered superior to civilians. 
These writers also claim that Turkey’s good relations with the Eastern world do not 
mean that Turkey is becoming an “Islamist country”. They argue that it is becoming a 
regional power and every regional power pursues multi-dimensional politics.60 What 
made the JDP controversial was the fact that a few years before forming the JDP, 
leaders from this party were completely against Turkey joining the EU, calling it a 
Christian Club. They also did not believe that the EU would ever accept Turkey as a full 
member. 
As mentioned above, under the JDP, Turkey-EU relations developed much faster 
than anyone could have anticipated. The commission reported that Turkey had 
successfully fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria and therefore should be given the go-
ahead with negotiations. This was a major breakthrough after the 1999 Helsinki Council 
which recognized Turkey as an EU candidate country on an equal footing with other 
candidate countries. 
Following the recommendations of the European Commission, EU leaders agreed on 
December 16, 2004, to start accession negotiations with Turkey from the October 3, 
2005.61 On December 17, 2004, the European Council defined the conditions for the 
                                                          
59 Secular writers and columnists including Ilhan Selcuk, Erol Manisali, Murathan Mungan and Ümit 
Zileli 
60 Ahmet Davutoğlu , Stratjik Derinlik, Turkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 41st 
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opening of accession negotiations with Turkey after long discussions. This decision led 
to a major debate to take place across European political spectrums.  
The Austrian People’s Party claimed that Turkey would cost as much as “the recent 
accession of all ten new members and [that] someone needs to explain this to our 
citizens.”62 Then the German Christian Democratic Union offered only “privileged 
partnership status”, something which was obviously less than full membership. Despite 
all of these negative developments, EU accession negotiations –which are conducted 
over thirty-five chapters – continued and were officially launched on the October 20, 
2005. This began a process of analytical examination of EU legislation (the so-called 
screening process). The screening process, which is the first phase of the accession 
negotiations, was completed on October 13, 2006. During this process, sixty-six Turkish 
delegations held explanatory and bilateral meetings with European Commission 
officials in Brussels. At the explanatory screening meetings, the European Commission 
briefed Turkish delegations on the EU acquis for each chapter and at the bilateral 
screening; Turkish delegations explained Turkey’s level of alignment with the relevant 
acquis under each chapter. Thus, by comparing the EU acquis with Turkish legislation, 
the level that Turkey reached concerning the adoption, enforcement and effective 
implementation of the above-mentioned acquis was identified.63 
Although everybody was fascinated with how fast relations between Turkey and the 
EU had progressed during the first six years of the new millennium, the same cannot be 
said at the time of completion of this research as relations have almost entirely frozen 
for a variety of reasons. These reasons include weakening support for the EU in Turkey 
and anti-Turkish sentiments in Europe. 
Hence, since the 1950’s there have been different phases in Turkey-EU relations. 
There may have been increasing disillusionment with the EU but also some positive 
political and economic consequences that have come about as a result of this. Although 
historical legacies play a great part and the support for Turkey’s EU membership has 
fallen both in Europe and in Turkey, when one mentions noteworthy developments 
inside Turkey during the last two decades, one cannot underestimate the significance of 
the EU’s role.  
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A major change in the identity of the religious political parties was one of the key 
impacts relations with the EU had on Turkey. Once fearsome anti-EU political leaders – 
including Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül – realized that being anti-Western was the main 
reason why the army had always stopped them getting very far in Turkey’s political 
system. These leaders also realized the value of Western democracies when it comes to 
freedom of thought and speech. Their survival within Turkish politics was only possible 
within a state which adopted Western style democracy which the army claimed to be the 
guardian of. As a result of this realization and change in strategy, the JDP finally came 
to power in 2002. 
Removal of the army’s presence from civilian politics was another direct impact of 
the EU on Turkey. Keeping the army under civilian rule was not possible without the 
civilian government taking total control of the Westernization process in Turkey. This 
was only possible by adopting a very pro-EU stance. When it came to power, and with a 
westernized outlook, the JDP would go on to adopt an even more modern and European 
outlook than the army. This was a clever move designed to take away one of the 
military’s main tools which allowed it to interfere in politics. The JDP subdued the 
army by introducing one EU reform package after another. Finally, in 2007, it had 
become clear that the army was now mainly in the hands of the civilian government, 
perhaps for the first time since the foundation of the Republic in 1923.  
Giving Turkey confidence and credibility in its surrounding regions which allowed it 
to become an energy bridge and perhaps an energy hub was another impact the EU had 
on Turkey. By getting closer to the EU and further earning the trust of the West, Turkey 
adopted an active policy of becoming an important actor in energy politics which sought 
to link the energy rich East and the energy hungry West. Utilizing its geostrategic 
positioning, especially after several Ukraine-Russia gas crises which are explained in 
chapter 5 in detail, where Europe felt vulnerable to Russia’s control over its energy 
needs, become one of the most important foreign and domestic policy agendas for 
Turkey. Using its closeness to the EU and the Western markets, Turkish politicians 
successfully secured major energy deals with Azerbaijan, Iraqi Kurdistan and other 
Middle Eastern countries. Construction of major oil and gas pipelines such as the BTC 
and Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) were also begun. Thanks to EU support, Turkey 
– which does not possess enough energy resources to fuel its own domestic needs – is 
now on the way to becoming one of the most important countries in global energy 
politics. 
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Improvements to its human rights record, noteworthy developments in education, 
progress in transportation and technology, increase in trade, tourism and agriculture, 
and increasing income from exports will also be remembered as major positive aspects 
of Turkey’s relations with the EU. However, these aspects will not be studied in much 
detail in order to keep the focus of the thesis on the three aspects as mentioned 
previously.  
It is apparent that the multifaceted debates and arguments surrounding Turkey-EU 
relations will continue until the day membership is – if ever –granted to Turkey. Thus, 
the literature related to this long-lasting process is as complex as the relationship itself. 
The biggest handicap of the literature is that it focuses on well-known subjects and 
arguments, identifies the problems repetitively but offers limited or no solutions. 
Furthermore, the progressive manner of the relationship is underrated as it has been 
considered mostly in terms of a cost-benefit relationship. Moreover, the impact of 
historical memories on current affairs, something which this thesis pays much attention 
to, have also been neglected and not considered important enough by the literature. 
Hence these are the areas identified as gaps in research. This thesis attempts to fill in at 
least some of the gaps.  
The literature in this study is divided into three schools of thought. These are studies 
that are either generally against, in favor, or balanced in their views regarding Turkey-
EU relations. This chapter positions the thesis among the available literature before 
moving on to the methodology section.  
As well as the literature, the theoretical framework for this relationship is also 
composite. In the second chapter the methodological framework of the research is 
explained. In this section, theories of external agency impact on domestic changes are 
evaluated. Following this, the methods used during the research process will be 
elucidated. The third chapter analyses the impact of the EU on the normalization of the 
military’s role in Turkey. 
In the third chapter, the impact of EU on changing the role of Turkey’s military from 
the 1990’s and 2000’s will be evaluated in depth. This chapter will first analyze and 
evaluate the underlying causes of the military’s intervention into politics. After this, 
each military intervention since 1960 will be explained briefly. After understanding 
where the army stood in Turkish politics, the chapter will then evaluate the impact of 
Turkey-EU relations on the role of the army in civilian politics, especially during the 
new millennium when the EU negotiation process began to gather momentum. The 
35 
 
thesis will then move on to the fourth chapter, where the change in the identity of 
religious political groups due to the impact of the EU will be examined in detail. 
The fourth third chapter aims to explain the impact of Turkey's relations with the EU 
on the ideological evolution of the religious political parties and leaders in Turkey and 
the changes in their identity. Firstly, it will look at the history of these groups and 
analyse their rhetoric towards issues of Westernization throughout the history of the 
modern Republic. It will also briefly touch upon the place of religion in the EU. Next, 
the chapter will focus on explaining the change in the ideology and identity of the major 
religious parties due to the process known as Europeanization64. Here the underlying 
causes of the changes and the impact of the EU, especially during the 1990’s and the 
2000’s, will be assessed.  
The fifth chapter, which can be considered as the economic outcome of the 
developments explained in chapter three and four, will look at the impact of the EU on 
Turkey’s aim to become an energy corridor between the East and the West, and its 
impact on Turkey-EU relations more broadly. It will briefly explain the energy politics 
of the Eurasian continent while elucidating the energy problems faced by the EU and 
Turkey’s possible contribution towards solving these issues. In this respect, Turkey’s 
strategy of using energy as a political tool by connecting Europe with energy rich 
regions such as the Caspian and the Middle East through pipelines that cross its territory 
will be examined in detail. While focusing on the proposed TANAP (or smaller 
Nabucco) which will bring natural gas from the east to European markets, this thesis 
will use the already running BTC as a case study to explain the political power of such 
pipelines. 
The sixth chapter is dedicated to the overall conclusions of the thesis, where the work 
will refer back to the research question and the hypothesis. The overall and undeniable 
impact of the EU on Turkey’s domestic issues, from reforming religious political 
groups, the military’s role in politics and the energy politics, will also be accounted for. 
This thesis proposes that Turkey-EU relations should not be considered as merely an 
“accession process”, but must be evaluated from different angles as both Turkey and the 
EU have different strategic goals and, accordingly, they want different things from each 
other. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review and methodology 
Literature review 
It is not hard to find sufficient accounts written about Turkey-EU relations because 
of the span and the topicality of this affair. However majority of the work produced on 
this topic does not look in to the impact of this relation on Turkey’s domestic evolution 
and they do not seem to acknowledge the importance of global economics and its 
actors65 on this relation to a greater extent as they tend to focus mostly on the accession 
related issues. This was something the thesis identified as an issue and a gap in the 
literature. By offering a discussion of the role of external actors in the transformation of 
domestic political dynamics and linking three important issues under examination to 
one another, this thesis tries to fill at least some of the gap identified in the literature.  
As mentioned before, due do international and domestic social, economic and 
political demand, religious parties in Turkey underwent an ideological change to be able 
to bypass the intimidation of the military. When the army’s chief instrument, ‘the 
Westerniser force’, was taken away from its hands, by using the EU candidacy as a tool, 
civilian politics started playing more proactive role within the global economics by 
offering to become an energy bridge between the East and the West. Thanks to EU 
membership aspects and the reform process that took place especially after 1999, 
increasingly more confident civilian authority wanted to utilize the power and influence 
of economic tools in foreign policy which is considered as one of the key dimensions of 
IPE.66 
Due to the immensity of information available for researchers, it is vitally important 
to conduct a critical evaluation of such information in order to find answer to the 
hypothesis and the research question posed above, as well as to be able to come to a 
logical conclusion. Therefore, this thesis used a variety of different resources from 
Europe and Turkey to create the sense of balance in its analyses of the relationship 
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Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD)   in Turkish: Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları 
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between Turkey and EU. Mainly sources written and spoken in English and Turkish are 
employed while conducting the research, as well as translations of some other resources 
from different languages.  
During the research phase, numerous books, journals, internet resources and 
newspapers were consulted. This included consulting the major libraries containing 
nearly all the books and journals published on this relationship and the key universities 
with access to journals that have many articles related to Turkey-EU relations. Most of 
the newspapers consulted also have an online version that helps to ease the research 
process. Overall, research suggests that the English language works are largely skewed 
towards a type of Turkey-scepticism, while the Turkish language works largely favour 
entry into the EU.   
As mentioned above Turkey-EU relations generally evaluated from the accession 
angle and the interaction between EU and Turkey were not particularly analysed in 
terms of three important factors such as interests, institutions, and information, but they 
rather focused on benefit cost calculations of the relationship. This is another thing the 
thesis realised was an issue in the literature. Frieden and Martin noted that:  
The interests of economic and political actors are a driving force behind economic (and political) 
policy decisions. How interests are translated into outcomes depends on the strategic 
environment, especially institutions and information. Interests are aggregated through 
institutions, which also delegate responsibility for decision making to particular actors. The 
structure of the information similarly influences bargaining and policy choice.67  
 
In Turkey-EU relations all three of these factors are important as key domestic 
institutions in Turkey such as the army, the ruling parties in government, religious 
organisations and economic corporations affect the way the EU and the international 
information available about the EU is presented to Turkish people and vice versa. This 
thesis tries to avoid aforementioned way of studying Turkey-EU relations due to the fact 
that it believes that this relation is something more than membership negotiations.   
After a careful evaluation, the thesis identified that the existing literature on Turkey-
EU relations focuses on a series of relatively narrow, yet well-established debates that 
can be grouped under three different prominent schools of thoughts. These are: 
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1- Studies against Turkey’s entry into the EU: This group does not see Turkey as 
“European” in terms of religion, history, culture, society, with its huge population 
and underdeveloped democracy. This threatens to derail the EU and, therefore, 
Turkey should not be allowed in.68 The EU will never accept Turkey as a full 
member as it is a “Christian club”. Moreover, historically speaking, Europeans 
wanted to throw Turkey out of Europe. Another group of scholars - though from 
a different perspective - also argue that by enforcing new rules and regulations on 
Turkey, the EU, that has a secret agenda, aims to ethnically divide Turkey69 
2- Studies in favor of Turkey’s entry into the EU: To them, Turkey can offer great 
benefits to the EU, including a secure energy supply and a young workforce. By 
allowing Turkey in, the EU will have a new and inclusive image. Turkey has also 
been part of European affairs for many centuries and a reliable partner of the 
West since World War II, and therefore, Turkey must be allowed in.70  
3- Studies that have a balanced view towards Turkey’s entry into the EU: Here, 
there are both benefits and problems connected to the possible Turkish entry. 
They must both be appreciated equally. If Turkey can fulfill the criteria of 
membership, it will surely be allowed to join the EU. However, the EU must 
ensure that it approaches Turkey in the same way as it approached previous 
candidates. Close relationship between Turkey and EU will boost Turkey’s 
international image and therefore allow it to economically prosper which in 
return is good for EU trade and energy security. 71 
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Images and Memories, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), pp. 15-33. 
70 William Chislett, ‘Socio Economic Arguments for and Against Turkey’s EU Membership,’ in 
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71 Karlsson, ibid., pp.2-3. 
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Although these debates are well established and there is enough literature to support 
each one of them, when analyzing these work some noticeable issues have become 
clearer. These include: long established cultural prejudices, over emphasizing 
controversial subjects, involvement of sponsors with biased political agenda, influence 
of public figures and leaders, sole use of official documents or use of sources from one 
side and subordinating certain topics.  
It is very clear that academia, journalists, popular public figures, leaders and policy 
makers dominate these discussions and that the arguments are skewed in a particular 
direction, serving as a tool in altering public opinion and constructing alternative 
perspectives. The current literature therefore has a major dosage of prejudice, as many 
works are produced solely for the purpose of fulfilling a prior, set agenda or producing 
profit for their companies (especially in the energy sector). As the relationship between 
Turkey and the EU is very delicate, often biased work plays an important part in 
representing this relationship. 
However, it should be noted that there is also a major cluster of literature that is 
produced out of joint ventures of academics with more balanced views about the 
relationship between Turkey and the EU. Additionally, the work of some renowned 
academics, journalists and other interested parties that take inspiration from a variety of 
different resources produced both in Turkey and in Europe is also utilized by this thesis. 
The aforementioned three schools of thoughts will be explained in detail below.  
 
School of thought against the Turkish entry to the EU 
As Turkish entry into the EU generated a heated debate, most writers located 
themselves among one of the school of thought mentioned above. However, it is not 
difficult to identify that the majority of the work published align themselves with the 
cluster that is against Turkish accession into the EU. The supporters of this group, both 
in Turkey and in Europe, are against Turkey’s entry for a number of different reasons 
that span social, political and economic concerns. In Europe, the first school of thought 
that accounts for the majority of the works available, is against Turkey’s entry due to 
problems it perceives this relationship would create for the EU. The literature that falls 
into this category tends to consider the costs and benefits of accession, as well as 
possible Turkish migration into EU countries, lack of real democracy in Turkey, 
underdeveloped economy and Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population. This is 
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because of the argument that there would be a flood of immigration from Turkey if it 
joined the EU, something which is accentuated by fact that more than five million 
ethnic Turks already leaving in Europe.72 In their conclusions, the costs of Turkish entry 
overweight the benefits for the EU in general. This tendency also focuses on other well-
established debates which centre on Turkey’s human rights record, as well as the 
Cyprus issues and which generally sees Turkey as a Muslim country with an 
underdeveloped democracy that is not fit for the EU.  
Focusing exclusively on these common subjects perhaps creates the illusion that 
there are no other subjects or ways to approach Turkey-EU relations. The supporters of 
this perspective tend to not realize the importance of other issues, such as energy 
concerns, as they state that Turkey should not be offered full membership in the EU due 
to a variety of different reasons mentioned above, but instead be offered a “privileged 
partnership”. As one of the fiercest supporters of this school, Paul J. Welfens states: 
Think neighbor instead of family. With the expected Turkish immigrants, by 2050 the share of 
the Turkish population in Germany will reach 10 % in the long run. If Turkey is admitted in to 
the EU this would undermine political and economic stability in Germany. Again, Turkish 
membership in the EU will be a plain invitation for all manifestations of radical fundamentalism 
to move towards the Bosporus and from there to Western Europe.73 
 
This school sees Turkish entry into EU as and economic disaster for the EU 28, 
believing that Turkey could absorb about one-half of all agricultural funds and one-third 
of the structural funds under current rules. To them, bringing Turkey in line with EU 
standards is beyond the absorption capacity of the EU. They further claim that:  
The country’s economy is too far below European standards to integrate comfortably with 
other members. 74 
 
Moreover, Turkey’s geographical positioning is also a worry for this group, as they 
believe that Turkey is not “in Europe”. The idea of Turkey not being European is 
promoted in different platforms. For example, another strong supporter of this school is 
Tom Spencer, a Turkey-sceptic, former Conservative politician and Member of the 
European Parliament for Surrey West, writes that: 
                                                          
72 Refik Erzan and Kemal Kiririsci, Turkish Immigrants in the European Union: Determinants of 
Immigration and Integration,  (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp.1-9 
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Turkey is not in Europe. The Treaty specifies that only European countries can be admitted. 
Therefore, it would be much better to end a generation of diplomatic dishonesty by giving the 
Turks a simple ‘No’ now and starting work on the creative task of how Turkey and Europe 
together can bring security to the regions which they jointly care about. 75 
 
The literature that sees geography as important includes former Dutch EU 
Commissioner Fritz Bolkeshtein and former French President, Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing. The latter is helping to shape the future EU Constitution and a known 
“Turkey-skeptic”. He once argued that, 
Turkey's capital is not in Europe. Ninety-five % of its population lives outside Europe, and it is 
not a European country. Admitting predominantly Muslim Turkey would mark the end of the 
European Union. People who backed Turkey’s accession are the adversaries of the European 
Union.76 
 
Some European leaders who gave themselves specific roles to keep Turkey out of 
Europe include former French President Nicholas Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angele 
Merkel and former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt77 also contributed to the 
development of an anti-Turkish literature in Europe by stating that  
Turkey has no place in Europe its place is in Asia and Turks are not European, they should only 
be offered a privileged membership not a full accession” 78 
 
In fact leaders such as Sarkozy went so far with their anti-Turkish rhetoric79 that they 
openly promoted a referendum on Turkish EU membership. These leaders were not 
convinced of Turkey’s cultural, historical and political compatibility with Europe. As a 
result, much was written promoting the idea of a referendum on Turkey’s accession in 
European countries. This aspect of the impact political leaders have on the literature 
reminds one of E. H. Carr’s statement “individuals in history have roles; in some sense 
the role is more important than the individual.”80 
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In addition to the above, there is also an historical and religious aspect in the 
literature, whereby “the Turks” are identified as a quintessential “other” or “invader”, 
but certainly not “European”. These writers are preoccupied with culturally prejudiced 
claims that Turkey has been, historically speaking, “the enemy of Europe”, with the 
invasion of Cyprus only the most recent manifestation of this; moreover, its unfair 
treatment of Kurds is also mentioned, as is its democratic deficit and overwhelmingly 
Muslim population that possesses, according to this literature, unsophisticated social 
standards when compared to EU criterions. It is clear that the idea of linking the past 
with the present is most prevalent in countries that were once at war with the Ottomans, 
countries such as Austria, Hungary, Malta, Italy (especially the Vatican), Greece and 
Bulgaria. Many in these countries argue that Turkey’s EU membership would be an 
affront to the very cultural base upon which the EU has been constructed.81 This school 
of thought holds that Turks are not European due to the fact that, historically speaking, 
ever since the times of the Seljuk’s and the Ottomans, they have tried to invade “their” 
continent and expand Islam into Europe. They believe that due to this long lasting 
historical enmity the two sides are not compatible. The main problem with this literature 
is that it underestimates the importance of the Turks in the building process of 
“European identity”, as well as Turkish reforms imposed by late Ottoman Sultans and 
then the great reformer, founder of the modern westward looking Turkey (rather than 
one which looked towards the Islamic world), Mustafa Kemal. This literature also paid 
great attention to the lack of democratic progress in Turkey due to military’s heavy 
presence. As mentioned by Tekin, to the French for example; 
the active role Turkish army plays in politics has been widely assessed as the primary reason for 
Turkey’s democratic deficiencies and weak human rights records. In the debates about Turkish 
entry to EU, Turkey is considered as having a highly fragile democracy; under constant pressure 
from its strong, politically active army.82  
 
Therefore they think the Turkish democracy is not complying with European standards. 
However they seem to not acknowledge the fact that the recent reform programmes 
imposed on Turkey by EU has minimised the influence of the army in civilian politics. 
The literature presents Turkish entry into the EU as cause for concern owing largely 
to social and religious issues, is in fact, quite wrong in its portrayal of the identity of 
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Turkey as not “fitting in” the European cultural mould and the idea that Turks will 
eventually try to convert Europe to Islam. For example, as cited by Levin, under the 
shadow of historical memories, Fritz Bolkeshtein expressed his concerns that the 
admission of Turkey would lead to the “Islamization of Europe and thus that the 
deliverance of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain.” 83 
However, this literature forgets the fact that the majority of the people in Turkey also 
do not want Turkey to be radically Islamized. Therefore, Turkish and European seculars 
share the same concerns about radicalisation of Turkey. But rejection from Europe does 
not help the secular people in Turkey to broaden the support they receive. To 
compliment this point Huntington sarcastically writes in his well-known work “Class of 
Civilisations” that: 
Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent 
may be the answer.84 
 
Some reputable scholars also intensify the debate about Turkey’s religious suitability 
for the full EU membership. For example a well-known and highly respected orientalist 
Bernard Lewis, who told the German newspaper Die Welt that “Europe will be Islamic 
by the end of the century”85, observes in his Emergence of Modern Turkey that religious 
freedom in Turkey today may be still less than during Ottoman Empire.86 While 
alarming Europe from a possible Islamisation, Lewis also warns that there is no 
religious freedom in Turkey. In a sense he contradicts with his long standing view 
regarding Modern Turkey.87 
Within the same cluster, it is also not difficult to identify works that are against 
Turkish entry due to the fact that they see Turkey as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for US interests in 
the EU.88 Being part of US led NATO alliance system since 1950s is rather seen as an 
obstacle then a positive aspect for Turkey. Therefore, US support for Turkish policies 
over energy resources and political issues in the region does not add anything positive 
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to Turkish hopes of becoming a member for this school of thought, as they look at the 
US aims regarding the EU with suspicion.    
Moreover it is important to state that although this school is against Turkey’s 
accession to the EU, they do not want to push it too far away so that it forms an alliance 
with the Islamic world. This school would clearly prefer to see Turkey as a modern 
democratic nation outside the EU. To them, if Turkey were to turn its face to the East 
and pursues an Islamic regime, it would create a security gap on Europe’s eastern 
borders. Therefore, their primary concern is not the welfare of Turkey, but the security 
of Europe’s southeast borders. 
Although it occupies less space in the literature there is a good amount of work 
produced in Turkey that falls under this category of being against Turkey’s entry to the 
Union. This group is against EU accession for similar reasons. To them, the EU will 
create problems rather than prosperity for Turkey since it is never really going to allow 
Turkey to become a full member.   
According to this tendency in Turkey, where religion and history plays a great part, 
the EU is seen as a Christian Club who still has this ancient aim of kicking Turkey out 
of Europe. To them, the ultimate goal of EU is to split Turkey into sectarian and 
ethnically based units to make it weaker. Turkish accounts consider that this ambition 
was established among the ruling classes of European heads since medieval times.89 
The majority of religious writers also fall under this Eurosceptic category in Turkey 
as they think that Turkey should align itself with the Islamic world, rather than with 
Europe. They argue that ‘Europe has been the enemy of the Muslims ever since the time 
of the Crusades and in fact recent developments in the Middle East, Iraq and 
Afghanistan show that this war continues’. To them, the aim of EU is to cut the 
historical link Turkey has with the Muslim world. They also see EU as a “Jewish 
Masonic organisation” that aims to destroy Islam and therefore Turkey.90  
This group also argues that the issues between Turkey and EU can be seen as 
historically inherited. They think that while prejudice plays a great role, the historical 
and psychological background clashes with the reality of EU-Turkey relations: 
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Anytime there is an opportunity the European leaders and intellectuals talk about 
internationalism and pluralism. However, when it comes to Turkey they start bringing up the 
identity and Christian foundations of Europe.91 
 
Moreover, some of the writers in this school of thought in Turkey argue that the EU 
has a secret agenda when it pushes for more reforms in Turkey. According to them, the 
ultimate aim is the destruction of Turkey by enforcing non-compatible rules and 
regulations on the country. As one prominent Eurosceptic, Professor Erol Manisali,, a 
writer and journalist, writes: 
People are put to sleep in Turkey while the EU is exercising its civil invasion through the 
Islamist fundamentalist government we currently have. They will be keeping Turkey in the 
waiting lounge perpetually to turn her into a new Yugoslavia.92 
 
Another argument within this cluster is that the EU has over expanded in a very short 
period of time. Therefore, it has not got the economic, political and social capacity to 
absorb yet another big country like Turkey. Ortayli, a prominent historian and a public 
figure in Turkey argues along the same line when he says: 
[The] EU is portrayed badly in Turkey. People are made to think Turkey’s problems will be over 
when it joins the union. That is not true. It is awkward to expect the EU to solve Turkey’s 
internal and external problems. It has grown too much and too fast. It is not as strong as USA 
and Turkey will not be destroyed if we stay out of it. We need to think a lot before approaching 
this entity that cannot even guarantee its existence for another next twenty year.93 
  
Overall, we can say that in this school of thought there exist much difference 
between European and Turkish writers when it comes to skeptical views about Turkey’s 
EU accession, opposing as seen in the case of Welfens and Manisali. They tend to only 
realize the negative impacts and bypass the positive effects this relationship might offer 
to both sides. On the one hand, European writers focus on immigration, economic 
disadvantages, religious exploitation of Western values, the large population of Turkey, 
and the crises on Turkish borders that the EU might be pulled into – as well as the 
possible US impact on EU policy that could be had via Turkey. On the other hand, 
Turkish Eurosceptics focus on the length of the negotiation process, the negative impact 
of EU regulations on the internal affairs of Turkey, EU bias against Turkey when 
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dealing with Cyprus and Armenia, and the EU’s secret agenda to break Turkey from its 
Islamic roots. 
These fears are expressed and exploited in different platforms via diverse methods 
(via conferences, TV debates and newspapers and nowadays via social media) by 
academics, think tanks, political parties and many other public figures including 
politicians and journalists – all serving to influence public opinion. But the biggest issue 
is that apart from reading and citing from each other’s works (only some of it due to the 
language barrier), most of these writers have no direct communication with each other. 
Although it is becoming a common practice to co-author papers and present work in 
conferences, there is still miscommunication among scholars. Works published in 
English are mostly read in Turkey, but it is not possible to say the same for the opposite 
– European writers rarely read works published in Turkish. Therefore, one of the main 
catalysts in order to make a better judgement related to this relationship is the language 
barrier, as they cannot read each other to a greater extent. Hence it is clear that there are 
fears and hurt egos on both sides.  
This school’s major worries are based on financial and political concerns but when 
Turkish immigration, religion and Germany are mentioned together one cannot avoid 
thinking about common stereotyping problems in Europe, especially in Germany and 
France. They clearly miss the point that religious fundamentalist terrorism94 hits Turkey 
more than any other European country and, having accepted secularism since 1923, for 
many years, Turkey sends its troops across the world to deal with this issue. Thus, it 
becomes a target of extremists since it allies itself with the Western countries when 
combatting international terrorism as seen in the case of recent terror attack in Suruc 
and again Istanbul terror campaigns in 2003. In a sense Western literature is not clearly 
aware of the fact that the more extremism hits Turkey, naturally, the closer it gets to the 
West. Although they recognize the aging and declining population of Europe, the 
possible contributions of a young Turkish population seems to be ignored. 
While only focusing on the negative effects of Turkish EU entry, one of the most 
important worries of the EU today is energy security, though Turkey’s possible 
contribution in this regards do not occupy much space in this literature. This is certainly 
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an issue which is identified here as a weakness in the overall literature on EU-Turkey 
relation. 
 
School of thought in favour of Turkish entry to the EU 
Although it occupies less space in the literature, the second school of thought in 
Europe is in favour of Turkish entry to the Union due to the prospects of this bringing 
benefits to the EU. This school considers Turkey’s culture, geopolitical status as well as 
its growing young population as an asset to the EU. This school also sees the impact of 
EU on Turkey’s domestic political and economic evolution positively and vice versa. 
To them Turkey-EU relations help Turkey become politically more democratic and 
economically more prosperous.  
Official documents of the EU also make up a good bulk of the literature on this 
subject. These documents represent the EU’s stance on the issue. Since 1999, EU papers 
have painted a constructive and supportive picture of Turkey’s membership bid. In line 
with the EU’s positive approach to Turkey since 1999 – and especially after 2004 – 
some of the main European leaders, as well as US presidents, have also made 
statements that influenced some of the literature on Turkey-EU relations. For example, 
in his welcome note to the first edition of the Turkey in Europe magazine former British 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair argued that, 
Over the past decade, I have been proud to champion the case for Turkey’s membership of the 
European Union because I passionately believe that it is in the economic and strategic interests 
of both Turkey and the EU.95 
 
President Obama also openly supports Turkish entry into the EU, frequently 
referencing the mutual benefits for the parties involved ad also for the wider world: 
The United States and Europe must approach Muslims as our friends, neighbors and partners in 
fighting injustice, intolerance and violence, forging a relationship based on mutual respect and 
mutual interest. Moving forward towards Turkish membership in the EU would be an 
important signal of your commitment to this agenda and ensure that we continue to anchor 
Turkey firmly in Europe.96 
 
They think, especially after accepting all other Eastern European countries EU needs 
to be fair on Turkey and issues like Cyprus must not be seen as an obstacle. In this sense 
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literature in Turkey and in Europe agree that otherwise this would send a wrong 
message across the Islamic world. As Stone who also criticises EU’s visa regime 
against Turkey writes: 
The real problem has been the absurd EU visa regime, in which professional-class Turks are 
humiliated, filling in huge forms for a three-day visit, as if they were drug smugglers. Turkey is 
a large and growing market, the only preponderantly young population in Europe, many of them 
well trained. The effort to match conditions for joining Europe has also been beneficial in prising 
open sleepy monopolies and making the country more open to foreign investment. Prosperity has 
obviously been increasing. But with the ever-closer union Europe that we now have, the Turks 
are simply opening themselves to ridiculous rebuff, being told that they have to wait because of 
some pimple like Greek Cyprus.97  
 
Within this school it is also argued that Turkey will create a bridge between the East 
and the West, particularly in relation to energy issues. Especially after the Russia-
Ukraine crisis over gas prices, EU policy makers and some academics have pushed 
intensely for the development of alternative European energy supply routes.98 In their 
quest for a safer fourth artery for the energy hungry EU, Turkey has emerged as the 
safest and the most reliable option. This school also promotes a closer partnership 
between Turkish and European energy policies. It sees Turkey-EU rapprochement as a 
good indication for Turkey to confidently undertake major energy projects. As a result, 
a good bulk of literature has developed around this particular topic.  
The rhetoric of the European leaders fuelled the amount of work published about this 
topic, and developed into supportive statements for a quest for alternative routes. 
Indeed, the former leader of the European Commission José Durão Manuel Barroso 
said, “We must not sleepwalk into Europe’s energy-dependence crisis. The EU wants 
different sources of supply.”99 
The EU’s official documents that also make up a good bulk of the work in this 
school imply that Turkey is critically important to safeguarding its future energy 
security. For example, the Green Paper of the European Commission on the strategy for 
the security of energy supply published in 2000 clearly stated the importance of 
diversification of energy supply routes and hinted at Turkey playing a part:  
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Security of supply aims to reduce the risks linked to such dependence. Among the objectives to 
be pursued are those balancing between and diversifying of the various sources of supply (by 
product and by geographical region).100 
 
Within this school of thought there are also Turkish writers and they account for the 
majority of the works available on this topic. This school perceives that Turkish entry 
would be mutually beneficial for both Turkey and the EU. In this category, Turkish 
literature sees EU entry as part of a long term modernisation process. While paying less 
attention to  the social and cultural aspects, this tendency focuses more on the 
economic, political, scientific and technological aspects of the relationship. 
Again, the tendency that falls under this category includes the work of Laçiner, Bal 
and Karlsson who all see EU-Turkey relations as related to modernisation and identity 
building processes. According to this group, the EU will transform Turkey into a 
modern westernized nation once it fulfils all the requirements of the EU. For this group, 
which embraces constructivist ontology issues such as democracy, an established justice 
system, no presence of the army in politics, secularism and human rights all come in to 
play. They also argue that if Turkey is accepted as a candidate it will have a positive 
impact over the region and among other Muslim majority states:  
Turkey’s accession process into the EU will not only ameliorate the political stability and 
prosperity in Turkey, but with a domino effect, it will also actuate the conditions providing 
political stability in this most unstable region of the world. Consequently, a strong tendency 
towards democracy will emerge in the region’s totalitarian regimes.101 
 
In addition to his, they also think that if Turkey joined the EU, this would create a 
positive environment for a better dialogue between EU and Turkey’s neighbouring 
regions, as former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi once argued: 
This resistance has arisen from the fact that not everyone understands that Turkey’s crucial role 
is not just to make the EU as competitive as other major areas of the planet, but also to ensure a 
dialogue with the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia and thus counteract any possible 
fundamentalist influence.102 
 
This school disagrees with Turkey-skeptics’ arguments centred on geography, or the 
idea that Turkey is not really “in Europe”. They argue that,  
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It is often said that Turkey has been in Europe but that it is not of Europe, but is there a 
European history without Turkey? There are more Greek ruins in Turkey than in Greece. 
Herodotus, the father of history, was born in today’s Turkey as well as Strabo, the first 
geographer. It was in Antakya that the followers of Jesus first called themselves Christians; Saint 
Paul was born in Tarsus and made his first travels to spread the new faith in Anatolia.103 
 
To them, the EU is a way forward for Turkey and therefore Eurosceptic Turks should 
stop seeing either whole or some parts of Europe as a threat to Turkey’s unity as 
“Turkey applied to the EU by its own conscience.”104 
 
School of thought balanced in its views about the Turkish entry to the EU 
This school of thought takes a more balanced view towards a possible Turkish 
membership of the EU and the impact of this relation on Turkish domestic politics as it 
evaluates the positive and negative aspects fairly. Although it occupies less space in the 
overall literature, in these studies debates and arguments from both sides are represented 
equally. This group may be said to be generally more useful to academics than the other 
two schools. This school considers the benefits and problems of social, political and 
economic aspects equally. The majority of the work that falls under this category 
belongs to the joint ventures of academics. For instance Ruben and Çarkoğlu’s work105 
fall in to this category where sources from both EU and Turkey are effectively used in 
an objective manner. While appreciating the benefits and problems of membership, this 
school sees the Turkey-EU relationship as a great challenge for not only politicians, but 
also academics.  
Turkey’s possible accession to the EU generates debates among politicians, policy makers and 
academicians because the issue of Turkish membership carries significant challenges for EU 
policy making as well as theories of integration.106  
 
Like the other previous two, this school also uses official documents of the EU and 
Turkish institutions. But rather than encapsulating formal stance of EU or Turkey 
towards each other, this school tends to bring forth a balanced perspective by taking 
views from both sides into consideration.   
                                                          
103 Karlsson ibid., pp.3-4 
104 Davutoğlu , ibid. 
105 Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, Turkey and the European Union: domestic politics, economic 
integration and international dynamics, (London: Frank Cass, 2003) 
106 Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Yannis Stivachitis, Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas, 
Opportunities, and Constraints, (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), p.1-2. 
51 
 
According to this school, the Turkey-EU relationship has mutual effects on both 
sides and needs to be developed according to the global needs. The opinion of this 
school is more objective and more academic in their assumptions as they look at the 
long term impact of this relationship on regional and global issues such as, energy 
security, peace and social, economic and political stability. They argue that, 
Joint Turkey-EU actions and the contributions that Turkey and the EU could make to one 
another on a wide scale ranging from economics to politics, culture and foreign policy are very 
significant not only for the two sides, but also for regional and global peace and stability.107  
 
The mutual benefits for both sides are expressed by this school in the different social, 
economic and political spheres:  
While accepting Turkey as a full member of the EU would demonstrate that the process of 
European integration and its enlargement operates on the basis of universal norms rather than 
religion or geography, the project of Europeanization in Turkey makes a significant 
contribution to the process of democratic consolidation and societal modernisation. With its 
secular modernity and the Muslim cultural traditions of the majority of its population, Turkey 
can contribute to the reshaping of the political identity of Europe as a multicultural space 
governed by the universal norms of democracy and a modern socially-caring market 
economy. With the strengthening of such a political identity, Europe will for its part, help 
reshape international relations in the direction of more democratic world governance. 108 
 
Security aspects of relations are also covered by this cluster, as it considers the 
relationship to have a positive impact on both parties, as well as the greater Middle 
Eastern region, including the Caucasus. To them, an EU which includes Turkey could 
challenge the dominance of Russia and Iran in the region by having the historical and 
cultural links with the region (via ethnically Turkic people living in Caucasus, Central 
Asia and Iran) that Turkey brings in to the Union. Indeed some scholars have argued 
that one crucial outcome of Turkey’s membership in the EU would be the guarantee of 
stability in the Greater Middle East.109  
Moreover the recent nuclear deal signed with Iran will open up a new era in terms of 
regional and global security as well as economic and political cooperation. Turkey 
would directly benefit from an increased trade with Iran as it is a natural bridge between 
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the West and Iran, especially concerning the transportation of natural gas. This is the 
main reason why Erdogan was trying his outmost to establish peace between the West 
and Iran. Iran on the other hand would benefit from a stable, more democratic and a 
richer Turkey as a trade partner and a reliable neighbour. In simple terms EU 
membership for Turkey would improve the whole Eurasia’s prosperity further. 
While mentioning the benefits of the relationship, problems are also identified within 
this cluster. Although Turkey is located in strategic location in the sense that it can aid 
the EU’s energy security problems, it must also be noted that Turkish membership 
brings burdens with it. As Constantinos Koliopoulos, an expert in international politics 
and strategic studies writes that:  
The claim that the EU needs Turkey to become a global actor is groundless. The EU is already a 
Goliath: It has a population of 485 million and constitutes the world’s biggest single economic 
unit. However a highly important feature of Turkey’s possible EU membership is that the EU 
will find itself bordering with the Middle East and Transcaucasia, plus acquiring increased 
stakes in Central Asia.110 
 
 However, even within this tendency there are some gaps in knowledge, due to the 
fact that sources from different languages, including Turkish, are not always deployed 
effectively. Therefore, conclusions are overwhelmingly affected by the materials 
employed during the research process. Realizing the importance of this, this thesis tries 
to use both Turkish and European sources equally.  
 
Where does this thesis locate itself? 
While most authors locate themselves clearly on one of the sides mentioned above, a 
more critical literature takes a guarded view that is somewhere in between all three. As 
Ranke has noted in his On the Epochs of Modern History “the truth lies possibly in the 
middle.”111 Therefore, although this thesis feels more affinity to the last school of 
thought, it also pays attention to the elements of other schools, too.  
The debate on Turkish accession to the EU needs to be understood in light of a 
number of important local, national and regional policies, including energy, militaries 
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position, transformation of political thinking in Turkey and constitutional reforms. And 
all these policies must be evaluated within historical context.  However, it is not easy to 
find detailed research that focuses specifically on these three areas as they are outside 
the scoop of the well-established topics mentioned previously. Therefore, this is 
something that the thesis identified as the weakness or “gap” in the literature which 
needs to be addressed. It should be noted that although there are some weaknesses with 
the last school in terms of the aspects that makes up the back bone of this research, the 
thesis found more materials supporting its evaluations during the course of research and 
fieldwork within this cluster than the other two. 
One of the most important benefits of this cluster for the thesis is that as well as 
using literature produced in Turkey and in Europe, they also gave reasoned and well-
balanced arguments throughout to explain the key issues concerning Turkey-EU 
relations. Therefore, even though some issues are not fully addressed by this school, this 
research can nonetheless be located within this category, which tries to pay equal 
attention to studies done both in the West and in Turkey and uses literature written in 
different languages, including Turkish.  
The main reason why this research identifies itself within this category is that this 
school is balanced in its views, avoids prejudices, is independently produced via use of 
materials from different sources, evaluates the benefits and problems of the relationship 
equally, and is not guided by any foreign policy goals dictated by particular institutions.  
Since the focus of the thesis is the impact of the EU on Turkey’s domestic issues 
such as the military’s involvement in politics, energy policies and the identity changes 
in religious political parties, a wide range of areas had to be covered during the research 
process. Therefore, while conducting the research both positive and negative impacts 
had to be evaluated without any preconceptions. Sometimes authors had to be loyal to 
their institutions’ official stance towards Turkey-EU relations-as seen during the review 
process-, something which makes the outcome thorny. While producing this thesis there 
was no conflict of interest for the author to influence the objective of the thesis. The 
research did not have any pre-set agenda or prejudice towards either side. 
While paying equal attention to both sides of the arguments, the relationship between 
Turkey and the EU is not only examined in terms of the accession issue. Cultural and 
historical matters are taken into account, too. That is something that the third school 
also tries to do to a certain degree. Therefore, the intentions of this school match with 
the main objective of this thesis which is to be balanced and impartial.  
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Prior to this thesis, the topics covered in this research have not been studied 
comprehensively and objectively. As a result, this thesis tries to fill the gap in the 
literature by being unique and original. 
Theoretical Framework 
Although theories can account for unstable identities, in terms of rapid changes in 
their nature, it is very hard to approach Turkey-EU relations with a precise theory due to 
the unpredictable nature of their relationship. Both the EU and Turkey behave 
differently under different leaders, different governments and in different historical 
periods. Therefore, the identities of both are unstable. This thesis believes that this 
relationship is a strategic instrument for both Turkey and the EU to achieve different 
goals and it is, in fact, a co-constituted relationship where two institutional cultures exist 
in a complex semi-autonomous relationship relative to one another. Therefore it was 
necessary for this study, which relies on empirical research, to use a multi-disciplined 
approach to come to its conclusions. 
Due to its unique location, history, ethnic, religious and cultural links with broad 
areas and people and as well as its desire to become part of the Western world, Turkey 
is undeniably a key state in its region. As a result of this geostrategic importance, 
external actors including the EU and US, regional actors such as Iran and Russia, as 
well as financial and security agencies like the IMF, WB and NATO have always 
played major impact on Turkish domestic and foreign policy choices.  
Thomas Risse-Kappen has analysed domestic structures to understand policy making 
in different states and in this context also discussed the possible impact of international 
actors on domestic politics which he called the ‘transnational coalitions’.112 Moreover, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier developed a rationalist bargaining model called ‘the 
external incentive model’ which follows logic of consequences and is driven by 
the external rewards and sanctions that the EU adds to the cost-benefit calculations of 
the rule-adopting state.113 Both the ‘transnational coalitions’ and the ‘external incentive 
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model’ certainly account for the selective and overall moderate degree of 
Europeanization process in Turkey especially during the last three decades. Therefore 
this thesis will make use of the approaches adopted by Risse-Kappen and 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier and others to explain whether external actors, most 
importantly EU, had the desired impact on transformation of Turkey’s domestic 
political dynamics.  
According to former USA National security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski Turkey - 
and Iran- are influential geostrategic players in their sensitive location and they have the 
capacity and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in 
order to alter the existing geopolitical state of affairs. But he notes that domestic 
problems prevent Turkey from becoming an active regional power. To him if Turkey 
resolves its internal concerns and develop its capacities then it could become a 
geostrategic player in its region.114 Turkish political authorities also identified this issue 
especially after 1980s with Özal and pushed for more liberalisation and further 
democratisation. However settings of the internal dynamics in Turkey did not allow 
domestic civilian politics alone to overcome the challenges they faced. They realised the 
need of external assistance. This thesis argues that after WWII, being a reliable ally of 
the West, especially during the Cold War, allowed Turkey to use the international actors 
mentioned above as a tool to improve its domestic economic, political and social 
standards.  
For example, the USA, as long as they do not abandon their pro-Western stance, is 
always keen to support any Turkish government in Ankara because of Turkey’s unique 
geopolitical position, its membership of NATO, its strong ties with the Muslim world 
and the Central Asian Turkic republics.115 For instance Turkey successfully utilised 
strong US support especially during the debates related to the Caspian Energy pipeline 
routes. It is very well known that the BTC was built thanks to the USA and EU support. 
Again US’s assistance was critical in order for Turkey to become a candidate country 
for the EU. Similar claim can be made for the EU as it has a substantial impact on the 
candidate countries’ internal and external relations too. As Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier noted, 
                                                          
114 Zbigniev Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1997). 
115 Gareth Winrow, ‘Pivotal State or Energy Supplicant? Domestic Structure, External Actors, and 
Turkish Policy in the Caucasus,’ The Middle East journal, Vol.57, No.1, (Middle East Institute, winter 
2003), pp.76-92. 
56 
 
the desire of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to join the EU (in our case 
Turkey), combined with the high volume and intrusiveness of the rules attached to its 
membership, have allowed the EU an unprecedented influence on the restructuring of domestic 
institutions and the entire range of public policies in these countries.116 
 
Turkey, which is a unique case compared to other candidate states, has effectively 
used the EU candidacy as a tool to improve its domestic political and economic 
standards. However domestic changes in Turkey have been selective, depending on the 
ideological aspiration of the government at the time. 117  For example during the last 
decade EU conditionality which Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier explains as ‘a 
bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external 
incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions,’118 have been used as a 
tool to minimize the military’s role in politics, extend Turkey’s role in international 
energy games and soften the secularist stand against the religious political parties. As 
noted by Noutcheva and Düzgit: 
Turkish policy-makers introduce domestic reforms that conform to EU demands, but are 
driven by their own political agenda as in case of the constitutional reforms in 2010.119   
 
EU and other external actors provide democratic assistance to domestic actors in 
Turkey in order to promote democratisation as well. Certain aspects of EU policy were 
aimed at directly promoting democracy and human rights, such as the PHARE 
Democracy Programme.120  
Transnational actors and various states do this by providing support to the 
institutions or individuals who favour democratisation, and by weakening the power of 
the regime that might be opposing democratisation.121 In Turkey’s case Erdogan’s JDP, 
who openly declared that it will turn Turkey’s face to West and continue with the 
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harmonisation programs, was heavily supported and openly promoted at the same time 
by the EU officials and the heads of states in key European countries like the UK even 
before he become the Prime Minister.  
In order to promote democracy the EU not only requires institutional conditionality 
but also sets up a serious of assistance programs aimed to facilitate transition and 
condition periods of the potential members.122 According to Tanja Borzel and Thomas 
Risse democracy promotion has become a centrepiece of the EU’s foreign policy and it 
is backed up by considerable financial resources.123 
Again the support from the international financial and collective security agencies 
such as the IMF, WB and NATO were also critically important for the Turkish 
economic and political developments. For example, in Turkey after a devastating 
financial crisis in 2001 the JDP was elected. The newly elected government pushed 
ahead with economic reforms in close collaboration with the IMF and became very 
successful in the long run. Most economists links the strength of the Turkish macro-
economic stability of the last decade to the strict IMF backed reforms imposed after 
2001 crisis.124 Additionally, taking part in NATO led operations such as Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, on a regular basis, improved Turkey’s international image as reliable ally 
of the Western powers.125   
According to Risse-Kappan there are four domestic structures; state controlled, state 
dominated, stalemate and society dominated.126 Arguably, in the case of Turkey, what 
has been a state dominated domestic structure appears to be exhibiting features more in 
line with that of society-dominated one, in which the influential social organisations 
such as powerful business lobbies have emerged (Like TUSIAD). In part, this would 
appear to be the product of the liberalisation of the Turkish economy, which 
commenced in the 1980s.127 In this context the impact of secular and western minded 
business lobbies supported by the western governments including the US and the EU 
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countries in Turkey are critically important. For example during the BTC negotiations 
important international energy companies were able to access the Turkish political 
system and strive to build winning-coalitions by cultivating this with government 
officials and local businesses.128 Again during the EU candidacy negotiations, media 
organisations and big businesses significantly influenced the Turkish public opinion by 
forming the coalitions mentioned above.  
Even though external actors have been critically important in Turkish domestic 
evolution, their role on the improvement of political system and spread of economic 
prosperity for the wider society in Turkey only become significant after the Cold War as 
prior to that, due to the organization of the Turkish domestic structure, mostly the 
military and the secularist political elite were the beneficiaries of the continuous 
Western support. After 1990s, with the substantial changes in Turkish domestic political 
structures, EU reforms were implemented more thoroughly and reached wider ends of 
the social spectrum. This has enabled a majority of people in Turkey to enjoy the 
benefits of a Westernised political and economic system. Therefore, the EU 
conditionality has, undeniably, been a driving force behind recent reform waves in 
Turkey, referred to as the “silent revolution” by the former president Abdullah Gul.129 
Decision on Turkey’s candidacy in 1999 Helsinki Summit has been a turning point for 
Turkey’s reform process, exemplifies the role of international institutions, particularly 
the EU, as a catalyst for domestic political changes.130 
While Risse-Kappen and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s above mentioned 
approaches  made up the backbone of this research Ranke’s empirical view of history, 
which widely relies on primary resources131 (although heavily criticized by Carr 132) and 
focuses on ‘what actually happened’133 has also influenced this thesis. After evaluating 
prior studies and approaches, this study, which also uses history as an analytic tool to 
explain Turkey-EU relations, argues that to find the main reasons why this relationship 
is unstable, one need to look back to the historical interactions that took place between 
the two powers over the course of a thousand years. The majority of the literature has 
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assigned history, as Ranke said, “to the office of judging the past, of instructing the 
present for the benefit of future.”134 In this respect this thesis also holds that without 
understanding past relations between the two sides, it is impossible to understand how 
the current state of the relationship has come to be the way it is today as ‘history is 
sometimes defined as the working memory of society or the collective memory’.135  
As well as the approaches mentioned above, this thesis also believes in the idea that 
“rules form institutions and institutions form societies.”136 Therefore, the institutionalist 
approach was also used to support and find answers to the hypothesis outlined above.  
It can be argued that by reforming its fundamental institutions with the help of 
external Actors, most importantly EU, such as the judiciary and the military to meet the 
Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey will offer its citizens a better standard of living. People 
value the rule of law and enjoy the freedom it gives to them. This brings them closer to 
the norms the EU are trying to impose. This, in turn, takes Turkey closer to the EU 
itself. Here the formal institutions such as the EC, the EP and the ruling JDP in Turkey 
play a large role. Good examples of the role of institutions in building new identities are 
the mutual student-exchange programs, such as the Erasmus Programme initiated by the 
European Commission.137 
Additionally cooperation among the institutions will also help form new identities 
and norms on both sides. For example creation of consortium among big energy 
companies including the Turkish companies enhance international trade norms and 
standards as seen in the case of BTC. In support of the assumptions mentioned, Peters 
quotes from March and Olsen that: 
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As human beings, by reflecting on our experiences, we construct our own understanding of the 
world we live in, and the people functioning within certain institutions behave as they do 
because of normative standards rather than because of their desire to maximize individual 
utilities. These standards of behavior are acquired through involvement with one or more 
institutions and the institutions are the major social repositories of values.138  
 
As mentioned above Turkey is actually a unique case in EU candidacy debate with 
its religion, history culture and external relations. It was member of NATO since 1952 
and the only country who became part of the EU Customs Union before it became 
member of the Union. Again it’s the only predominantly Muslim country among the 
previous candidates. Therefore it needs to be separated from other candidate countries 
and evaluated on its own merits.  
Nevertheless, external agencies, in this case the EU, are critically important in the 
positive developments that took place in Turkish domestic and international affairs. 
Therefore it can be argued that the EU candidacy, in the broader context, worked in 
Turkey’s favour in terms of rising as a regional power.  
 
Research Methods 
Most intellectual engagements with the Turkey-EU relationship are written from an 
outsider (non-Turkish) vs. insider (Turkish/regional) perspective and that this 
positioning inherently affects the nature of the narrative, particularly whether Turkey is 
characteristically perceived as 'weak/dependent’ on outside actors vs. 'strong/rising 
actor' able to manipulate external actors. Therefore doing research on this, necessarily 
involves paying careful attention to how different authors positions themselves 
(insiders/outsiders) and how that affects their narrative. This thesis is balanced in its 
views as it is not swayed towards one of the perspectives mentioned above. That only 
became possible by doing a multi-disciplined and through research by employing 
numerous research methods. Selection of texts, interviews, places to do research was 
largely motivated by providing as wide a spectrum as possible, while at the same time 
engaging key intellectual voices. 
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This study, which focuses on empirical research due to the very fragile and 
changeable nature of the relations, combines qualitative and quantitative methods, 
focusing in particular on primary sources, library-based research, field work, case 
studies, media analysis, discourse analysis, interviews, surveys and statistical analysis. 
Historical and political research also makes up the backbone of this research. National 
archives and the archives of national assemblies of relevant countries were consulted 
widely during the writing of this thesis. The British Library, the Directorate-General 
Energy and Transport research facilities, official documents of the European Parliament 
and the EU Digital Library were also extensively used. 
First, library-based research was conducted to understand the extent of literature 
available and also to understand the study in depth. Once the direction of study was 
identified, different groups of people were interviewed. After this, suitable locations 
were decided on and the field work stage begun. During field trips some interviews 
were also conducted and observations of people made. 
The research first focused on library-based historical evaluations of relations 
between Turks and Europeans to understand the impact of history on current affairs. 
After the 1960s, European decision makers who wanted to keep Turkey out, empowered 
by public discourse, historical texts and many symbols spread across the Europe of 
once-threatening-Ottomans, deployed rhetoric that relied on several ideas from Turkey’s 
level of democracy, influence of the military on the civilian politics, underdeveloped 
economy, large population, to religion and human rights issues. However, after a 
comprehensive evaluation, this study argues that current policy makers are also heavily 
influenced by the lengthy, and mostly negative, history of interaction between Turkey 
and Europe. 
A close analysis of the media has clearly shown that the rhetoric of political elites, 
journalists and public figures has an immense impact on the people’s views towards 
Turkey-EU relations in both sides. The mass media acts like a modern propaganda 
machine as it helps those in power to reach millions of people on a regular basis. 
Politicians then shape the way they want to construct people’s conceptions about the 
material world we live in today, using the reach of the mass media and modern 
technologies. The thesis wanted to figure out the impact of media on Turkey-EU 
relations as well.  
To explore further the rhetoric of the media, this study evaluated the material 
published in Turkish and in the English language across Europe on a regular basis. The 
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research looked especially at the speeches and texts of the French, German, British and 
Turkish leaders, policy makers, and journalists, as well as those of highly influential 
people in academia to understand the impact of the rhetoric they use.  
The findings were very clear that in the minds of many Europeans, Turkey moved 
from an exotic, threatening ‘other’ to a populous, underdeveloped Muslim country that 
needed to be developed, but also be kept away from ‘Europe’. But it is still considered 
as an ‘other’. As a result, the EU supports the development of democracy, rule of law 
and economy in Turkey but not full integration. On the other hand Turkish people, 
while admiring the EU’s outlook, look at the EU with great suspicion, believing that 
Europe has a historic agenda that will never accept Turkey being a better and stronger 
country.  
In addition to historical research the study also heavily relied on the media analysis 
as mass media had a great impact, on a daily basis, on the opinion of the people. The 
majority of English and Turkish speaking media were analysed during the research 
process on a daily basis;139 this covered newspapers, news channels, online magazines 
and periodicals.  
To complement the findings of other methods used in the study field trips were 
organized to various parts of Europe and Turkey during the course of the research to 
observe public opinion trends regarding Turkey EU relations.The original field research 
was mainly focusing on grasping how Turkey is seen or perceived both internally and 
externally. Additionally Field research was trying to compliment what was the agenda 
behind Turkey’s new energy politics. And through field research the thesis was trying to 
figure out how that perception has changed through time and the extent to which 
Turkey's 'foreignness/difference' is in many ways embedded in a firmly established 
European cultural tradition. 
During the field trips as many people as possible from a variety of backgrounds were 
spoken to. These people included market stall holders, waiters, restaurant owners, petrol 
station managers, superstore managers, office workers, artists, lawyers, pharmacists, 
people in bars, teachers, farmers and many more to learn about the feelings towards 
Turkey’s potential membership of the EU and the impact this relationship had on 
Turkey’s domestic evolution.  
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For example, one field trip was conducted by visiting a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
tanker to discover the differences between transporting natural gas via pipelines or ships 
to be able to understand how important to build pipelines via Turkey. As part of the trip 
Al Oraiq of K-Line, one of the largest tankers in the world was visited, in Zeebrugge 
Port in Belgium.140 This trip helped the study to better consider the infrastructure and 
delivery methods of natural gas by sea and to attain critical information about cost and 
security issues. The field work also helped the thesis to conclude that pipelines were 
much more cost-effective than carrying gas in the form of LNG; therefore a possible 
pipeline via connecting energy resources with Europe via Turkey would be mutually 
beneficial. However, during the same field trip the study also concluded that LNG was a 
great alternative to the pipelines in case of a disruption of energy supply to many 
European countries caused by any political and environmental reasons.  
Several other field trips were conducted to mainland Europe and to Turkey to 
observe the impact of this relation both on Turkey and on EU. During these trips about 
15 European countries and hundreds of different cities, towns and villages were visited. 
These trips were vital in providing information about public opinion regarding Turkey-
EU relations. I could also get the sense of the perceptional change that took place 
between 1990’s and 2015. 
Interviews were also a great source of information for this thesis. As Atkinson and 
Silverman state, our culture is almost an ‘interview society’141 and this study conducted 
various interviews to corroborate evidence supporting the points made in this thesis. 
Interviews were conducted with politicians, experts, elites, members of the public, 
academics, business people and journalists in order to understand the relationship better. 
The thesis mainly used semi-structured interviews to give more flexibility to the 
interviewers, as in a semi-structured interview the interviewee has great freedom in how 
to reply to questions.142 In some cases, the people interviewed consisted of lecturers, 
teachers and postgraduate degree holders’. They tended to be the people that the rest of 
society respect and listen to. Therefore, their opinions were crucial for the study, giving 
an insight into the views of informed members of society.  
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In other cases, generally less-educated people in society such as builders, market-
stall holders, farmers and unemployed men in cafes were also interviewed. As they 
make up the majority of the population and obviously contribute to the outcome in 
national elections;, their opinions were quite important to this research. We should 
however bear in mind that their opinions shifted more easily than those of educated 
people. They sounded less informed, but also less firm in their views; some of them 
changed their views towards either Turkey or Europe during the course of the 
interview.143  
When an interview was arranged with the first group, a set of questions were on hand 
to ask. Some of the answers received both in Turkey and in EU states were surprising 
and shocking; some degree holders even thought that Turkey was already an EU 
member, while others thought Turkey was ruled according to Sharia Law, or that the 
EU was a Zionist organization run by atheists, and that Turkish women were forced to 
wear headscarf and had a similar regime to Iran.  
Again, it was very clear from the Turkish respondents that there exists a very 
negative feeling towards the EU in that almost all of them thought the EU had a secret 
agenda and did not want Turkey in the union. However, majority of the people in this 
cluster were well aware of the volatility of the relations and suggested that historical 
legacies are crucial; people needed to interact with one another through visits, though it 
would take time for any major development to take place between the two sides.144  
With the second group, which is considered to be the less informed part of society 
compared to the degree holders, cafes or building sites were visited in order to have 
informal group talks rather, than pre-prepared interviews.145 Here, the intention was to 
get the general feeling of the working-class.  
The most significant difference in responses was that educated people were more 
rational in the way they talked about the issue, while the less-educated people generally 
spoke in the way that the political parties they supported – or the newspapers they read 
– discussed the issue. This cluster focused more on daily life, even sporting events, in 
their answers. Some people interviewed in Europe supported Turkey merely because of 
its national football teams’ passionate performance in games. Others were against 
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Turkish entry into EU because they thought that the Turks would flock Europe and take 
their jobs and seek social security benefits.  
The above interviews were a critical source of information about the public view 
towards Turkey-EU relations. Therefore, they brought immense clarity to the questions 
posed above. 
As well as interviewing non-academic people this thesis strongly believes that 
consulting and interviewing experts146 and policy makers is highly relevant to Turkish-
EU relations as the process between the two sides frequently involves the analysis of 
political developments at the highest level of government, and elite actors will often be 
critical sources of information about the political processes under study. 
Consulting experts and elites, who influence and shape the public opinion with their 
comprehensive and authoritative knowledge and skills in a particular field assisted the 
research greatly.147 They are also important in terms of constructing collective 
understandings and attaching meaning to the material world for the people they 
represent. Their opinions were crucially important as they help shape the opinions of 
political elites. For example three scholars, King,148 Taşağıl and Kızıltoprak149 
unanimously stated that ‘history plays a major part in EU-Turkey relations. They also 
asserted that although it will take more time, one day, if EU remains together, Turkey 
will be a full member of this Union. But if the process takes much longer Turkey might 
not want to be part of it any more’. Again when a prominent public figure and historian 
Ilber Ortaylı150 was interviewed, he stated in our informal meetings that there was no 
hope in the EU itself and therefore Turkey must seek its future in other directions or it 
should at least have a multi-dimensional foreign policy rather than wait at the gates of 
the collapsing EU.151 He also said: 
The EU has shifted away from its original way and its future is unknown. It has expanded more 
than it should have expanded. We do not have to be in this institution. And it is not a good idea 
to solve our domestic problems with the EU.152 
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Interviewing politicians also helped make general inferences about the beliefs, 
activities or actions of the large group of people that the particular leaders represent. 
When the former leader of the Great Unity Party (GUP), Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, was 
interviewed,153 he clearly stated that: 
The EU will keep Turkey waiting at the door for a long time and it was unnecessary for Turkey 
to remain at the door any longer.  
 
From this assertion, the common beliefs of his followers could be interpreted and partial 
generalisations could be made. However, the research also took note of the fact that 
perhaps some members of GUP were protest members who do not support the party in 
all policy matters. They follow the GUP because they do not support the ruling party or 
have no alternative place to lend their support.154 
Even though there are problems with the idea of generalisation in qualitative 
research, it was necessary for this study to make some judgments through partial 
generalisations of the findings of the interviews conducted, as it is impossible to speak 
to every person. In the case of this study, the people interviewed in Europe and Turkey 
were carefully selected to be representative of the wider population. For example, if a 
person was a member of a political party, it was taken that they were ideologically 
driven, and mostly thought, in similar ways to their political parties. Also, the study 
looked for wider trends at key moments in time to mark important norm and identity 
shifts with regards to the Turkey-EU relationship. However, there are always limits to 
the accuracy of mass generalisation. Therefore, this study also used other methods to 
support its findings. 
During the interview stage, my identity as a Turkish man made my research easier in 
Turkey, though this was not always the case everywhere in Europe. For example, in 
France and Austria people refrained from talking negatively about Turkey. Due to this, 
it was very important for the thesis to critically assess every interview. Even though I 
interviewed very reliable people, the evaluations still had to be done robustly so that the 
personal bias of the interviewees was not reflected in my findings.  
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As well as interviews, the thesis also used surveys and statistical analysis to track 
changes in popular opinion on current issues. As well as using surveys and statistical 
analysis made by myself – via the internet and social media sites such as Facebook, 
private companies, and mass media organizations – I also heavily relied on the 
Eurobarometer155 as it offered me a great deal of information. Using these tools, I 
discovered a rising trend of anti-EU feelings in Turkey over the last five years. 
Combining different sources of information to confirm particular trends at particular 
moments in time helped the thesis to explore and explain these trends. 
Larger samples used in quantitative research methods were supplementary to the 
qualitative outcomes of the thesis, especially when doing partial generalisations and 
interpretations of public opinion. For example, a joint project of three universities from 
Turkey and Spain surveyed people in France, Britain, Germany, Spain and Poland on 
how Turkey’s EU bid was viewed, discovering that the most significant variable was 
age and generation when it came to the issue of supporting Turkey’s EU accession. The 
results showed that support was higher among the younger population and was lower 
among those older.156 
However, this method also has some limitations when analysing and evaluating EU-
Turkey relations, as public opinion shifts almost every year in Turkey and in Europe 
too. Therefore, some statistics became invalid over a very short period of time. As a 
result, I had to be very careful when deploying surveys and statistical analysis in my 
thesis. 
As well as direct communication, indirect observation was also used in this research. 
For example, the way Turkish and German people crossed the road were compared, as 
well as the busyness of religious places when comparing Austria and Turkey and again 
to compare Italy and Turkey. Additionally, the driving styles of Europeans and Turkish 
people were also noted during the field trips. The observations of these specific norms 
were critically important for the thesis in order to understand and confirm stereotypes.  
Due to the fragile and changeable nature of the relationship between EU and Turkey, 
the empirical study side makes up the backbone of this thesis. Therefore national and 
international media makes up the largest chunk of the research material employed 
during the research process.  
                                                          
155 The public opinion analysis section of the European Commission since 1973. 
156 Anatolian News Agency, Jan. 24, 2010. 
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Various national media played a more important role than pan-European media 
portals in terms of what this thesis is focused on (EU-Turkey relations). With this in 
mind, the national media of influential countries such as Germany, the UK and France 
gave us a more accurate insight and more reliable information regarding public opinion 
in Europe towards Turkey. Since English is considered the lingua franca of our era, the 
British-language media occupies a greater place within this research when it comes to 
measuring public opinion. Therefore, this study extensively uses the main media organs 
in the UK to find logical answers to the research question posed above. English versions 
of European newspapers were also used during the research process. When checking the 
public and official government opinions in the US, the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, as well as others news networks such as CNN and Fox News were 
also used to consolidate the library-based research part of this thesis.   
Regarding the Turkish part of this research, Turkish mass media organs were also 
relied on extensively. In addition to the media published in Turkish, some Turkish 
newspapers published in English were also used.  
While working on the thesis, the rules governing research ethics and legal issues 
were strictly observed. Any issues that could be regarded as unethical and illegal were 
carefully avoided. For example, some interviewees did not want their names to be 
mentioned in the thesis, some public figures did not want certain information to be 
recorded and some interviewees did not want to have any recording devices taken to the 
interview site. Moreover, people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds were 
included in the research process. They were clearly informed about the intentions of the 
author and the research being conducted. Their traditions, cultures, religions and values 
were respected. 
There were some obstacles to the research, such as security restrictions on many 
energy sites, and partial access to Russian and other European resources due to 
limitations regarding language skills. However, the connections made during the 
research process secured the study enough access to the information needed to find 
answers to the questions in mind. Hardship in arranging interviews with high-profile 
people, the cost of the field work and obtaining important publications regarding energy 
markets, were other obstacles encountered during the research. 
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Chapter 3 
The EU and Civilian-Military Relations in 
Turkey 
 
 
The role of the Turkish army in civilian politics 
This chapter will evaluate the impact of Turkey-EU relations on Turkish domestic 
politics, with a focus on civilian-military relations. First, the historical place of the 
military in Turkey will be evaluated. After this, the underlying causes of the military 
interventions will be assessed. Then each military intervention will be explained briefly. 
This will be followed by an evaluation of EU’s impact on the civilian-military relations 
in Turkey and how the civilian authority, thanks to EU reforms, gradually contained the 
army’s presence in politics. In this section, the JDP government’s push for EU reforms 
and results of this in terms of curbing the military’s presence will be studied in 
particular.  
Historically speaking, the Turkish military has been an important force behind most 
important developments in Turkey, shaping its domestic and, to a certain extent, foreign 
policy agenda. Many see the frequent military interventions and armed forces’ tutelage 
over politics as the main reason why Turkey’s democracy did not consolidate for so 
long.157 However, during the last decade, mostly due to Turkey-EU relations, this 
privileged position of the army has waned significantly. This chapter will first take a 
closer look at the underlying causes of the heavy presence of the army in civilian 
politics, particularly since the 1950s and then give a brief outline of each major direct 
military intervention in Turkish politics. Lastly, it will evaluate the impact of Turkey-
EU relations on civilian-military relations by focusing on the latest developments in 
Turkish domestic politics due to the reform process encouraged by the EU.  
In Turkey, the military traditionally thought of itself as the “guardians of the secular 
republic” and directly interfered in civilian politics on three occasions, which will be 
                                                          
157 Ahmet T. Kuru, ‘The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamisn, Kurdism and 
Communism’,  Insight Turkey, Vol 14, No:2, 2012, pp. 37.57 http://www.insightturkey.com/the-rise-and-
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Sept 24, 2013 
70 
 
expanded on later in this chapter. This thesis strongly argues that the military’s position 
in Turkish politics until the early 2000s was so significant that governments in Turkey, 
like the JDP, knew they could not clash with it on their own. Powerful external 
assistance and support was required. Therefore, they tried to use the process of 
Westernization/modernization and EU relations to subdue the military. In simple terms, 
the EU became a tool of domestic politics in Turkey in the struggle for civilian rule over 
the military’s position. After the JDP’s electoral victory in November 2002, Turkish 
politicians, under the convenient pretense that they wanted to reform Turkey to meet EU 
requirements, namely the Copenhagen Criteria, began pursuing a hidden agenda, which 
was to use the reform programs to fight the military. Equally, the EU was not too 
concerned about being used against an institution that was preventing a major ally from 
developing into a Western-style democracy. These politics suited both Turkey and the 
EU. This is why the thesis strongly believes that co-constitutionalism exists in Turkey-
EU relations. 
As implied, the presence of the military in civilian politics worried the EU more than 
anything else as it was definitely against the values and norms of Western 
democracy.158 
In its 2004 report on Turkey, the European Commission noted that,  
Turkey has achieved significant legislative progress in many areas, through further reform 
packages and constitutional changes and … further changes have been introduced over the last 
year in order to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU Member States … 
Civilian control over the military needs to be asserted.159 
 
Therefore, the EU supported governments who tried to tackle this issue by stating its 
contentment in its annual progress reports. Its 2013 progress report pointed out that,  
As in all of their previous reports on the accession progress, the Commission, Council, and 
Parliament found positive issues that they could point to and noted in one year or another that 
they welcomed Turkey’s continued commitment to the negotiation process, as well as 
advancements Turkey had made in judicial reform and civil-military relations.160 
 
                                                          
158 Eric Faucompret and Jozef Konings, Turkish Accession to the EU: Satisfying the Copenhagen 
Criteria, (New York: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Economics, 2008), p. 156. 
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http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1426_final_progress_rep
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Perhaps the experiences of the Italian coup attempt (in 1970 by Junio Valerio 
Borghese) followed by the Spanish one (in 1981 by Antonio Tejero) taught the EU the 
lesson that a country where the military has such a strong presence in politics could 
easily turn into a dictatorship. However, the military’s position in Turkish politics is 
more complicated and very different from the other two examples. While the Italian and 
Spanish coups were considered right-wing, the Turkish coups were considered secular 
and left-wing. The former were directed to destroy the republics while the Turkish ones 
took place in order to “protect” and “guard” the Turkish Republic. Also, in Turkey, the 
military’s reasons for intervention changed over time. Sometimes, they legitimized this 
by claiming to save the republic from the communists, other times from the Islamists or 
Kurdish separatists.  To be able to understand the underlying factors that facilitated the 
military involvement in politics, it is important to look at the fundamental reasons in 
detail. This thesis believes that analyzing this matter in depth will enlighten some 
Western scholars about the military’s place in Turkey. 
 
What were the main causes of the intervention of the Turkish military in 
politics? 
The Turkish military took matters into its own hands on three different occasions in 
1960-1961, 1971-1973, and 1980-1983, and also developed for itself a higher political 
profile during the intervening periods. As seen in 1997, it has indirectly caused 
governments to resign and has temporarily or indefinitely ended the political careers of 
prominent leaders, including current Prime Minister Erdoğan who was imprisoned in 
1999. Again in 2007, chief of general staff Yasar Buyukanit gave a stinging warning to 
the JDP government in the now infamous attempted ‘e-coup’ by posting a statement on 
its official website about the military’s ‘concern’ regarding the way events were 
unfolding in Turkey. This role of the military in politics is now being challenged, and to 
a great extent subdued, as the Turkish government seeks to comply with the 
Copenhagen Criteria for something which is necessary in order to obtain membership in 
the EU. 
In this part of the thesis we will consider the causes underlying the emergence of an 
active role for the army in the Turkish political arena in the second half of the twentieth 
century. The historical role of the military in the Turkish politics prior to 1960 will be 
considered, as will the impact of the end of the single-party political system in 1950 and 
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the extent to which military intervention from 1960 onwards set a precedent for future 
intervention. The ideology of the officer class will then be examined, with a particular 
focus on the somewhat paradoxical roles of the army as both the “protector of the state” 
and a “modernizing force” in society, and the extent to which the civilian population of 
Turkey encouraged and supported an active political role for the military. Lastly, after 
outlining the external factors such as US support during the Cold War, the direct causes 
for each instance of military intervention will be explained. This section will end with a 
detailed consideration of the changes in the military’s position in Turkey due to Turkey-
EU negotiations. 
Although the Turkish Republic was established by soldiers, Mustafa Kemal (later 
Atatürk, or ‘father of the Turks’) moved quickly to differentiate between soldiers and 
politicians in the belief that the military’s active involvement in politics would corrupt 
the military as an institution.161 Less than two months after the proclamation of the 
republic, he passed a law banning serving soldiers from holding political office and 
insisted that officers who wished to retain their parliamentary seats should resign their 
commands.162 Still, Turkey was to be ruled by retired military men until 1950 as İsmet 
İnönü, a prominent war hero, replaced Atatürk, when the latter died in 1938. İnönü also 
held the military rank of ‘pasha’ and, during his entire political career most people still 
continued address him as ‘pasha’, rather than any other title connected to civil politics, 
right up until his death in 1973. 
Again, contrary to what Atatürk had wanted, throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century, military intervention in politics during periods of crisis became a 
recurring feature of Turkey’s political landscape. In each instance, civilian control was 
restored after a transitional period during which purported problems were addressed. 
During each intervention Turkey had problems with its relationships with the Western 
world, particularly the EU, as the strong presence of the army in civilian politics was 
unwelcome. To understand the root cause of the military intervention, we need to look 
at the underlying issues in Turkey’s politics in some detail.  
There are several causes underlying the intervention of the military in Turkish 
politics. The historical role was a key factor. Due to the modernization programs 
implemented in the army after the failure of the second siege of Vienna in 1683, the 
                                                          
161 Gareth Jenkins, Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics, (Oxford: Adelphi 
Papers 337, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.33. 
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military occupied center stage in the Ottoman Empire for about three hundred years. 
Military leaders also took over following WW1. Therefore, any study regarding the role 
of the Turkish army in politics should begin with its traditional role from the Ottoman 
period. Military and politics were mixed together. Therefore, a clear distinction between 
the military and civilian arms of the administration was not developed during the 
Ottoman period.163 
The military’s special place in Turkish society can be traced back to the critical role 
the army played in the showdown with the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the 
modern Turkish Republic too;164 as Andrew Mango writes: 
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 can be seen as a model for military intervention in politics 
... it was a military operation which seized power, and it was followed by other military 
operations in 1909 and 1913 until the plentitude of power was concentrated in one junta.165 
 
The Turkish military’s role in the modernization of the Ottoman Empire and the 
subsequent establishment of the Republic resulted in the military leadership viewing 
itself as a modernizing force and the vanguard of democratic rule in Turkey. In a sense, 
the military saw itself as the key to westernization in Turkey. However, it must be noted 
here that when the JDP government came to power in the 2000s, it was a party 
considered not ideologically compatible with the military. However, the JDP took 
Europeanisation and turned it into a tool against the military which reduced its power in 
the civilian domain.  
Therefore, although the military was, in one sense, removed from politics during the 
early period of the republic, it was consistent with historical Turkish political traditions 
for the military to intervene when it perceived such intervention to be in the “interests of 
the nation”. 
When Atatürk founded the republic in 1923, it was based on a single-party system 
that, it was argued, would eventually lead to democracy. The idea of introducing liberal 
democracy to Turkey was not new. There had long been a general policy of 
Westernization, which started during the Tanzimat period, reaching its pinnacle during 
Kemalism,166 and was the official ideology of the single party. Atatürk had the intention 
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to introduce a multiparty system in his new republic.167 Attempts were twice made to 
build a multiparty system, but both failed (1924 and 1930).168 A real step towards 
creating that democratic system was made in 1946 when opposition parties made their 
first appearance in the Turkish political arena due to external and internal reasons. As 
the Cold War, seen as one of the principle factors of Turkish political life after 1945,169 
was heating up with the end of the World War II, the Soviet Union had abandoned its 
traditional policy of friendship with Turkey and had begun to demand concessions 
inconsistent with Turkish national interest, such as bases in the Bosphorus and 
territories in the East.170 For İnönü, it had become impossible to stand up to this 
superpower by continuing to stay neutral: The only solution was to unconditionally join 
the West, which in turn necessitated the acceptance of the Western model in domestic 
rule as well.171 The first multi-party elections held in 1946were the direct result of this 
decision.  
Turkey’s turn towards the West and Western liberal ideas was also prompted by the 
desire to take advantage of American financial aid. Hale believes that the launch of the 
Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947, in which US President Harry Truman asked for 
the approval of a $400 million aid program to Turkey and Greece (to last until the end 
of June 1948) marked a turning point in this regard.172 This was the start of the 
American commitment to the defense of anti-communist regimes around the world.173 
Therefore, this was the start of direct American influence on the Turkish military and its 
officers. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Reformism, the ideology of Kemalism was officially adopted by Turkey in the 1930s. Since then it 
evolved gradualy and Kemalism not only determined the nature and dynamics of Turkish policies but, as 
Feroz Ahmad writes, also been “a source of permanent ideals and ideology for all nations which had yet 
to realize their national aspirations.” (Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, London: Routledge, 
1993, p. 66). Kemalism remained a flexible concept in Turkey, as these principles were never defined in 
any detail. After Erdoğan’s JDP came to power, Kemalism began to be debated openly. As a result, the 
supporters of the RPP thought that the JDP and the policies it was following posed a threat to the official 
secularist nature of the state. 
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The İnönü government was in serious need of foreign support in terms of continued 
military expenditure which it needed to deter Stalin, meaning that any economic 
assistance was a major advantage. More importantly, Turkey’s inclusion in the Marshall 
Aid program was a clear signal to the Soviet Union that the United States was prepared 
to make material, and not only purely symbolic, contributions to the defense of Turkey. 
Indeed, Sadak argues, that “The Truman Doctrine was a great comfort to the Turkish 
people, for it made them feel that they were no longer isolated.”174 Turkish leaders may 
have believed that a turn to Western liberal ideas would improve the possibility of them 
obtaining aid, and the provision of aid from the West may have improved the way in 
which the Turkish people viewed Western political ideals. Consequently, with the 
Truman Doctrine in 1947 Turkey officially became part of the long-lasting Western 
alliance system which involved the development of rule of law and democracy. 
There were also a number of domestic social, political and economic factors that led 
to Turkey’s turn to liberal democracy in the second half of the 1940s. One such factor 
was the general dissatisfaction of the population with the government of the time. 
Eroğul writes that the long period of rule without opposition had led to a situation in 
which all discontent was directed against the government.175 One factor was therefore 
the desire to channel popular discontent, which had reached a critical level, toward 
democratic avenues in order to prevent a social explosion.176 
A large number of Turks, including the bourgeoisie, found the patronizing attitude of 
the establishment particularly difficult to swallow in the late 1940s. In Zürcher’s words, 
“The regime had never been popular with the masses.”177 The Kemalist reforms had 
done little to improve their lot but had stripped them of their religion by imposing 
secularism, a move resented by ordinary people who could not understand why their 
age-old traditions – which could hardly be described as fundamentalist in a country 
where Islam has traditionally assumed a very pragmatic form – were summarily 
dismissed as obscurantist superstition.178 This might be one reason that people during 
the 1990s and again in the 2000s did not really support the military in its politics against 
the religious sects. Contrary to this, after the 1990s, the more the military harassed 
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religion and religious symbols such as the headscarf, the more the religiously motivated 
parties gained public support. 
The bourgeoisie did not place much trust in the single-party regime179 as it was 
always possible for it to suddenly institute policies detrimental to their interests, such as 
the Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) of 1942180 and the land reform and nationalization of 
forested areas undertaken in July and August 1945.181 Despite the generally pro-
business attitude of the state, the bourgeoisie felt insecure in its diminished ability to 
influence it. Sakip Sabanci, who was a major tycoon in Turkey, stated in his 
autobiography that, “the overwhelming impact of state-induced uncertainty in business 
life creates instability and leads to business failures.”182As Mardin points out, while the 
business community fails to exercise control over the state, there is always uncertainty 
and unpredictability in business life, no matter how sympathetic the attitude of the state 
to business interests.183 Consequently, there was a determination on the part of the 
bourgeoisie to end the domination of the state on the economy.184 Therefore, when the 
opportunity to do so appeared in 1945, they supported the creation of a multiparty 
system separating the ruling party (the Republican Peoples Party, or RPP) and the state 
(since the RPP was in fact running the state)185 and, in time, establishing the hegemony 
of the former over the latter. 186 The military, as well as the RPP, were seen by the 
masses as the main agents behind religious oppression. Therefore, the introduction of 
the multiparty system was welcomed by people of all classes, who showed their support 
by overwhelmingly voting for the Democrat Party (DP) and its liberal policies. 
Nye has also noted that perhaps it was inevitable that the multiparty system instituted 
by İnönü would devolve into the factional polarization and bitter conflict that has come 
to characterize Turkish politics as battles between right and left-wing extremists during 
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the past two decades show.187 It was this conflict that created the conditions for the first 
military coup in 1960. However, the ways in which the principal political players 
reacted to the creation of the multiparty system were more important in leading to the 
intervention of the armed forces in 1960. Frey writes that, following its electoral victory 
in 1950, the DP 
Began to tamper with the cherished programs supported and even, to a large extent, inaugurated 
by the army ... and, in the eyes of many officers, began to sabotage some of those programs.188 
 
Hence there was a latent but growing feeling of betrayal among these military 
officers, which, in the words of Landau, was “gradually grouped under a commonly 
agreed slogan of ‘a return to Atatürkism’ or ‘Neo-Kemalism.’”189 They strongly 
believed that it was religious fundamentalism that had brought backwardness to the 
Ottoman Empire and that had eventually brought about its end. They thought that by 
allowing religious freedom, the DP was preparing the subsequent end of the Kemalist 
state too. This feeling of betrayal, coupled with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’s 
indiscriminate use of the military to enforce martial law so as to prop up his unpopular 
regime (mostly among military personal), resulted in the politicization of the military in 
the late 1950s.  
The initial military coup in 1960, which was conducted by the National Unity 
Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi),190 set a historical precedent which led to an increase 
in the military’s role in the administration of the state. After the coup, power and 
authority which were constitutionally vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(TGNA) was assigned to the NUC until it would be eventually transferred to a new 
TGNA.191 The military intervention in politics can therefore be viewed to a certain 
degree as self-perpetuating. 
Following this coup, the National Security Council (NSC [Tr.: Milli Güvenlik 
Kurulu-MGK]) was created through the 1961 constitution.192 This body was composed 
of the president, the prime minister, the chief of general staff, the ministers of national 
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defense, the three commanders of the army and the commander of the gendarmerie 
forces and was an important forum for the military to express its political views.193 
According to law number 129, the duty of the NSC is to advise the council of ministers 
on security matters and to help them implement any decision taken by the council.194 
Videt writes that the creation of the NSC in 1962 assured a constitutionally 
guaranteed privileged role for the military in Turkish politics and injured civilian rule 
permanently.195 The NSC provided a legal forum for the armed forces to convey their 
views to civilian politicians and to voice the concerns of the military regarding domestic 
politics and foreign relations.196 The strength of the NSC was confirmed in 1971 by the 
“coup by memorandum.” This is still a powerful institution; for example, in 1997, the 
NSC thought that a government led by the Welfare Party was a threat to secularism in 
Turkey and forced the government to resign.197 
With each military coup, the role of the armed forces in the political sphere was 
strengthened and re-affirmed, and the legal basis for such a role was consolidated in a 
series of enactments. The Turkish Constitution of 1982, The Turkish Armed Forces 
Internal Service Law of 1961 and the National Security Council Law of 1983 all 
emphasized the military’s duty to, in one form or another, “protect the democratic 
principles of the republic”. Article 85 of the Internal Service Regulations of the Turkish 
Armed Forces stipulated that those forces “shall defend the country against the internal 
as well as the external threats, if necessary by force.”198 
One factor that facilitated the military taking an active role in the political life of the 
nation was the homogeneous lifestyle of the officers, which led to a unity of political 
views and of purpose. The officer class was a professional military group, which tended 
to avoid the rest of society, almost for life. This had the effect of creating a kind of 
social layer, complete with their own casinos, swimming pools, sports centers, 
restaurants and even private beaches. Places occupied by the military are always the 
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most beautiful parts of the country, such as the banks of the Bosporus in Istanbul. There 
was therefore a distinct, fairly homogenous, group of people with a high degree of 
organization and similar aims. 
Turkish military training begins at an early age, with army officers of the future 
isolated from the rest of society and educated in military high schools. Orhan Erkanlı, a 
former member of the NUC of 1960, wrote in 1973 that, 
The military class lives an enclosed life, and its contacts with the civilian people are slight. ... 
They spend all twenty-four hours of the day in the same environment, and in the company of the 
same people. This way of life draws them into exactly the same ideas, opinions, complaints and 
results.199 
 
The military therefore needs to be viewed not merely as a professional group but as a 
distinct social group in Turkish society with its own political aims and ideals. Moreover, 
the officer class has an aristocratic confidence in the superiority of its own political 
ideals. Hale points out that army cadets are impressed with the view that they are 
superior to civilians200, indeed, Birand’s quote of a speech made by a commander to 
military students is illustrative here: 
Always bear in mind that you are superior to everyone and everything and that you are trained 
here to have superior knowledge and superior qualities.201 
 
It was in the 1950s that the Turkish army became adequately equipped to mobilize 
itself as a political force, largely due to US aid.202 This aid also encouraged the army in 
its belief that civilian politicians were failing Turkish society. Many young officers 
went abroad for training through NATO exchange programs and so had a chance to see 
how backward Turkey was when compared to the West. According to Zürcher, it is now 
known that from 1955 onwards plots against the government were hatched in these 
circles.203 
Since then, the position of the military class has changed dramatically as a result of 
the EU backed reform programs which were implemented – especially during JDP-
dominated governments. Military figures are no longer considered untouchable, since 
hundreds of them have been prosecuted and have ended up in prison during the now 
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famous Ergenekon, Balyoz (sledgehammer) and Espionage trials. Public opinion 
towards their position in the country has also changed. This naturally led to a major 
attitude shift amongst the officer class too, in that many more now believe that they are 
there solely for security purposes and that they serve the state and the people. This was 
reflected in their actions, as mighty top brass generals now resign quietly, rather than 
giving the prime ministers orders and warnings.204 In sum, although they are still seen 
as a distinct class in society, it is nowhere near the levels seen in the past.  
The military’s own constitution defines its role as to protect both the state and the 
republic. Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code states: “The 
duty of the Armed Forces is to protect and safeguard Turkish territory and the Turkish 
Republic as it stipulated in the Constitution.”205 General Kenan Evren in fact cited this 
article after the coup of 1980 as legal justification for the takeover of the government by 
the armed forces in circumstances where the republic might otherwise have collapsed.206 
İhsan Dağı argues that there is a deep-rooted tradition of military intervention in 
politics which is largely brought about by the military’s self-perception as “the guardian 
of the state” and its distrust of politicians.207 The military’s conception of democracy in 
Turkey is based on its own perception of the expression of the national will rather than 
just ballot box results.208 The self-ascribed guardian role of the military, which is 
legitimized by the role of military elites in forming the republic and a national security 
ideology, gives rise to interventionist and authoritarian tendencies.209 
According to the current mission statement of the Turkish military, it sees itself as 
having a moral and legal obligation to protect the Turkish republic against every kind of 
threat or danger that might threaten the existence of the state.210 It does not differentiate 
between internal and external threats or between threats to the country’s territorial 
integrity and to the Kemalist principles enshrined in the Turkish Constitution.211 As a 
result, anything that was seen as a threat by the army was something to act against. 
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Civilian opinion had no importance once the generals “who are superior in knowledge” 
had made a decision. 
Nevertheless, thanks to relations with the EU, and the helping hands of the reform 
packages imposed by it, Turkey’s civilian authority has managed to amend the articles 
that had previously paved the way for the coups since 1960s. In this respect, Article 35 
was rephrased and greater emphasis placed on the role of the army as a protector from 
“external threats” rather than “internal” ones. The new article reads:  
The duty of the Armed Forces is to protect the Turkish homeland against threats and dangers to 
come from abroad, to ensure the preservation and strengthening of military power in a manner 
that will provide deterrence, to fulfil the duties abroad with the decision of the Parliament and 
help maintain international peace.212 
  
Bal writes that another factor that led the army to intervene in politics during the 
second half of the twentieth century was the Turkish military’s perception of itself as 
representing enlightenment, secularism and modernism.213 Dağı also refers to the legacy 
of the military as a self-professed “modernizer.”214 Indeed, this modernizing aspect of 
the military ever since the nineteenth century meant that, especially after the Kemalist 
reforms, the military was even more committed to bringing in a Western-style 
government which would be democratic (in the sense that the military understood 
democracy, which essentially meant secular government).215 
The reform movements that had emerged at the end of the nineteenth century had 
been led by the military, and it was the military intelligentsia that had designed the 
secular Turkish Republic. As former president and 1980 coup leader, Kenan Evren, one 
said, “the Turkish armed forces are devoted to democracy and they are its indestructible 
guards.”216 
The reality is that Evren was being selective in his interpretation of the term 
“democracy,” taking the secular elements of Western democracy and not the general 
principles of rule by elected representatives. In the West, military interventions are not 
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part of the democratic structure. Therefore, what Evren really means when he is 
discussing democracy is the idea that Turkey is a “secular republic”. The Turkish army 
therefore reacted whenever it considered that these principles were coming under threat. 
In all three coups, the reasons given by the military for intervention have been 
similar in nature: The military say that they are “the guardians of democracy and the 
civilians, who need to be cared for and guided.”217 In a press conference on May 28, 
1960, General Gürsel emphasized that: 
The purpose and the aim of the revolution is to bring the country with all speed to a fair, clean 
and solid democracy. I want to transfer power and the administration of the nation to the free 
choice of the people.218 
 
The 1971 ultimatum stated that the current government had “made the public lose all 
hope of reaching a level of contemporary civilization, a goal set by Atatürk.”219 Dağı 
further notes a conflict between the military’s role as a modernizer and its previously 
mentioned desire to avoid fragmentation and insecurity. While the latter leads to 
intervention in political life as a way to safeguard the principles of the republic and to 
clean up the mess politicians make, the former forces the military to reassert its 
commitment to democracy and a rapid return to civilian rule after a military takeover.220 
Although the Turkish army’s long-term aim is the establishment of a democratic state, it 
is willing to sacrifice democratic principles in the short term where it perceives that they 
pose a threat to national unity. 
The military’s principles therefore lead it to intervene in politics but also operate to 
define its role narrowly and limit such intervention to the short term. As Karpat argues, 
despite the difficulties in managing a Western-style civil-military relationship, the 
Turkish military did not envisage the creation of a permanent military regime and 
remained the “guardian” of the state, not the “ruler.”221 
Paradoxically, the later military coups can be seen in one sense as short-term 
measures to actually protect the state against long-term military rule. From 1960 to 
1980 the military interventions in Turkey became less and less threatening to the 
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consolidation of democracy.222 While in 1960, colonels led the military intervention, the 
following two interventions were carried out by higher-ranking generals. Also, while a 
faction of the junta that carried out the 1960-1961 intervention toyed with the idea of 
introducing not only constitutional but also social and economic reforms in Turkey, the 
latter two had more limited goals.223 
There was also civilian encouragement of the interventions of the army in Turkish 
politics. As the leader of the 1980 coup, Evren, said in 1987: 
The armed forces do not carry out a coup whenever they feel like it. They do it only at the 
invitation of the nation. And the nation wanted the coup of 12 September.224 
 
The initial coup, in 1960, was legitimated by a contemporary report of the then 
leading students of law that claimed that the DP government, which was subsequently 
removed from power, had lost its legitimacy. It was argued that the government had 
acted with no regard to the enlightened public opinion of the country.225 Heper points 
out that it was in fact this report that led the military to reconsider their initial decision 
to return to civilian rule as soon as possible and to stay in power and supervise the 
adoption of a new constitution.226 
When we look at public perception of the military’s role in Turkey, the combination 
of social, cultural and historical factors which have exalted the Turkish military as 
virtually the embodiment of the nation have also endowed it with a security role, which 
extends far beyond that of the armed forces in Westernized parliamentary democracies. 
Although the Turkish military undoubtedly relishes its role as both guardian of the 
nation and of Kemalist doctrine, it is not merely self-appointed, it has a popular 
mandate. Many Turks expect the military not only to protect them against foreign 
threats but also to intervene to restore order from the chaos created by inept and corrupt 
civilian government.227 
It is the lack of confidence in politicians and the political process which, added to the 
public prestige of the armed forces, has ensured that public perception of the security 
role of the military extends into the political arena. In 1980 when the military physically 
intervened, the public initially welcomed the coup. Commenting on this, Birand writes, 
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Weary and shocked after years of terror in the streets, the Turkish public embraced Kenan Evren 
and the army as their liberators. Some got carried away and began comparing Evren with the 
legendary Atatürk… A broad spectrum of the Turkish people was convinced that the country had 
been saved from the brink of self-destruction.228 
 
Birand adds “but this attitude changed as time passed.”229 Hale also notes that by 
September 14, life throughout Turkey had returned to an unaccustomed calm.230 
However, it should be noted that the public support for the military was for intervention 
rather than rule.231 In other words, people wanted the generals to go back to their 
barracks once calm was restored. 
Some analysts, such as Hale and Jenkins, have suggested that among national 
institutions, only the armed forces retain consistent public trust and respect.232 Other 
Western commentators also note the outlook of the military in Turkey; Nick Ludington, 
who for years was a Turkish correspondent for the Associated Press, talked of Turkish 
officers as “well-educated, in general non-corrupt, and Western-oriented secular 
democrats.”233 Bal comments that sometimes the lack of belief in democracy and the 
incapability of civil society to solve its own problems are related to the military 
interventions.234 
The military has been an effective institution, perhaps the most effective institution, 
within the Turkish state. Despite it being a very important economic actor in its own 
right, the military establishment is seen as largely untainted by corruption. This is a 
function of the sheer size of the military establishment – the second largest in NATO 
after the United States – its large claim on state spending and its pension, foundation 
and commercial holdings. Retired senior officers are commonplace on the boards of 
Turkey’s large holding companies.235 
However, while the support for the army always remained high against the PKK 
terrorism, with the JDP in power and the aforementioned court cases against military 
personal, the attitude of people towards the military has changed. According to the 
opinion polls, confidence in the army was 90 % before the Ergenokon trials, but went 
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down to 63 % by 2010. This was the lowest public support ever for the military, as it 
had never previously gone below 80 %.236  
It is probable that  the younger and more educated generation, which has been much 
more exposed to the EU and the Western standards, has a different set of expectations of 
the army and they are the root cause for the lowering of support. These people want see 
the military as a security provider, rather than policy makers. For the majority in this 
group, conscription is not needed as it gets in the way of their career plans.237 They 
think Turkey must build a professional army and stop relying on conscription.  
Although internal factors were the root cause of the interventions of the army in 
civilian politics, external factors should not be disregarded. Many observers in Turkish 
politics are convinced that there could have been no coup unless Washington had given 
the green light.238 All three direct interventions happened during the Cold War era 
(1945-1991). As an indispensable ally of the United States, Turkey was the forward 
base of Western capitalist interests near the southeastern borders of the Soviet Union. 
For example, the United States installed the Jupiter nuclear missiles in southern Turkey 
in the 1950s, which were one of the root causes of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.239 
After the Truman Doctrine, Turkey was included in the American sphere of influence 
and joined NATO in 1952 (Turkey sent soldiers to Korea during the Korean War to 
show its support). On one hand, the United States was supporting liberal reformers 
inside the DP that had allowed religious freedoms, a sort of counterbalance to anti-
religious Communist tendencies; while on the other hand, it spent millions of dollars to 
modernize the Turkish army with training programs by NATO officers. Some of the 
officers would go on to carry out the 1960 coup, officers such as Alparslan Türkeş who 
had been trained in the United States. We can say that American policy towards Turkey 
during the Cold War was paradoxical. This was clearly explained in the memories of a 
well-known revolutionary officer, Talat Turhan: 
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The Anti-Communist Front, which was formed in every American ally during the Cold War, 
included the army, nationalist groups and even religious organisations. They were all financed 
by American dollars.240 
 
With this in mind, the military was seen as the vanguard of Western, and mainly 
American, interests in Turkey. Thus whenever left-wing groups gained momentum, 
right wingers were supported, and if they could not stop the rise of the left, the military 
intervened. 
The army’s influence in politics was something the EC strongly disliked. However, we 
cannot say the same thing for the United States, as it has been claimed that the 1980 
coup was the “preference of the USA.”241 According to Birand, as cited by Balta, the 
CIA Ankara Station Chief Paul Henze sent a telegram to Washington informing the US 
President James Carter242 about the coup by saying “Our boys have done it.”243 When 
Henze disowned the words and branded Birand as a liar, Birand provided the media 
with the video of a conversation, proving the words Henze used. 
Another example of US support for the coup was its strong opposition to the many 
EC countries who chose to cease relations with Turkey following the coup. For 
example, after the coup, the EC rejected the release of the Fourth Protocol that involved 
financial help (European Currency unit (ECU) 600 million) to Turkey on the grounds 
that the current military regime in Turkey was not welcomed by the EC.244 However, 
the United States, which also supported and perhaps organized (via the CIA) similar 
coups in Greece, Chili, Argentina and Brazil,245 declared that it trusted the Turkish 
army. Thanks to this US support, although almost all formal relations were cut off until 
1986, the EC did not prevent military aid to Turkey after the coup.246 
This shows how EU-Turkish relations have been affected with the special 
relationship that existed between Turkey and the US. However, as mentioned later on, 
some Turkey skeptics in the EU see the Turkish-US relationship with a hint of caution, 
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believing that Turkey could become a Trojan horse for US interests within the Union. 
On the other hand, Turkey-US relations are not the same as they used to be before the 
new millennium as Turkey is trying to pursue at least some of its foreign and defense 
relations independently from US influence. This was the case when Turkey decided to 
award the tender for a missile defense system to China, instead of to a NATO state, 
since China offered co-production and technology transfer to Turkey which neither the 
USA nor other NATO members were too keen on doing.247 This choice was not 
welcomed by NATO members as they argued that these weapons were not compatible 
with the NATO military equipment. Under pressure from NATO, Turkey, who first, 
signalled a clear message to its allies that relations were not going to be the same as 
before did go back on its decision and re-opened the bidding to allow Western 
companies to revise and resubmit their bids. On 19 February 2015, the Turkish Defence 
Minister İsmet Yılmaz announced that “there was no interest from the Western 
companies to the rebidding so Turkey is closer to completing the agreement with the 
Chinese company.” Yılmaz also made it clear that “the new missiles would not be 
integrated in to the NATO defence system and operate completely independent of it.”248 
 
Direct causes of military intervention in Turkish politics: 
The1960 coup 
      On May 27, 1960, modern Turkey witnessed its first full-fledged military coup 
d’état. The coup was of a non-hierarchical nature in the sense that it was not carried out 
by generals, but by other military officers of lower rank, such as colonels.249 These 
middle-rank officers, upon assuming power, organized themselves into a revolutionary 
council named the National Unity Committee (NUC), under the chairmanship of 
General Cemal Gürsel, the former commander of the army.250 Menderes’ policies can be 
seen as the direct cause of the 1960 coup. However, during the early part of DP rule, the 
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majority of the people in Turkey supported liberal reforms brought by his government. 
As Karpat notes, 
The Democrat Party regarded religious freedom as one of the principles of basic freedom; the 
words of the party suggested that Turkish society was an Islamic society, so that people should 
practice their religion in the way they like and in the language they prefer without mixing 
religion in with daily politics.251 
 
For example, the DP passed a law with the support of the RPP252 allowing the call to 
prayer to be made once again in Arabic – something which had been outlawed since 
1932 – in accordance with its liberal view on religious affairs. A week after his election 
victory, on May 20, 1950, Menderes made a speech explaining the program of his new 
government and did not even mention Atatürk’s name. In fact, he emphasized that the 
victory of the DP was the most important revolutionary moment in Turkish history.253 
These activities were interpreted by the officer class as undermining secularism and 
Kemalism. The DP went further with their reforms; they shortened the period of 
military service, enforced a liberal amnesty law, made travel for Turkish citizens abroad 
easier, as well as that of foreigners to visit Turkey. Formerly banned Turkish citizens 
were allowed back to Turkey, enacted a new press law and formed a commission to 
determine which laws and decrees were anti-democratic.254 However, the Menderes 
government also repeatedly passed legislation designed to restrict freedom of the press 
to print material “designed to damage the political or financial prestige of the state” or 
“belittling persons holding official positions,” in order to combat growing Kemalist 
political opposition.255 Not only was strict censorship placed on newspapers and radio 
stations, thus inhibiting free discussion of political and social issues, but opposition 
parties were also barred from access to state radio, the only way the masses could be 
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reached during the election campaign of 1957.256 Menderes felt secure in his position, 
knowing that the people were behind him, and hence did not think about the military.257 
By 1959, growing hostilities between government and opposition supporters fuelled 
by a polarization of public opinion led to a breakdown in law and order.258 Although 
Menderes survived a plane crash near London on his way to Cyprus negotiations, on 
February 17, 1959, which worked to soften relations between the two sides, it did not 
take too long for the RPP to start an aggressive campaign against the government. In 
April 1959, the leader of the RPP, İsmet İnönü, started a tour of Western Anatolian 
cities which his followers called “Büyük Taarruz” – or “the Great Offensive”.259 It was 
named after one of the campaigns of the Turkish Independence war, a period when 
İnönü was commander in chief of the Western Front in Turkey. The tour was 
deliberately begun from Uşak, the town where İnönü took the Greek commander in 
chief, Nikolaos Trikopis, as a prisoner of war.260 
Student demonstrations in April 1960 led to violent clashes with police, with the 
imposition the following month of martial law in Istanbul and Ankara failing to restore 
order. In fact, it was the imposition of martial law that provided the catalyst for the 
coup, as many army officers were opposed to their mandate to fire on “even the smallest 
public assembly.”261 So, in a sense, in a strange twist of events, the military resisted the 
anti-democratic will of the civilian government. 
The stated purpose of the 1960 coup was to return the Turkish republic to the 
democratic reforms of Atatürk. The immediate or proximate casus belli was an order 
from Menderes to the military to arrest İnönü. But, in fact, this coup was organized and 
planned by the students and faculty of the War College and the Faculty of Political 
Science – many of the same social forces that had achieved the Young Turk Revolution 
of a half-century earlier.262 This intervention clearly showed that the Turkish army was 
                                                          
256 Lombardi, ibid.; Kemal H. Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," The Western Political Quarterly, 
Jun. 1961, pp. 43-59 and Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey, Vol. II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Vol. II, p.411. 
257 Aydemir, ibid., p.210. 
258 George S. Harris, ‘The role of the military in Turkey in the 1980s’, in M. Heper and A. Evin (eds.) 
State Democracy and the Military, (Berlin: deGruyter, 1988), p. 182. 
259Protesto Kurbani Siyasiler (politicians who were the victims of protest, translation of author), Sabah, 
Apr, 19, 2010, http://www.sabah.com.tr/fotohaber/gundem/protesto_kurbani_siyasiler/17076,  retrieved 
Jun. 12, 2011. 
260 Aydemir, ibid., pp.281-282. 
261 Hale, ibid., pp.185-189. 
262 Shaw and Shaw, ibid. p.414. 
90 
 
not separate from politics. The tradition they acquired from the Ottomans, of being 
deeply involved in politics, was in fact still the case. 
 
The 1971 military ultimatum 
     In 1971 Turkey experienced what Özbudun called a “half coup”, in which the 
military chose to govern from behind the scenes instead of taking over directly.263 It is 
also known as the “coup by memorandum.” On March 12, 1971, Chief of General Staff 
Memduh Tagmac handed Prime Minister Demirel what amounted to an ultimatum from 
the armed forces, demanding that a strong government be formed, that would be able to 
end “anarchy” and carry out reforms “in a Kemalist spirit.”264 If the demands were not 
met speedily, the army would “exercise its constitutional duty” and take over the 
administration directly.265 
A breakdown in law and order was also the trigger for the military ultimatum of 
1971. After 1968, clashes between right- and left-wing students turned especially 
murderous, and bank robberies and kidnappings rocked Turkey.266 The generals blamed 
the government for the disorder. By early 1971, Demirel’s government, weakened by 
defections, seemed to have become paralyzed. This paralysis coincided with the 
deterioration of the economy. Despite the controlled devaluation of the national 
currency in August 1970, efforts to redress the economic decline were undermined by 
chronic inflation (78 % from 1963 to 1968).267 Again, as had happened in 1960, what 
was seen as the abuse of the armed forces led to political intervention by the military; 
martial law was imposed in Istanbul in 1970.268 The use of the army to support an 
unpopular government was opposed, and the generals issued a series of proclamations 
and warnings. General Memduh Tagmac used his New Year’s address to issue a strong 
warning to “all who may try to destroy the national integrity of the republican regime 
and Atatürk’s reforms.”269 He continued:  
The armed forces, whose mission is to protect the country against any danger from without or 
within, will smash any action directed against the country.270 
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It should also be noted that on this occasion people in Turkey kept quiet and, to a 
certain extent, supported the military. Commanders who did not want to take power into 
their own hands organized an ‘above party’ cabinet under the leadership of Nihat Erim. 
Erim appointed a technocratic cabinet from outside the political establishment to carry 
out the commanders' socio-economic reform programme.271 The regime rested on an 
unstable balance of power between civilian politicians and the military; it was neither a 
normal elected government, nor an outright military dictatorship which could entirely 
ignore parliamentary opposition.272 It could therefore be considered as a meritocratic 
government since the members were chosen according to their intellectual capacity.  
 
The 1980 coup 
     Between 1973 and 1980 there were no less than ten successive governments. , and 
most of the time they were formed without the majority support in parliament.273 
According to Özbudun, this political instability would lead to the 1980 coup.274 There 
were similarities when compared to previous interventions. In particular, the role of the 
military in maintaining law and order had increased to a level that the generals did not 
like. By early September, 1980 it was estimated that approximately 25 % of the 
475,000-man army was involved in maintaining civil order, a role not welcomed by the 
military High Command.275 
There were also factors that existed in 1980 that had not been present in the 1960 and 
1971 interventions.276 As journalist Mehmet Ali Birand notes, it would have been 
impossible to expect them “to remain immune to the divisions and stirrings which had 
rent asunder the fabric of civil society.”277 By early 1980, senior officers were becoming 
increasingly alarmed that the country’s political polarization had begun to “seep into” 
the armed forces, as Birand has noted.278 
                                                          
271 Feruz Ahmad, ibid., pp.149-150 
272 William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, ibid.,  p.195 
273 Mango, The Turks Today, pp. 59-61 and Hale, ibid., p.215. 
274 Özbudun, ibid., p. 21. 
275 Soner Kizilkaya, ‘Bir 12 Eylul Bilancosu’, NTV Magazine, (September 2000), p.77. 
276 Sühayp Aydın, 1980 darbesi neden yapildi? (why di 1980 coup took place?), 
http://www.sosyaldusunce.com/1980-darbesi-neden-yapildi/ retrieved, Dec.15, 2010 and Kenan 
Evren  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMSFJ0J1dZQ retrieved, Jan.15, 2011 and 
277 Birand, ibid., p.85. 
278 Ibid, p.56. 
92 
 
The organizers of this intervention had greater objectives than the previous ones. In 
many ways, the changes they brought consisted of undoing the work of their 
predecessors (the 1960 and 1971 coups)279 and declaring the 1961 constitution null and 
void. The 1980 junta questioned the legitimacy of the 1960 coup and blamed it for the 
liberal 1961 Constitution and democratic laws, denounced as a luxury it could not 
afford at this stage of Turkey’s development. Consequently, May 27 (the date of the 
1960 coup) was eliminated as a day of national celebration.280 Taken as a whole, the 
1982 constitution and other post-1980 legislation represent a significant attempt toward 
de-politicization coupled with greater state control over both the legal arena and the 
institutional framework of the nascent civil society in Turkey. The new constitution 
rejected two main things: a major premise of pluralist democracy and the clarification of 
the position of civil society institutions. The architects of the September 12 regime 
desired to construct a political sphere with the state at its center and society as the 
periphery.281 By 1980 the army had turned itself into an autonomous organ in Turkey. 
After the coup, the 1982 constitution made this position legal.282 
Evren, the coup commander, was very happy with the results of the intervention as it 
completely stopped the social unrest within hours. He commented without a trace of 
irony that “those young children [the soldiers who implemented the coup] saw 
themselves as the lions saving the country.”283 In what can only be described as a 
“justification tour” of the country after the intervention, Evren plainly announced that 
“there was no state, let alone state authority, and our intervention reminded people 
about the state.”284 
However, the unrest did stop after the military takeover and thousands of people 
including politicians, students and trade unionists were arrested – 48 of whom were 
executed – and strict censorship was imposed on the media. There was torture, 
persecution, oppression and coercion in the country.285 Many left Turkey and became 
asylum-seekers in major European countries such as Germany, France and the UK. 
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They created an anti-regime environment in Europe by informing the public about the 
mistreatment of the people by the military. This was not something the military would 
initially wanted, as these countries were providing both financial and military aid to 
Turkey. European leaders began to publicly criticize Turkey. As Dağı notes: 
Democracy and human rights issues were repeatedly expressed publicly and privately by the 
West European states in their bilateral relations with Turkey. At the beginning they showed a 
rather mild reaction, but as time passed without much progress, and as the generals took harsh 
policy decisions they became tougher.286 
 
Alternatively, the United States had a different way of dealing with the new situation 
in Turkey. It saw Turkey as a strategic ally in its fight against Soviet Communism 
during the Cold War. Therefore, it did not criticize the military’s intervention, merely 
expressing its trust in the Turkish military and their promise to restore democracy. 
Strategic imperatives were the basis of the US approach to Turkey in the post-coup 
period and they prevailed over concerns about democracy and human rights. US high 
officials even criticized their European allies for failing to understand Turkey’s 
problems and lobbied effectively in the Council of Europe to prevent Turkey’s 
expulsion.287 However, the EC repeatedly expressed its discomfort at the general state 
of democracy and human rights in the country. The leaders of European countries were 
very clear that the EC would not deal with an anti-democratic regime; indeed, they had 
stopped dealing with Greece in 1967 in the wake of the coup there. As a concrete step 
against the military regime in Turkey, the European Commission decided not to pass the 
Fourth Financial Protocol to the Council of the European Community. Consequently, 
any possible European aid to Turkey became conditional on the restoration of civil 
democracy. This was a clear sign that Turkey was being isolated in European affairs, 
something which disturbed the military as it saw itself as a secular modernizing force. 
By imposing strict censorship and putting thousands of people on trial, the 1980 
military regime tried to change the political attitude of the people and to de-politicize 
the whole of society in an attempt to prevent future political and ideological 
fragmentation like that which had characterized pre-coup Turkey. The aims of the coup 
were expressed in the first communiqué as including “to re-establish the authority of the 
state and to eliminate all the factors that prevent the normal functioning of the 
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democratic order.”288 This third intervention can therefore be seen as an attempt to 
ensure long-term reforms that would prevent the need for a fourth intervention. 
However, it should be noted that the last direct coup of 1980 did not prevent Turkish 
democracy from experiencing the so-called “post-modern coup” in 1997. Nor did it 
prevent the military from issuing a threat to the JDP government in April 2007 in the 
now infamous “E-coup.” 
Before this however, the 1990s was another interesting period of civil military 
relations in Turkey. Shortly after the creation of the Task Force West (Bati Calışma 
Grubu) in the naval staff division of the military, a move designed to collect evidence 
about “fundamentalist threats” to the state, on February 28, 1997 the military issued a 
memorandum to Erbakan – then head of the coalition government – that called on him 
to “balance democracy” and “restore the Kemalist regime”289 in the face of “radical 
Islamic threats”. In addition to institutional mechanisms such as the NSC, the military 
used a variety of informal mechanisms to influence policy against the government. 
These ranged from public pronouncements and briefings to journalists, to informal 
contacts with bureaucrats and politicians.290 As a result of the pressure applied by the 
military, on June 18, Prime Minister Erbakan resigned.291 The “Modern coup” of 28th 
February, as it came to be known, caused the almost total disestablishment of Islamic 
organisations in the country.292 Religious foundations, schools and other establishments 
were all taken under a tight scrutiny and under pressure from the military’s threat, many 
people tried to cut off links with these organisations.  
After these events, the military restored its historically privileged position and started 
exercising dominance over civilian rule until almost late 2007. However, after 1999 – 
thanks to Turkey’s closer ties with the EU – governments began pushing forward with 
reforms necessary to meet European standards in democracy, as outlined by the 
Copenhagen Criteria. These reforms meant that there was no space for generals to set up 
policy agendas for the civilian authorities. The only way for governments to tackle the 
military was to take the modernization and westernization tools away from it and 
spearhead these two processes themselves. This is exactly what happened, especially 
after the pro-Islamic JDP’s landslide victory in the 2002 general election. Knowing well 
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the military’s stance towards them, the JDP was cautious not to make any religiously 
motivated moves. They left their traditional Islamist rhetoric in favor of conservative 
democratic discourse, allowing them to gain the backing of the well-known liberals and 
public figures.293  
At the same time, they bore in mind the most important charge that the military could 
use against them, that of “religious fundamentalism” (or Irtica in Turkish) and “turning 
away from Europe.” The JDP therefore became the champions of modernization and 
westernization in Turkey – the two most important aspects the military was proud of 
being the protector of ever since the creation of the republic.  
During the rule of the pro-Islamic JDP government led by Erdoğan, the military’s 
authority on civilian rule almost completely vanished. During this quick, but very 
important progress Turkey made in terms of democracy, one cannot underestimate the 
significant role that the EU played. Below we will be evaluating in detail the 
chronology of this development. 
 
The EU’s impact on the civil military relations in Turkey 
Although the EU had clearly showed its disapproval of the military’s involvement in 
civilian politics, until the beginning of the 2000’s EU’s impact in Turkish domestic 
affairs was factually minimal. This was due to the fact that there was not a strong 
government drive since Özal, who until his death, tried to increase the authority of the 
civilian government over the military. Özal did try to overcome the military’s presence 
by doing unprecedented things.  
Firstly, in the hierarchical protocol order, the Prime Minister used to stand at number 
seven. Özal changed this to make it so that he became third, after the president, and the 
head of the parliament.294 Then, in June 1987 he vetoed Necdet Öztorun,295 as the chief 
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of General Staff.296 Moreover, he ignored the foreign office and the chief of General 
Staff, Necip Torumtay, who was selected by Özal when he decided to ally with the USA 
during the first Gulf War. Torumtay resigned over this issue, thus giving Özal a third 
consecutive victory over the generals. However, it should be noted that at the time Özal 
had a very good relationship with US president, George Bush Sr., and many in Turkey 
knew that the army could not get its way without de-facto authorization coming from 
the USA, as had happened during the 1980 coup. To reiterate again, these events could 
have resulted from the fact that the Cold War was nearly over, and that the army was no 
longer perceived by both Western and Turkish politicians as the most important entity 
in protecting Turkey against  possible Soviet aggression.  
In the 1990’s and early 2000’s, Turkish politics lacked three important elements to 
subdue the military. First was the absence of a strong domestic political actor. The 
second element was the insecurity felt within the country as internal security threats 
reached an all-time high, and finally, insufficient international assistance.  
During this time, no civilian authority could undertake the task of fighting the army 
single handedly, due to the fact that the government was invariably led by coalitions 
with rarely any unanimity with regarding internal and external matters. Again, 
traditional Kemalist elites and the dominant media always supported and promoted the 
army, viewing this as the only stable and powerful institution that could support them 
and their privileges. These elites strongly believed that Turkey’s geographical 
conditions required a special type of democracy297 where the army occupied a central 
place. To them, Turkey was encircled by a ring of fire: Armenia, Syria, and Greece all 
laid claims to Turkish land, and with Iran and other Middle Eastern countries 
considered too religious and a threat to Turkey’s secularism, while the Kurds posed an 
internal threat to Turkey’s unity. For Kemalists, the lack of a strong civilian government 
which could keep the people together against all of these perceived threats meant that 
the army became critically important. 
Moreover, the increasing terrorist activities of the Kurdish separatist group, the PKK, 
made both the military and general population in the country believe that soldiers were 
the most important people in maintaining peace in the country against an international 
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conspiracy that wanted to divide Turkey. This conspiracy, in their eyes, had been 
ongoing ever since the First World War. The years 1992 to 1995 were seen as especially 
critical times in terms of general terrorist activities and unrest as well as violent 
crackdowns on many civilian and other groups in southeastern Turkey. During this time 
media coverage was dominated by military activities in the southeast with regular 
scenes of funeral ceremonies for fallen soldiers, as well as coverage of other internal 
and external threats to the country.  
Lastly, although Turkey was trying to get ever closer to the EU, as seen in the 
successful bid to secure a Customs Union deal in 1995, there were few other steps that 
had been taken towards membership since the first application was made in 1987. As a 
result, external assistance and guidance from the EU caused the civilian authority to feel 
weak when compared to the military. This worked to give the military the sense that it 
occupied first place in the eyes of the public. This was only intensified when the 
Islamically-rooted Welfare Party (WP) of Erbakan won the general election on 24 
December 1995 with 21.8 % of the vote which gave it 158 MPs in Parliament.  
This result created tension between segments of the military and civilian leaders.298 
Army chiefs, who never did anything tangible to get close to the West besides rhetorical 
commitments, were worried that a religious party could move Turkey away from its 
‘western orientation’. A large part of the media was behind the military’s stance against 
the WP. This also included many left-wing politicians. It is worth mentioning here that 
some influential conservative politicians, like former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, 
openly showed their disapproval of the involvement of the military in politics. In one of 
her rallies, Ciller, the first female Prime Minister of Turkey, who was also a professor 
of economics and a well-known western-leaning democrat, stated that “[the] Public 
wants the military to get out of the politics and stick to soldiering”299 
As well as many of the internal dynamics, external support for the military was also 
incremental during the aforementioned years. As already mentioned, American support 
for the military during the Cold War was one of the main reasons it felt its involvement 
in politics was justified and was vital to keeping Turkey a western oriented and 
secularist state. However, this is not to say that Turkey lost its importance entirely for 
the West after the Cold War. When the superpower rivalry was over, Turkey continued 
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to perceive its geographic location as a military asset which offered the opportunity to 
act as a bridge, or a barrier, between the West and the energy resources in the Middle 
East.300 Especially the American involvement in the Middle East and Iraq at the 
beginning of the 1990’s and Turkey’s active support of American policies in the region 
once again made the military the country’s most important foreign policy tool. Due to 
the fact that the Turkish military had allied itself with Western powers, much literature 
and media coverage also clearly promoted the notion that the military was a secularist 
organization. For example, Weede argued that “Turkey is still the best example of a 
Muslim democracy, but Turkish democracy is strongly guided by the secularist armed 
forces, which makes the democratic character of the regime dubious.”301 Again 
Chomsky argued that the American media will not pay attention to many negative 
aspects in Turkey.302 
It is important to note that the military’s traditional place in Turkish politics was 
always seen as a headache in terms of Turkey-EU relations. Thanks to its military, 
Turkey officially became part of the western alliance system in the 1950s due to its 
membership of NATO. Over the last five decades, however, and especially during EU 
negotiations, the same army that had forced Turkey to orientate itself westwards now 
became an obstacle for Turkey’s western-oriented policies. In one sense, the military 
was confused about whether it should support the EU or not, and the military frequently 
caused tension in negotiations with the EU over accession, acting as a barrier which 
prevented the country from meeting the Copenhagen Criteria which has steered EU 
enlargement since the early 1990’s.303 Still, it would be the democratization process, 
strengthened by the EU’s accession conditionality (the acquis communautaire)304, that 
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would change the role and position of the military in policy making.305 Due to the EU’s 
harmonization reform packages, which had to be implemented, by 2007 the military’s 
authority over the civilian government had weakened and by the end of 2014 it was 
reduced almost to zero. This progress will be explained in detail below. 
 
Reform and Progress in civilian-military relations 
The military’s strict control over civilian rule did not last too long after a clear 
confrontation had begun between the self-styled secularist forces and the Islamic 
political activists during the second half of 1990’s. This fight became most overt in 
1997 after the military dominated NSC forced the coalition government, headed by 
Erbakan – the predecessor of the now ruling JDP – to resign.306 
However, by the end of 2007, just a decade after their massive victory against 
political Islam307, the military had almost totally lost control over civilian authorities. 
There is no doubt that the political balance shifted in favor of civilians thanks to the 
EU’s conditionality rules – considered in this research as the main force behind the 
reform programs put in place by the JDP governments in Turkey since 2002.  
Up until 2007, the military was the main ‘secular force’ in the conflict between 
sections of Turkish society who were secularist and the more politically Islamist ones 
(or those with an ideology similar to Turkey’s current President, Erdoğan),308 which 
also included religiously motivated movements like the Nurcus. In this long running 
conflict, the military had maintained its position of strength by forging close relations 
with the most important elements of the Turkish state, such as the judiciary, including 
the Constitutional Court (which decided on the closure of the political parties), as well 
as various ministries. It also found close allies within the secularist media circles and 
business environment which controlled the majority of the mass media and the 
industrial output in Turkey.309  
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As civilian authorities in Turkey could not single handedly change the nature of 
civilian-military relations in favor of the former, external assistance and guidance was 
crucially necessary. Therefore, both the 1999 Helsinki and 2004 Brussels summits can 
be seen as watershed moments in Turkish political history. After both of these summits, 
Turkey passed reform packages necessary to meet European democratic standards. 
These reforms focused on the EU’s most significant reservations about Turkish politics 
and policies, including civil military relations.310 
 
1999 Helsinki Council and aftermath 
After the Helsinki Summit where Turkey was officially accepted as a ‘Candidate 
Country’, many official documents, such as annual progress reports, criticized both the 
level of democracy and the military’s position in Turkey. The main criticisms in these 
documents generally centred on the institutional aspects of democratic control. In this 
respect, the status of the Chief of the General Staff (nominally under the prime 
minister), the role of the National Security Council in Turkish political life, the lack of 
an effective civilian control over the military / defence budget,311 the removal of 
military representatives from the civilian boards and amendments to military courts 
constituted the main focus of reform. As Yıldırım notes:  
Looking at EU’s official reports concerning Turkey, reform process in civil-military relations 
can be divided into four parts, the transformation of the role and composition of the National 
Security Council, the transparency of the defense budget, the removal of the military 
representatives from the civilian boards and amendment of military courts.312 
 
Due to the Helsinki summit, political life in Turkey began to change dramatically. 
This is because the decisions made there meant that Turkey needed to meet the 
Copenhagen political criteria in order to become a full member of the Union. The 
Turkish government had a strong incentive for its democratization and political reforms, 
that is, the distinct possibility of full membership of the EU, but only if it fulﬁlled the 
latter’s political conditions. This was also the ﬁrst time that Turkey was given a clear 
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perspective for membership; this, in turn, increased the impact of the EU on Turkey’s 
political Europeanization process.313 According to the EU Commission: 
The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, 
such as civilian control over the military, remain to be effectively addressed. 314 
 
In every official communication between Turkey and the EU, one of the most 
important obstacles for Turkey was cited as the army’s regular involvement in civilian 
politics. In simple terms Turkey needed to fulfill the EU conditionality which is the core 
strategy of the Union to induce non-Member States to comply with its principles of 
legitimate statehood,315 or, in Birsen’s words: 
The European Union has set a number of common and legitimate values upon which stands the 
membership of each candidate country. These values are accepted not only by the European 
members, but are also part of the overall international community and the United Nations.316 
 
Turkish leaders were excited about the decision of the EU in 1999, however, they 
were also very cautious not to make the military restless. In his speech in the aftermath 
of the Helsinki summit decision, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, a well-known left-wing 
secularist politician, said that the, “Turkish state would not grant freedom to those who 
oppose secularism” before adding that “the NSC was not an impediment to Turkish 
democracy.”317 Basically, he was worried that with the EU rapprochement, political 
Islam would gain momentum and only the military could stop it. By trying to clarify the 
NCS’s position he was also making it obvious that the EU was not happy with this 
institution within Turkish democracy. After the so-called ‘Post-Modern coup’ of 1997, 
the military exercised special powers over civilians in such matters connected to internal 
and external affairs. For example, when local governors had to be informed about 
security matters, the military did not consult the civilian authority first, but went straight 
to the governors. Again, as regards external affairs connected to countries such as Israel, 
USA and EU member states, the military had a near monopoly, thus influencing the 
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foreign ministry to a large degree318. But the decision in Helsinki was going to have a 
great impact on the way the military operated in Turkey. 
As Eralp states, the Helsinki framework required a major mental shift of orientation 
in the attitudes of both the EU and Turkish officials towards creating a more cooperative 
relationship. This summit also called for major political and economic reforms in 
Turkey. The EU actively stimulated these reforms through the publication of its 
Accession Partnership document which was announced in November 2000. As a result, 
the EC listed the short and medium term economic and political priorities aimed at the 
transformation of the Turkish state in line with the Copenhagen Criteria. The political 
measures in the document were designed to create a more liberal and pluralistic order 
and the economic measures focused on the achievement of macroeconomic stability and 
an effective regulatory structure.319 The Accession Partnership Documents also openly 
criticized the State Security Courts which included both civilian and military judges. 
These courts tried cases involving crimes against the security of the state and organized 
crime, and were one of the main reasons of criticism from the EU as they had been 
accused of human rights violations. 
Although in the immediate aftermath of the Helsinki Summit some changes were 
made with the introduction of EU Harmonisation Reform Packages, Turkey could only 
start to implement the major changes by the end of 2001 due to the dire financial crisis 
it was fighting in 2000 and early 2001. As well as this financial crisis, the weakness of 
the collation government was also a factor. With the introduction of the first (February 
19, 2002) and the second harmonization packages (April 9, 2002) the status of the State 
Security Courts which were created by the military regime in 1980 were changed. With 
the third package the structure of the NSC was an important area the government begun 
to address.  
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Harmonisation Package 
And Law number  
Date accepted Date 
officialised 
Connection to the military 
1- 4744 6 February 
2002 
19 February 
2002 
 
2- 4748 26 March 2002 9 April 2002 Changes in the State Security Courts 
3- 4771 3 August 2002 9 August 2002 Job description and specification of the 
gendarmerie force  
Changes in the Radio and Television 
Broadcasting 
4- 4778 2 January 2003 11 January 2003 Changes in the State Security Courts  
5- 4793 23 January 
2003 
4 February 2003  
6- 4928 15 July 2003 19 July 2003 Changes in the State Security Courts, 
internal security threats 
7- 4963 30 July 2003 7 August 2003 Military courts law number 11 
NSC and NSC Secretariat laws 4, 5, 9, 
13, 15, 19 
8- 5218 14 July 2004 21 July 2004  
9-  12 April 2006 Military courts  
Table 1- EU Harmonization Packages after 2000 
 
As Eralp writes in response to the Accession Partnership Document, the Turkish 
government prepared the Turkish National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis 
which was submitted to the EC in March 2001. This was a major attempt to meet the 
political and economic requirements of the EU. Turkish authorities focused on the 
political aspects of the National Program in the later part of 2001 and in 2002. For this 
purpose, 34 amendments to the constitution were made, primarily in the areas of human 
rights, freedom of expression and freedom of organization.320 At first, significant 
changes related to the position of the military in Turkey were not included in these 
amendments. However, they were followed by harmonization laws designed to translate 
the constitutional amendments into concrete action by bringing Turkish laws in line 
with the acquis.321 On August 3, 2002 with the introduction of the third Harmonization 
package the death penalty was abolished. Then gender equality in marriage and 
amendment of the laws regarding freedom of the press was passed, as well as minorities 
being granted the right to learn and broadcast in their mother-tongues. 
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One of the most significant steps towards empowering civilian rule was the 
restructuring of the NSC. The reform packages which were undertaken to comply with 
the Copenhagen political criteria have changed the composition and function of the 
NSC, despite the remaining influence of the military in Turkish politics. Originally, the 
number of civilian and military members was equal, but the amendment of October 
2001 in the constitution granted a civilian majority in its composition by adding deputy 
prime ministers and the justice minister to the NSC. Article 118 was changed from “The 
cabinet will give priority to the decisions of the NSC” to “The cabinet will take NSC’s 
advice into consideration”322 Although these changes were simple words they meant a 
lot in terms of the legitimacy of the military interventions into civilian matters. It 
needed to pass through the TGNA. A proposal to make the constitutional changes into 
law was sent to the parliament on December 28, 2001. Due to the ill state of the 
coalition the proposal did not pass in parliament until January 15, 2003.  
 Also within the Second EU Harmonization Reform Package which came into force 
on April 9, 2002, the job description and specification of the gendarmerie force was 
changed to not allow any of its military personnel to fulfill civilian positions in local 
districts as acting officers.323 Consequently, the reforms introduced to meet the EU’s 
demands after the 1999 decision begun to impact on the military’s position when 
compared to before the coming to power of the JDP. However, it was clear that any 
direct confrontation with the military was still to be avoided and many issues related to 
foreign affairs were directed by the generals who had a strong presence within this 
‘advisory body’. During Ecevit’s time in office (1999-2002), the NCS continued to 
advise the civilian authority in terms of internal and external matters and in the 
Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 recalled its decision in 1999 in 
Helsinki which stated that: 
Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied 
to the other candidate States. It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent legislative packages and the 
subsequent implementation measures which cover a large number of key priorities specified in 
the Accession Partnership. The Union acknowledges the determination of the new Turkish 
government to take further steps on the path of reform and urges in particular the government to 
address swiftly all remaining shortcomings in the field of the political criteria, not only with 
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regard to legislation but also in particular with regard to implementation. The Union recalls that, 
according to the political criteria decided in Copenhagen in 1993, membership requires that a 
candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.324 
 
This was a clear indication that Turkey was heading in the right direction in terms of 
reform programs but there was still a lot to do. However, the power of the coalition 
government was diminishing day by day and the military still occupied center stage in 
Turkish politics. Ecevit’s poor health made the situation worse, as there were rumors 
that the military and secularist media wanted him out so that they could put his deputy, 
Husamettin Özkan, in charge of the government. Özkan, however, refused to do so.325  
Nevertheless, until November 3, 2002, this coalition government successfully passed 
three EU harmonization packages and put them into force by the time the JDP, a party 
where liberalizing ex-radicals were in the steering wheel, came to power on November 
3, 2002. It was now the religiously-motivated JDP’s turn to continue with the reform 
movement that would successfully subdue the army by 2011. 
 
JDP and the civilian-military relations 
Following JDP’s landslide election victory in November 2002, a conflict between 
civilians and the military was seen to be inevitable. These two institutions were 
completely against each other concerning fundamental issues such as the place of 
religion and the extent of secularism in Turkey. The military deeply held conviction 
that, if unchecked, political Islam would emerge as a fundamental threat to the 
established secular regime. For example, while the military was the avatar of the 
Kemalist secularist regime, the JDP wanted religion to occupy more space in public 
sphere. To be able to overcome the threat of the military, the JDP reformed its image as 
the champions of the Europeanization program. As Cizre writes: 
The new government adopted a Europeanist posture in foreign policy, coupled with a 
reformist domestic agenda. If effectively implemented this posture would, by 
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prioritising democracy over security, inevitably diminish the influence of the traditional 
centres of power, most notably that of the Turkish army’s.326 
 
As well as the changes in the pro-Islamic image there were many other reasons why 
things were shifted in favour of civilian rule. These included the changing attitudes and 
rhetoric of pro-Islamist politicians, the support of liberal elites for politicians who 
supported Turkey’s membership into the EU, and the impact of continued EU initiated 
reform programs in Turkish domestic politics. It should be clearly noted that if the EU 
had not supported the democratization process the JDP would never have found the 
strength from any of the aforementioned factors to take on the military in Turkey. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that, in a sense, by trying to negotiate its membership with 
the EU, Turkey was also using the EU journey as a tool to challenge the military’s 
invincible power in its domestic politics.  
Nevertheless this transition was not as easy as some considered. As Tugal mentions: 
Following the JDP’s election victory in 2002, Kemalist journalists and politicians intermittently 
voiced their suspicion that the JDP was still an Islamist party. As proof they claimed despite a 
cosmetic change in the national showcase of the party, that the party apparatus remained 
unchanged in popular neighborhoods and provincial towns- deeply Islamist.327 
 
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, the JDP was also very lucky that a 
moderate secularist Hilmi Özkök was Chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) at the 
time when they came to power in 2002. He was known to respect the will of the 
majority in Turkey.  General Özkök sought to develop a modus vivendi with the AKP 
government. Özkök questioned the wisdom of the military interventions in the past, 
expressed his trust in the judgment of the electorate, and did his best to insulate the 
military from day to day politics. The military departed from this accommodating 
position when confronted with what it perceived as attempts to undermine secularism. 
During the İmam Hatip328 Schools controversy in 1997 the military declared that the 
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proposal to allow the graduates from this school to compete on an equal footing with 
graduates of other educational institutions in admission to non-theology faculties at 
university violated the secular premise of the republic.329  
The military, however, did not resist changes in civil military relations that were 
introduced via the harmonisation packages that sought to bring Turkey’s institutional 
framework more in line with EU standards. The most important of these changes was 
the reform of the NSC, which was divested of its executive power and turned into a 
purely advisory body; it went from a largely military membership to a civilian majority, 
with a civilian appointed as secretary general in 2004.330 
Although the fourth (January 2003)331 and the fifth harmonisation packages 
(February 4, 2003) did not have much to do with the military’s position, the JDP 
government legislated for some of the changes which were proposed to the parliament 
during Ecevit’s government in the years 1999 to 2002.332. According to these changes 
the number of civilian participants in the NSC was legally increased while the number 
of military members was reduced. Moreover, with the new amendment, the meetings 
were to take place less frequently and serve as purely recommendations to the 
government. The amendment changed the Statue of the NSC Secretariat General, which 
was previously classified, into an unclassified one. At the same time it also changed the 
Secretariat Generals internal composition by closing down the Community Relations 
Department which was responsible for the conduct of the psychological operations on 
the public.333  
Although these changes were improving the credibility of Turkish democracy, the 
presence of the NSC in politics was still remarkable and the weakness of civil society 
was obvious. Retired generals such as Sener Eruygur still chaired some of the most 
important civil society organisations, like the Atatürkist Thought Society (ATS 
[Tr.:Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği, ADD]). Civil society organisations were being used to 
influence the political life of the country. As mentioned by Rumelili and Cakmakli;  
The need for Turkey to consolidate its democracy is frequently emphasized and the role of civil 
society is seen as crucial for democratization. The EU has increasingly made efforts to 
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strengthen civil society actors in candidate countries as a means to enhance the level of political 
participation in these countries as a fundamental to democracy.334  
 
 For instance, the National Security Strategy Document was still prepared by the 
NSC and then adopted by the government without a parliamentary debate. To Terzi, this 
is one of the most controversial issues concerning the influence of the military over 
politics, since it severely diminished the power of the government to determine what is 
to be perceived as a threat and what is not from a political point of view. In this way, 
many political issues ended up being securitized without leaving space for discussion.335 
Due to fear of the generals, even a powerful government like the JDP stayed away from 
initiating its own agenda to move the military away from politics too quickly. One of 
the reasons behind this could be the fact that JDP, which is known to find much of its 
support among conservative and religious-orientated groups, did not want to take on the 
military by themselves. They wanted to take their time and gain momentum with the 
help of the EU and other bodies such as the Nurcu movement336. 
The sixth harmonization package, which entered into force on July 19, 2003, 
introduced significant legal changes that further expanded freedom of expression, 
religious freedom, and the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and 
Television Stations337 which was connected to the military’s power to monitor what was 
broadcast. One other important element of this package was that the government did not 
submit the bills to the NSC before it was brought to the TGNA. With this move, the 
JDP broke an unwritten grand rule which assumed the government would go to the NSC 
first.338   
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This package was considered to be one of the most controversial and bold moves by 
the JDP. Not only had it included delicate changes, it also created debates within the 
JDP regarding which parliamentary commission should deal with these changes.339 
With this package a number of amendments were enacted to the Law on the 
Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and Television Stations. Article 3 was amended 
to reduce the restrictions in relation to monitoring. An amendment to Article 6 removed 
the representative of the Secretariat General for the NSC from the Board of 
Supervision.340 With the abolishment of the National Security Political Secretariat, 
Public Relations Secretariat and Information Secretariat of the NSC, the scope of this 
institution was reduced to just an advisory body. Therefore, this was another important 
step forward, thanks to the EU, towards the goal of making politics in the country be 
governed by civilians.  
Although the EC was happy with the changes it still demanded more because the 
NSC was still an important institution where the military influenced many decisions 
affecting the state. Moreover, whenever military chiefs made speeches, the media paid 
as much attention to them as to the civilian leaders of the country. In simple terms, 
although laws were changing to limit the military’s reach, in public life they were still 
seen as important actors. Therefore, the EC wanted further reforms so the military could 
internalize the changes.  As a result, by the time the Seventh Reform Package was 
introduced in 2003, the progress of EU reforms had already prepared the way for a 
diminished military influence on the policies of educational, arts and broadcasting 
institutions.341 
The landmark seventh harmonization package, which entered into force on August 7, 
2003, introduced significant changes in the context of the civilian-military relations and 
the functionality of the executive, by a series of amendments enacted to the Penal Code, 
Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military Courts, and the Law on the 
NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC. With this reform package, ‘the NSC or the 
parallel government’,342 which was previously the main institution of army influence, 
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was transformed from being an executive decision-making board into an advisory 
board.343  
The seventh package also included a number of amendments pertaining to the 
jurisdiction of military courts over civilians, the auditing of public transactions, as well 
as reference to the military expenditures and provisions regarding the Secretarial 
General of the NSC. The amendment to Article 11 of the Law on the Establishment and 
Trial Procedures of Military Courts removed cases related to criminal offenses, such as 
inciting soldiers to mutiny and disobedience, discouraging the public from military duty 
and undermining national resistance, from the jurisdiction of military courts if these 
offenses were committed by civilians. 344 
The package also added an article to the Law on the Court of Accounts that 
introduced provisions that allow the Court to audit accounts and transactions, upon the 
request of the Parliament, in all areas where public means are used, including those of 
all kinds of institutions except the Presidency of the Republic and organisations, funds, 
establishments, companies, cooperatives, unions, foundations, associations and similar 
bodies which benefit from public resources. The package provided for the drafting of a 
bylaw to establish the principles and procedures to be observed when auditing state 
property in the possession of the Armed Forces.345 
As mentioned previously, via the NSC, the military exercised special controls over 
civilians. The government in Turkey tried to change this after 1999 with the help and 
guidance of EU conditionality. An Internal Service Act was adopted by Turkish Armed 
Forces following the 1960 intervention. Article 35 of this Act stated that the armed 
forces would defend the country against internal and external threats. This article was 
seen as the main justification behind the military interventions. Although the NCS was 
reduced to just an advisory body this article was not changed until 2013. Finally, with 
the constitutional change by the TGNA on July 13, 2013, this article was changed to 
prevent possible future interventions once and for all.346  
 Article 4 of the Law on the NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC were 
amended to revise the duties and authority of the Council in order to prevent the 
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misinterpretation of its advisory role. The package repealed Articles 9 and 14 of this 
Law that gave the Secretariat General certain executive powers. The amendment to 
Article 13 aligned the duties and authority of the Secretariat General with those of the 
Council, limiting them to the functions of a secretariat for the Council. The amendment 
to Article 5 increased the time period between regular National Security Council 
meetings from one month to two and repealed the prerogative of the Chief of General 
Staff to convene a meeting. Article 15 was amended to revise the appointment 
procedure of the Secretary-General of the NSC. The Secretary-General will now be 
appointed upon the proposal of the Prime Minister and the approval of the President, 
allowing a civilian to serve in this office. 
 The package repealed Article 19 of the Law, which provided that “the Ministries, 
public institutions and organisations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or 
when requested, non-classified and classified information and documents needed by the 
Secretariat General of the NSC.” The preparation of a new bylaw in conformity with 
these amendments to replace the current bylaw on the rules and procedures regarding 
the Secretariat General was provided for by the package. The new bylaw was published 
in the Official Gazette on January 8, 2004. The Parliament adopted a law on December 
10, 2003 that abrogated the confidentiality of the bylaw and the staff of the Secretariat 
General of the National Security Council.347 
With seven successive harmonization programs Turkey was even closer to the EU. 
After the changes made their way to the statute books, the NSC secretariat no longer 
had the authority to monitor the implementation of its recommendations on behalf of the 
president and the prime minister. EU pressure has been crucial in changing the balance 
within the NSC in favour of its civilian members and thus paving the way for a more 
civilian influenced foreign policy.348 Previously the army used to exercise special 
powers over foreign affairs agenda setting via the NSC. It was also the most important 
institution in internal affairs and the general security issues. Because the agenda in the 
NCS meetings was set and monitored by the security staff, namely the military, many 
concerns including the Kurdish issue were considered to be security matters rather than 
political problems. Therefore the Turkish politics was also primarily driven by security 
concerns. However, changes induced by the EU in relation to civil-military relations 
contributed to a process of ‘de-securisation’ of Turkish politics and society, whereby 
                                                          
347 Political Reforms in Turkey, ibid, pp.17-18 
348 Terzi, ibid.,  p. 63 
112 
 
issues were moved from the security agenda back onto the political one.349 With this 
having been completed, the JDP government successfully put in place its 
‘Democratization package’ to solve the Kurdish issue without using military methods. 
Therefore, it can be argued here that the EU is the main driving force behind the current 
process of ‘peaceful solution to the Kurdish question’ in Turkey.  
Thus the institutional changes in the making of internal and foreign policy have been 
achieved through EU conditionality and prove a strong example of the Europeanization 
process.350 Generally speaking, the period between 1999 and 2004 has witnessed radical 
changes in Turkish politics and society due to the EU requirements for reforms in 
legislation on various issues accompanied by increasing economic stability, 
unprecedented levels of foreign investment, and growing competitiveness of the private 
sector.351  
After the Seventh Reform Package other reforms to the Constitution were passed. 
Another huge shift occurred in June 2004 as the State Security Courts were formally 
abolished. The move was heralded by the government as a turning point due to the fact 
that these courts were seen as the main source of human rights violations by 
international organisations such as Amnesty International.352  
As Terzi argues, another crucial aspect of the civilian-military balance in Turkish 
domestic politics is civilian empowerment, whereby the civilian government took 
control over not only military matters, but also life in the country in general – from 
economics to social issues. As a result this brought a new norm in Turkish democracy: 
civilian oversight of the security sector.353 This meant that some of the most important 
internal and external concerns such as PKK terrorism that had drawn many in Turkey to 
supporting the military for nearly three decades was going to be dealt with via political 
rather than military means. This was something the EU wanted to happen.  
The Law abolishing the death penalty and amendments to various other laws, also 
known as the 8th Harmonization Package, was adopted by Parliament on July 14, 
                                                          
349 Atilla Eralp and Zerrin Torun, Europeanization of Turkish Politics and Policies: Past, Present and 
Future, in Belgin Akcay and Bahri Yılmaz (ed.), ibid. p.29 
350 Terzi, ibid, p. 63 
351 Eralp and Torun, ibid., p.29 
352 Koksal Bayraktar, Turkey, Justice Delayed and Denied: The persistence of protracted and unfair trials  
for those charged under anti-terrorism  legislation, Amnesty International, Sep. 2006  
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/013/2006/en/e83c909f-d3fe-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/eur440132006en.pdf, retrieved Dec.12, 2013 
353 Terzi, ibid., p.64 
113 
 
2004.354 With the amendment of various laws in line with the constitutional 
amendments of 7 May 2004, the death penalty was abolished and replaced with an 
aggravated life sentence. Many people, especially right-wing supporters argued that this 
was changed due to the fact that the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, had already 
been sentenced to death and was awaiting execution. They believed that the EU did not 
want him dead in order to make him the “Mandela of Kurds”355 so that one day he could 
be freed and used to split the southeastern regions from mainland Turkey. 
In this context, with the amendment of the Law on Higher Education, the provision 
allowing for the selection of one member of the Higher Education Council by the 
General Staff was also repealed. 356 This was also a good sign in that the military no 
longer had a hand in higher education.  
With the amendment of the Law on the Establishment of and Broadcasting by Radio 
and Television Corporations, the provision allowing for the nomination of a member of 
the Supreme Board for Radio and Television by the Secretariat General of the National 
Security Council was repealed. Again, with the amendment of the law on wireless 
communication, the provision regarding the membership of the Secretary General of the 
NSC at the High Communication Council was canceled. In addition, there was the 
amendment of the law on the protection of minors from harmful publications and the 
provision allowing for the selection of one member of the competent board by the 
National Security Council which was also repealed.357 
All these changes were welcomed by the EU and the Turkish authorities were 
encouraged to take further steps to strengthen the rule of law and democracy in Turkey. 
However, while these brave steps were taken, the government also moved cautiously. 
An interesting part of the document published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ EU 
secretariat can be used to highlight this fact; for example, when the document 
summarized the changes that took place in Turkey with the EU harmonization packages 
under the title ‘What has changed with the EU Harmonization Packages?’, all changes 
and amendments are meticulously mentioned – except the changes that affected the 
military’s position. This alone allows this thesis to make the judgment that the civilian 
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government was still very worried about the military’s presence in politics at the time of 
the publication of the aforementioned report in 2007.  
Apart from these harmonization packages, the government passed other regulations 
that affected the position of the military in Turkey. For example, the law amending the 
Military Criminal Code and the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of 
Military Courts was adopted by the Parliament on 22 January 2004, and entered into 
force on 29 January 2004. Thus, provisions on the death penalty were aligned with the 
constitutional amendments of 2001.358 
The law amending the Military Criminal Code and the Law on the Establishment and 
Trial Procedures of Military Courts was adopted by the Parliament on 22 January 2004, 
and entered into force on 29 January 2004 with the purpose of aligning with the 
constitutional amendments of 2001. Under this new law, a person who was arrested or 
detained would be brought before a judge within four days in case of offences 
committed collectively and the arrest or detention of a person shall be notified to the 
next of kin immediately, while findings obtained through illegal methods shall not be 
considered as evidence.359  
 
Table 2: Turkish Political Reforms, 2001-2004 360 
The ninth harmonization package was announced on April 6, 2006, by the then 
foreign minister, Abdullah Gül, included the law amending the Law on Establishment 
and Legal Procedures of Military Courts (this law came in to force on July 5, 2006).361 
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The law was approved by Parliament on 29 June 2006 and published in the Official 
Gazette of 5 July 2006. It was one of the elements of the 9th Harmonization Package 
which abolished the competence of military courts to try civilians during peacetime, 
with the exception of collective military crimes. Moreover, thanks to this law, it was 
now possible to request, from military courts, the reopening of cases in accordance with 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. Individuals who did not comply with 
compulsory military service or persons who did not comply on time would now be tried 
in civilian courts.362 
The JDP Government set up a high-profile Reform Monitoring Group in September 
2003 with a view to ensuring effective implementation of the reforms. The Group was 
composed of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Interior ministers and high-
level bureaucrats, and chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, since June 2005. Secreteriat General for EU Affairs provided secretarial 
services to Reform Monitoring Group.363  
The Reform Monitoring Group Information Gathering Sub-Committee that convenes 
in the chairmanship of the Secretary General of EU Affairs monitors the implementation 
of the decisions taken by the Reform Monitoring Group and work on the issues to be 
submitted in the Reform Monitoring Group.364 The high level of involvement shows the 
determination of the Turkish government in terms of the implementation of these rules 
in day to day life in Turkey. As it is mentioned in the official document, “the 
implementation of the reforms and the accession process to EU is a permanent item on 
the agenda of the Council of Ministers.”365 
 
Evaluation of the EU’s role in civil military relations in Turkey: 
Although EU conditionality proved a strong example of progress in civil-military 
relations in Turkey, it has not been fully successful in preventing senior military 
officials from publically expressing their opinions on foreign policy issues,366 as well as 
internal affairs. For example, on April 27, 2007, during presidential election 
campaigning, the military published a document online airing its disapproval of one of 
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the candidates, Abdullah Gül, as the 11th president of the republic. This document later 
on was called the attempted “e-coup”. 367 In the document the army clearly stated that: 
The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over 
secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be 
forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of 
secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and 
negative comments. It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is 
necessary.368  
 
People were shocked with what they read as it was almost a direct threat to the JDP 
government. The media also hastened to spread the news that the military had issued a 
very serious warning to the government. Prominent journalists such as Mehmet Altan, 
Hasan Cemal and Fehmi Koru called it a modern coup. The next day everyone expected 
the government to keep silent and not to respond to the military in any form. However, 
the spokesperson of the government, Cemil Cicek, did an unusual thing and organized a 
press conference the day after the army’s warning. He denounced the military’s 
statement in a clear and assertive manner. He reminded the press of the job of the 
military and told them that, according to the law, they were accountable to the Prime 
Minister.369 This was perhaps the first civilian showdown against the military 
aggressors which ended in the humiliating defeat of the generals for no response from 
them was forthcoming. Instead, soon after, military trials had begun to put many high-
ranking generals behind bars.  
The Prime Minister, Erdoğan also came out with a statement that called the Chief of 
General Staff one his officials,370 and stated that he would take the latter to task about 
this matter. Then, on May 7, 2007, Erdoğan had a meeting with the Chief of General 
Staff, Yasar Buyukanit, at the Dolmabahce Palace. This meeting is considered to be a 
turning point in the history of civilian-military relations in Turkey, as it was followed up 
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by the greatest trial of military personnel in Turkey’s history. This became known as the 
“Ergenekon Trials” as Judge Zekeriya Öz began proceedings on July 25, 2008.371  
Without backing from the west, no politician in Turkey could single handily tackle 
the military. For example, straight after the 27 April statement by the military, the EU 
Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, said that the controversy was a chance for the 
military to show that it respected democracy. Rehn went further, adding that, “The 
timing is rather surprising and strange. It's important that the military respects also the 
rules of the democratic game and its own role in that democratic game.”372 This warning 
from an important EU official came not less than twenty four hours after the statement 
was made. Therefore, the EU’s substantial support for the JDP government, during this 
critical showdown between April and May 2007, should not be underestimated.  
 
The military trials or revenge trials373 
During the first years of JDP rule, the Europeanization process was hastened. 
Regulations were changed to comply with EU standards. For the first time since the 
creation of the republic, civilians were truly trying to take charge of the country. This 
control brought about long-lasting trials of generals such as Ergenekon, Kafes and 
Balyoz.374 Hundreds of retired and serving officers were imprisoned, including former 
chief of general staff of the Turkish army İlker Başbug who served more than two years 
imprisonment sentence.375  
So many generals were imprisoned that it became a running joke that there was no 
high command to run a possible military campaign if there was a war involving 
Turkey.376 Some people, including politicians like Muharrem Ince and artists like 
Levent Kirca, criticized the trials as the revenge of pro-Islamists on the secular 
segments of society. Some people even described the trials as ‘Erdoğan versus the 
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military.377 At first, the EU and its officials supported the trials. However, the length of 
the trials and the continued imprisonment of prisoners during these long tribunals, 
which go beyond what the EU had wished for, have recently begun to be criticized by 
human rights activists and some politicians in Brussels. For example, in its 2012 
progress report, the EU showed its dissatisfaction with these trials by stating that: 
Concerns persisted over the rights of the defense, lengthy pre-trial detention and 
excessively long and catch-all indictments, leading to significantly enhanced public 
scrutiny of the legitimacy of these trials. Offering a chance to strengthen confidence in 
the proper functioning of Turkey’s democratic institutions and the rule of law, these 
cases have been overshadowed by real concerns about their wide scope and 
shortcomings in judicial proceedings. Moreover, they tend to contribute to the 
polarization of Turkish politics. Judicial proceedings need to be sped up to ensure the 
rights of the defense and to promote transparency in these cases. Investigations tend to 
expand rapidly; the judiciary accepts mainly evidence collected by the police only, or 
supplied by secret witnesses.378 
As evidently stated by the Commission’s report, although the military’s influence in 
civilian politics was reduced to a minimum, Turkey’s society has been polarized due to 
these trials. The government’s response to the EC’s criticisms was that the military’s 
previous position needed to be curbed in order for Turkey to develop into a properly 
functioning democracy. Looking at the government’s response, this thesis infers that the 
EU reforms were used by the JDP government to restrict the military’s reach in order to 
pursue an agenda of stripping Turkey of its strict secular face. But it needs to be noted 
that Turkish secularism needs to be understood in its own merits as it is different from 
French and American secularism.379 Before these trials, without the EU’s support, the 
military had pushed for a secular Western-style democracy - but placing itself at the 
core of the decision making process. However, without the military’s presence in 
Turkish politics, the EU is increasingly losing the power it once had to drive relations in 
the direction it wants. Perhaps also due to economic developments since 2002, for the 
first time, Turkey is equally in charge of its relationship with the EU. As Türköne 
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argues, “although Turkey does not receive the benefits it deserves as a result of its hard 
work, the EU adventure made us win a lot of things. For example if it was not for the 
EU standards civilian authority would not be able to remove the military’s presence in 
politics.”380  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the causes of the intervention by the Turkish military in politics are 
complex and particularly difficult to understand for many non-experts. One reason for 
the military taking an active role in politics is historical, as it is consistent with Turkish 
political history for the military to intervene in politics. Furthermore, interventions in 
the twentieth century set and reinforced a precedent, and the role of the military as a 
protector of the principle of secular rule grew with its membership in such bodies as the 
NSC. 
The unity and homogeneity of the officer class meant that the army largely 
subscribed to the same ideology – the protection of Kemalist style secular rule – which 
made intervention more likely. The polarization of political parties under the multiparty 
system led repeatedly to the failure of the democratic system to prevail in Turkey. This 
failure, combined with the abuse of the military by the elected governments in order to 
preserve their own positions and defeat their political opposition, made it more likely 
that the officers would intervene to restore order and prevent abuse. 
The impact of United States and the context of the Cold War influenced Turkey 
massively, especially in relation to the role of the military. Many people see the US and 
the Cold War as indirectly responsible for causing the numerous coups. By choosing to 
be an ally of the West, Turkey accepted the influence of American policies directed 
towards European countries designed to keep Soviet influence at minimal levels. 
Whenever left-wing sentiments gained popularity in Turkey, the United States did not 
shy away from supporting military interventions, like it did after the one in 1980. 
It is fair to say that the role of the military in Turkish society and politics is changing 
and it is likely to change further under the pressures of modernization and the 
emergence of competing political elites.381 Although there has not been any direct 
political intervention by the armed forces since 1980, on two different occasions – 1997 
and again in 2004 – the military tried to exercise its power on the civilian rule. Until 
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2007, governments tried to run the country by pleasing the officers in order to avoid a 
possible coup. Indeed, Momayezi rightfully argues that “coups avoidance is not the 
same as civilian control.”382 
As mentioned several times before, Turkey’s EU membership may largely depend on 
the ability of the republic to bring an end to the military’s active role in politics so that 
Turkey can comply fully with the Copenhagen Criteria. Until recently, across Europe, 
the image of  the civil-military relationship in Turkey remained much influenced by the 
military’s interventions in politics during the second half of the twentieth century and 
by the status and authority that the NSC had acquired by the end of the century. 
Although things have shifted in favour of civilian rule since the beginning of the new 
millennium with the push from the EU and the strong JDP governments, it will take 
some time for both the West and Turkish society to internalize a political life without 
the fear of military intervention.   
Yet much has changed of late, particularly in the last ten years, thanks to the EU 
Harmonization Programs implemented by the three consecutive JDP governments. For 
example, with an amendment to Constitutional Article 118, the role of the NSC was 
reduced to an advisory/consultative body. In addition, its composition was amended in 
order to make civilian members a majority.383 Moreover, since August 2004 the office 
of secretary general of the NSC was given to a civilian. The landmark Seventh 
Harmonization Package was particularly important as it changed the balance in the NSC 
in favour of civilians in Turkey. Perceptions, though, have not fully caught up with 
reality. Although in modern Turkish history the military is arguably a protector of 
democracy, it cannot be said to be a democratic or accountable institution. 
During the first decade of the 2000s there have been some very impressive 
institutional changes that have included changes to the military’s position in the 
country. For example, the aforementioned Seventh Reform Package of July 23, 2003, 
aimed to set considerable limits on the powers of the NSC. Despite all these efforts the 
army’s presence was still strong and the European Commission expressed its worries in 
its 2004 and 2005 annual reports by stating 
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Although the process of aligning civil-military relations with EU practice is underway, the 
Armed Forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series of informal channels.384 
They still exert significant influence by issuing public statements on political developments and 
government policies.385 
 
This influence includes provisions on the basis of which the military continued to 
enjoy a degree of autonomy in legal and administrative structures that were not 
accountable to civilian structures. However, recent reforms, such as annulling the 
military’s authority to nominate members to the Higher Education Council and 
broadcasting board and making its budget accountable to a civilian authority, have 
significantly weakened the power of the military in its areas of influence. It has 
minimum authority in the institutions it once used as a tool to interfere in civilian 
politics. These changes were necessary to meet the EU’s criteria for full membership. 
As a result, the military’s presence in Turkish politics is now at its lowest level since the 
creation of the republic. 
Nonetheless, the military in Turkey believe that becoming a member of the EU will 
keep Turkey a modern and secular republic – their initial stated goal when they first 
began interfering in politics. Their aim was to ostensibly stop Turkey from becoming a 
religious state which leaned towards the East. Another worry was the Kurdish issue, 
which they believed would only be solved by military methods. Becoming an EU 
member would solve these two major concerns of the military without any need for 
their intervention. 
Among the Turkish people there is significant support for the democratization 
process and Turkish EU-membership, as a survey conducted in July 2011 showed, 69 % 
of people in Turkey support EU membership.386 In no other candidate countries have 
these two topics been so closely interconnected. The European norm here is that armed 
forces are unambiguously subordinate to the lawfully elected government-in-office and 
the armed forces’ leadership has no voice in public affairs beyond its professional 
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domain.387 At this point in time, it is no longer possible for the segments of the secular 
elite and the military to jeopardize the democratization process and the possibility of EU 
membership. Civilian courts have conducted trials to subdue the military’s presence in 
civilian politics. As a result of these trials, more than 300 retired and serving military 
personnel were sent to jail for planning coups. Consequently, the balance of power in 
Turkish politics has undoubtedly shifted in favour of the civilian government over the 
course of the last decade. Even if they try, the military may not be able to maintain its, 
however little, remaining popular legitimacy any more. Some people in Turkey are now 
worried more about the JDP’s future plans considering that the military has no power to 
obstruct them. This thesis believes that even within the EU, although much of the 
reforms were welcomed, there is a segment that is worried about the direction Turkey 
has moved towards during last few years. For example, in an article related to Turkey-
EU relations published in the popular online EU newspaper ‘EUObserver’, in December 
2011, 11 EU foreign ministers wrote:  
Turkey has transformed its governance, society and democracy. Civilian control of the military has 
been firmly embedded and judicial reform is underway. And Turkey is now embarking on a new 
transformation discussing replacement of the current constitution drafted by the military in 1980.The 
EU has been at the heart of this transformation since the new millennium, the accession negotiations 
helping to guide the Turkish reform process. In support of Turkey’s reforms, the EU has committed 
technical assistance and funding worth over €750 million in 2011 including work to strengthen 
democratic institutions, protect fundamental rights and strengthen civil society. Recent progress in the 
accession negotiations has been disappointingly slow, but Turkey continues to pursue reforms to align 
its legislation with the EU acquis.388  
 
There is no question that candidacy to the EU membership has contributed to the 
democratization of civil-military relations in Turkey as the power of the NSC has been 
first restricted and then further diminished by 2011. The progress is obvious and the EU 
has clearly stated this in its reports in a supportive manner. The military court also lost 
most of its capability through the harmonisation packages while the Court of Auditors 
received the authority to audit accounts and transactions of every organisation including 
the state properties the army owned. Additionally, thanks to the Seventh Harmonisation 
Package, trials of the civilians in Sate Security Courts were also totally abolished, and 
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the transparency of defence costs was improved with the armed forces now more 
accountable for what they were spending. Finally, with the Eight Harmonisation 
Package, the State Security Courts were totally abolished. Moreover, the decisions of 
the Supreme Military Council are now open to judicial review. However, there are 
certain limits to its impact because of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Kemalist Republic, and this will probably remain the case in the near future. The only 
way to maintain full civilian control over the military is the full implementation of 
recent reforms, which, as the Regular Reports by the EU on Turkey consistently 
indicate, are crucial to the democratization process.389 
Since 2002, under the strong leadership of Erdoğan, the JDP, which won three 
consecutive elections with landslide victories, has implemented great reforms in Turkey 
which sent the military back to their barracks, the way Atatürk wanted in the 1920’s. 
However, no one can guarantee whether the soldiers would stay in their barracks if the 
civilian authority was not as strong as Erdoğan’s JDP. In order for civilians to control 
the military properly, both civilians and the armed forces need to be better educated 
about the role of the military in a state. As this is unlikely to happen over a short period 
of time, we still cannot say that army is fully controlled by the civilians.  
In general terms, whether or not Turkey is becoming more modern and whether the 
Turkish military’s role in politics has been reduced to zero, there remains a particular 
conception of Turkey within the EU: a large Muslim country, historically an enemy of 
Europe and one that is underdeveloped. That identity has remained stable, even in the 
face of significant changes occurring on the Turkish side. 
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Chapter 4 
The EU and Turkey’s Religious Political Parties: 
Ideological and Identity Change?  
 
Religion and Politics in Turkey: a brief history 
Turkey’s relations with the EU have played a great role in changing the identity of 
Islamic political groups in Turkey, most notably during the last decade. This was 
something the religiously motivated Turkish political elements did not expect or want. 
Nonetheless, it was a European ideal to see the transformation of Islamic parties in 
Turkey in order to set the country up as a role model for the rest of the Islamic World. 
Therefore, rather than just economic and political affects, enlargement has also been 
seen to provide other changes which includes the ideological transformation of religious 
parties.  
Since their foundation after the start of proper multiparty elections in 1950, Turkish 
Political Islamist thought gained support by being anti-Western in ideology. ‘The West’ 
was portrayed as evil while ‘the East’ represented all that was good. However, the 
Islamist parties were repeatedly closed down by the secular institutions for being anti-
Western and anti-secular.  As a result, their outlook radically changed over the course of 
the last fifty years. Incidentally, these years also coincided with renewed Turkey-Europe 
relations. Therefore, the impact of these relations on the ideological or tactical changes 
in religious political ideologies in Turkey cannot be underestimated. These changes 
were hastened especially after the Welfare Party (WP) was forced out of the 
government in 1997. Following this incident, the majority of political Islamists started 
to believe that they could only come to power if there was a functioning Western style 
democracy in Turkey. This is because, as it stood, the Turkish political system meant 
the secular military had a huge presence and would never allow a religious party to take 
hold of power. To be able to come to power properly, these parties needed the system to 
change and become more democratic. This was only possible through closer ties with 
the EU. Consequently, rather than opposing it, they became the champions of the 
Europeanization process in Turkey. The masses they mobilized in their anti-Western 
rallies were now mobilized in favour of the Westernisation processes. For example, no 
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political leader in Turkey was ever celebrated at the airports by thousands of supporters 
after their return from foreign trips like Erdoğan was after he had signed the document 
enabling the beginning of Turkey’s official EU negotiations in 2005. Most of the people 
who cheered at airports for EU membership were the same ones rallying on the streets 
with Erbakan against Europeanization a decade earlier. This is because they had come 
to view the EU as a “masonic, Jewish and a Catholic club” at the time. However with 
Erdogan religion in Turkey ‘has been able to adapt to capitalism, neo-liberalism and 
state or international organisations such as the IMF and WB.390 An explanation of this 
sharp change will make up the backbone of this chapter. 
After outlining the history of Islamist political thought and their anti-Western stance 
in Turkey, this chapter will focus on the changes in the outlook of Islamist political 
identity during the last fifteen years. Religion in Turkey and in the EU will also be 
touched upon to give the reader a greater sense of the context. Overall, this chapter 
argues that religious parties underwent a very radical turn, from resistance to Western 
policies and the EU in general, to their desire to use the process of EU accession for 
their own benefit. This shift was mainly the result of the rise to power of people like 
Erdoğan who were better at ‘playing’ the political game in a way that would reconcile 
their religious affiliations with a seemingly liberal approach to politics.  
Also, in its relations with Turkey, the EU has ignored anti-European rhetoric 
produced by the religious parties in Turkey who saw the EU as a threat to Turkey in 
every aspect. This lenient attitude from the EU can be considered a key element 
fermenting the major identity change of these religiously-motivated political parties.   
 
Religion and EU 
The EU, which considers itself secular, does not have an official religion and keeps 
itself away from any religious affiliation. The EU promises to guarantee religious 
freedom and promotes non-discrimination of religious groups; it promotes respect of 
religious diversity and the maintenance of dialogue with all religious communities and 
non-confessional organisations. At the same time, the Union endeavours to uphold the 
status of churches and organisations under member state laws. The EU has, over the 
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years, also become aware of the importance of religion as they started pushing for 
national values that includes Christian elements for political reasons as seen in the UK 
with the government initiative of teaching ‘the British Values at schools.’ The Union 
draws inspiration from the continent’s rich religious inheritance.391 
However, there are debates about whether there is a strong relationship between a 
‘European identity’ and Christianity in the Union, despite the fact that is officially 
considered secular. Both in Turkey and in Europe there is an unwritten requirement in 
the subconscious of the people that only Christian countries can be members of this 
Union since ‘Europe is Christian’. As Casanova writes: 
The debate about how Christian Europe haunts the secular elites by unspoken, cultural 
requirements as Christian Democrats when they address the question of Turkey EU 
membership.392 
 
European Christian Democrats think ‘European identity’ and Christianity have a very 
strong bond; to them, the EU is in the process of building a civilisation which Turkey, 
as a predominantly Muslim country that has not gone through a Christianity-inspired 
period of enlightenment, has no place. 393 According to this tendency, Turkish 
secularism is not recognized as equal to European secularism.  
Although diversity has flourished in today’s Europe and can be considered a 
common feature of the continent, it is also as common to see the dominance of 
Christianity across Europe in daily life. Undeniable reflections of historical legacies that 
once thrived with Christianity at its core can be observed in most streets of Europe. 
Thus, no matter how much it claims to be secular, the EU has a pan-European culture 
which was historically born out of Christianity. Therefore, one can also argue that 
religious difference is the most important cultural distinction between Turkey and EU, 
as all current members share Christian legacies. As mentioned in the literature review 
above, European politicians like Bolkestein see Europe as a ‘Christian continent’ and do 
not want Turkey, which was ‘kicked out’ of central Europe centuries ago, to be a 
member due to similar religious reasons. In a similar vein, the Christian Democratic 
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Union of Germany (CDU)394 also argues that Europe is based on Judeo-Christian 
traditions and Kantian enlightenment, 395 and that predominantly Muslim Turkey has no 
place in it – no matter how secular it claims to be. It is clear from their statement that 
Kantian cosmopolitanism with its inclusive morality is not very well internalized in 
European minds yet. However, as of today, European secularism lives alongside a major 
decline in religious practices and less space for religion in social life. European social 
life is no longer defined by religion and people almost think that they are supposed to be 
irreligious.396  However, it may still be considered ‘Christian’, for the EU actively 
promotes particular rights, including the right to freedom of religion – something which 
is crucially important. In official EU documents on these freedoms, it clearly notes that: 
The EU does not consider the merits of the different religions or beliefs, or the lack thereof, but 
ensures that the right to believe or not to believe is upheld. The EU is impartial and is not 
aligned with any specific religion or belief.397 
 
  However, in the same manifesto the EU also clearly states that: 
In any case, the EU will recall, when appropriate, that the right to freedom of religion or belief, 
as enshrined in relevant international standards, does not include the right to have a religion or a 
belief that is free from criticism or ridicule.398 
 
  Therefore, in light of the above statements on religion, Turkey’s Islamic faith is not an 
obstruction for it to become a member of the EU. As Zürcher and Linden have argued: 
Officially, Islam does not play a role in the decision whether to accept Turkey as a member state 
of the EU. Yet many people wonder if a Muslim country such as Turkey would really fit into the 
EU. Religion did not play part in 1999 when Turkey was granted the status of candidate 
member. However since September 11 2001, the concern in member states about Islam and 
Muslims increased. This has contributed to growing doubts over the question whether Turkey’s 
Islamic character is compatible with the political achievements of the EU and its member states. 
Objections to membership, on cultural and religious ground have been increasingly raised, even 
in political circles.399 
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As noted already, officially speaking, religion does not form part of the common EU 
values. The Union defines itself as a system of values and actions based on the basic 
principles of freedom and democracy, as well as recognition of human rights, 
fundamental liberties and the rule of law. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
forms an integral part of these basic rights, as does the respect afforded by the Union to 
cultural and religious diversity. Viewed from the perspective of the principles and 
fundamental rights of the Union, there is no prior reason to exclude a country on the 
grounds of its dominant religion.  Freedom of religion and conscience mean that 
religious believers, including members of minority beliefs, should face no restrictions in 
the exercise of their rights. It is precisely in this area that people harbour doubts about 
Islam. Even though all member states are formally secular and recognise freedom of 
religion, they do not always remain neutral towards different religions. For example, 
some member states have a state church, while others do not.400 Therefore, there is no 
single European model against which to test the ‘Turkish experience’. The most that can 
be done is to see whether Turkey meets certain minimum conditions. 401  
This is not to say that the church and the religious conservative parties do not have 
an influence in the EU. Altough some consider this to be merely symbolic, some 
European states, such as the UK, have a very close relationship with, in this example, 
the Church of England. Indeed, the Queen is the head of the state and the Church at the 
same time.402 There are also many Lord Spirituals in the House of Lords.403  Although 
the church does not have the traditional and historical powers to influence policy 
matters in the EU directly, it still has an important indirect impact through different 
channels that includes public sermons and charity works.  
In fact, the European People’s Party (EPP) which was originally founded by the 
European Christian Democrat parties in 1976404 is the largest party in the European 
Parliament, the European Council and in the European Commission. Moreover, both 
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presidents of the European Council and the President of the European Commission are 
from the EPP. 405  
As mentioned above, the EU keeps an equal distance from all religions and it does 
not officially endorse any religion. But through a connection to the electorate and the 
latter’s relations with churches and its ideology, there is thus an indirect recognition and 
influence of religion in the Union. 
 
Religion and Turkey between 1920 and 1950 
During the Ottoman period religion occupied center stage in state affairs. The 
reforms enacted by the Ottomans were generally meant to make for a stronger and 
modern Islamic state. However, after the creation of the Turkish Republic, almost all 
ties of the Turkish people with the Islamic world were slowly forced to cut off. The 
reforms introduced by the new Republic were intended to change the identity of the 
country and its people. The aim was not only to turn Turkey towards the West, but also 
to reform Turkey’s religious culture. To reach this goal the 1920’s witnessed Turkey 
accepting the French model of Laicism as the modern republic was founded. However, 
unlike the French state, the Turkish state still exercised strong control and influence 
over religion.406  There was a strong ideological dimension to reforms, coming as they 
did from the Republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal, into a series of dogmas which came to 
be known as Kemalism. This offered a blueprint for reform and was supposed to be a 
modern and scientific alternative to a religiously-based worldview.407 To Atatürk, 
reforms introduced to Turkey during this period were meant to “destroy the institutions 
that left Turkey behind civilised nations and then to introduce new and modern 
institutions in place of the destroyed ones”408 Although there were some resistance from 
the religious foundations of the time they were harshly suppressed.  
The first article of the 1921 constitution clearly stated that ‘sovereignty belonged to 
the nation unconditionally, thus replacing Islam as a principle of political legitimacy’.409 
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Then, in 1924, the Caliphate was officially abolished and the new, tightly controlled, 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Tr.: ‘Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı’) and the Directorate of 
Pious Foundations were introduced. Parliament also passed a bill on 3 March 1924 
which brought all educational institutions under state control. Again, in April 1924, 
Sharia courts were disbanded and the entire justice system was unified under the justice 
ministry, now following secular codes. In late 1925 another change swept across the 
state, as a new Western-style hat replaced the Ottoman fez. Moreover, religious tariqhah 
lodges were also banned, though these went underground rather than vanishing 
completely. Mustafa Kemal explained clearly why he wanted to close these religious 
lodges in his Nutuk (or ‘Great speech’) so as to “prove that our nation as a whole was 
no primitive nation filled with superstitions and prejudices”410.  
 The Swiss Civil code was adopted to replace the Islamic Sharia code in 1926. 
This was further strengthened in the same year as Turkey was officially declared to be a 
secular state. Although the 1924constitution had declared that Islam was the official 
religion of Turkey, this reference was removed in 1928. Moreover an amendment in 
1937 declared the republic to be secular. 411 Thus state and religious affairs were 
separated. In simple terms, the emphasis of the new Turkish nationalist ideology shifted 
increasingly towards language and race rather than religion.412 With the introduction of 
the Latin alphabet in 1928, replacing the Arabic one, another significant tie with the 
Islamic world was also removed. In the 1930s further steps were taken to remove 
Islam’s influence in Turkish life, as the call to prayer was legally only to be recited in 
Turkish, rather than Arabic, and people were increasingly penalised for possessing 
books written in Arabic scripts in their homes. As orientalist Bernard Lewis wrote, “the 
State aimed to end the power of organized Islam and break its hold on the minds and 
hearts of the Turkish people”.413 
On 27 May 1935, the Turkish Parliament passed a new law that changed the weekly 
holidays from Friday to Sunday and established the first of January as a public holiday, 
meaning that people were expected to celebrate the New Year along with Western 
countries. The suppression of Islam continued tightly after the death of Mustafa Kemal 
in 1938. Overall, republican reforms were imposed by the state in a top-down fashion, 
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without much concern for either public debate or public approval. Even today, despite 
considerable progress in the development of Turkish democracy, the basic tenets of 
Kemalism are viewed as sacrosanct and not subject to debate or revision.414  
There are two differences between Turkish secularism and the European secularism 
which we discussed above. Firstly, the Turkish case does not have the same historical 
context as European secularism has – and, obviously, Turkey had a majority Muslim, 
rather than Christian, population. Secondly, Turkey’s secularism was forced upon the 
people and did not have the same time as in parts of Europe to be truly internalized. The 
laicism imposed on Turkey by Mustafa Kemal was more of a cultural revolution than a 
social revolution, and it has failed in many ways to produce a secular moral code similar 
to the European ethical codes; this is because it all happened in a very short period of 
time without the consensus of the masses.  
The development of laicism in Turkey was a clear departure from the past, but also 
different from the West in another way – there was more resistance to this laicism from 
different religious factions. This clashing historical legacy has also had a great impact 
on the development of political parties in Turkey and later for the EU accession process. 
Resistance to secularism from conservative parties drew large amounts of votes.  With 
this, the military was able to legitimize its intervention into politics by arguing that it 
was ‘protecting secularism’. In most cases, military intervention was supported by 
secularist parties such as the RPP.   
The İnönü regime, which came to power following the death of Atatürk, in 1938, was 
even stricter than its predecessors in battling religion up until the end of World War 
Two (WWII). Turkey, who sided with the West at the last hour, requested huge 
financial and political assistance, especially from the USA. This was one of the 
important topics of discussion during the well-known Truman Speech in 1947. To be 
able to get the aid it needed, Turkey had to commit to a democratic future. As a result, 
İnönü, as the President of the Republic and the leader of the Republican People’s Party 
(RPP), a strictly secular movement founded to promote Atatürk’s legacy in 1923, 
initiated a process of allowing multiparty politics in 1946. Although there were two 
attempts in 1924-25 and 1930 to move to a multiparty system,415 until 1946 Turkey was 
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ruled by a single party regime, the RPP. This was due to the fact that the RPP would not 
tolerate the idea of any religious tendency that could grow out of the opposition. 
However, the Truman Doctrine meant that Turkey had to allow the formation of 
opposition parties. This meant that power for political parties rested on receiving the 
support and votes of the people. Everybody was allowed to vote. Therefore, to make the 
rural conservative electorate happy became a crucial matter for political parties. Since 
most people in Turkey were still living as they had done during the Ottoman period, 
religious oppression and anti-Islamic rhetoric would no longer serve the good of any 
political party. Acknowledging this, the RPP started introducing more religious freedom 
in Turkey. When multiparty elections were allowed for the first time in Turkish history 
in 1946, religion once again begun to occupy a prominent place in politics, necessitated 
by the fact that if the RPP was to ever receive public support, it had to loosen its anti-
religious drive. Although the RPP won the elections – under highly contested and 
controversial conditions – they realized the coming trouble and challenge to their power 
from the growing opposition parties. Consequently, RPP, against their traditional 
posture, started exploiting religion, as the opposition sounded friendlier towards Islam 
to the mostly conservative rural public. For example, by 1949, small numbers of 
religious education lessons were given in state schools and the RPP even allowed Imam 
Hatips (Muslim preachers) to be trained. Moreover the RPP’s educational reforms were 
accompanied by a relaxation of the restriction on religious instructions outside of the 
state system. Members of the tariqahs who had been providing clandestine Qur’an 
classes were now able to emerge into the open and expand their activities. Furthermore, 
in March 1950 the RPP restructured and expanded the Diyanet, appointing 941 new 
personnel. These religious reforms of the RPP did not help them in the 1950 elections 
however. But because of these characteristics, the republican era reforms are of the type 
that can best be described as ‘outer reforms’: this type of reform comes from the state 
rather than society, including the religious establishment, and is in sharp contrast to 
Ottoman reforms,416 however, in a sense they are broadly in-line with the English 
reformation of the 16th century. 
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Multiparty politics and religion 1950- 1987 
The new Turkish republic almost completely banned religious influences on the 
state. However, with the introduction of multiparty democracy to Turkey after WWII, 
religion started playing an important role once again. The Democrat Party (DP), which 
had a conservative outlook and appealed mostly to rural and poorer sectors of society, 
won the first proper multiparty elections.417 The reign of the secular RPP ended and DP 
formed the government in May 1950. One of the first things the new government did, 
specifically, on their third day in office, was to change the rules and allow the call to 
prayer to be recited in Arabic – something which had been banned in 1932. Imam Hatip 
Schools, those schools which educated religious leaders, or imams, were also re-opened 
and became popular across the country, replacing the typical and simple Imam Hatip 
Courses. There was of course major popular support for these changes and the DP took 
advantage of it.  
The role of education, and especially the education given in these Imam Hatip 
Schools, was critical in that they raised the back bone of future supporters of these 
religious political parties. The ones who were educated in these schools mostly 
supported conservative parties.  They hugely admired the Ottoman legacy, learned 
Islamic studies and mostly criticized the modern republic and its institutions. They had 
an anti-Western and pro-Eastern outlook.  These groups of people would end up feeding 
the youth organisations of the nationalist and religious movements in the 1960’s.  
At the time, due to its official position as the opposition, the RPP also started 
relaxing its stance against religion and became more moderate with regards to laicism. It 
was almost impossible for the RPP to come to power with its original stance towards 
Islam. The DP government, which was supported by the majority of the masses at the 
time, through Diyanet and some civil society groups, also initiated a mass building 
program which saw around 15,000 new mosques opened between 1950 and 1960. 
Tariqahs, especially the followers of a man called Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan – their 
group called the ‘Süleymancılar’ – were also allowed to operate Qur’an courses. Said 
Nursi, a hugely influential Islamic scholar who had faced constant harassment forcing 
him underground during the previous decades (his followers were called ‘Nurcular’) 
was now also given more freedom with the coming to the power of the DP governments 
in the 1950s. But it should be noted that these religious groups refrained from direct 
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confrontation with the state apparatus, which extended beyond the formally elected 
government. Their attitude was one of ‘work with the state rather than fight against the 
state’. For example, Mehmet Zahid Kotku – a well-known leader of the Naqkshibendi 
order in Turkey – has refrained from being seen as someone who was against the state; 
at a time when left-wing and the right-wing political organisations engaged in bitter 
fighting to bring their ideologies to the fore, his followers (along with the followers of 
other religious orders) stayed away from any sort of violent conflict. Again, the 
Fethullah Gülen, who is considered as the most important religious scholar in Turkey 
today, told people who were protesting against the USA’s invasion of Iraq in 1991 that, 
“by going to street and saying no to this, no to that you will achieve nothing.”418 This 
attitude has not changed up to the end of 2013 where a major animosity started between 
the ruling JDP government and the Gülenciler (in English Gulenists, sometimes they are 
also referred as Nurcular), the followers of Fethullah Gülen.419 
Consequently, due to the moderate stance of the government towards religion and 
religious organisations in the second half of the 1940’s and 1950’s, Turkey witnessed a 
surge in Islamic political parties. Religiously motivated parties such as the National 
Development Party, the Protection of Islam Party, the Nation Party and the Social 
Justice Party were all established after WWII. The DP however, received most of the 
conservative electoral votes while in office between 1950 and 1960.  
During the early years of the DP government, religious tendencies were given the 
freedom they desired – more so than at any time since the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. After lifting the ban on the Arabic call to prayer, the ban on religious 
broadcasting was also lifted by the DP. Some MP’s even began to promote the idea of 
Islam coming to occupy more of a public presence in everyday life. On one occasion, 
Menderes even told his MP’s that if they wanted “they could bring the Caliphate back”. 
While all of this was occurring, rumours began to rage about Prime Minister 
Menderes’s now infamous kissing of the hands of a previously persecuted religious 
scholar, Said Nursi (a sign of respect in Turkey) and raised many eyebrows in the 
Kemalist establishment. The RPP used these debates, which raged in the press, as an 
argument for the idea that religious sects were increasingly impacting Menderes’s 
policies. This rumour was clearly condemned by the students of Nursi as they argued 
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that the two had never met in person.420 However, while the DP increasingly controlled 
every aspect of life, there were widespread incidents which were seen to be targeting the 
secularist system in Turkey and they sparked counter protests by the opposition. Some 
such attacks included attacking busts of Atatürk in various places, asking for fez and 
burka to be freed in DP’s Konya meeting and again mayor of Izmir from DP, Raif 
Onursal’s proposal of expelling İnönü like the last Caliph Abdülmecit Efendi.421 These 
incidents forced the DP to introduced new laws in 1951 related to the protection of 
Atatürk and secular system. Following on from that the government also closed down 
the Islamic Democratic Party in 1952.  
In later years, the DP used religion as a tool to attack the opposition, and mainly the 
RPP who, in terms of outlook and worldview, came to represent the strict Kemalist-
secularist mood of the 1930’s. As a result, religious factions were controlled by the 
right-wing parties most notably the DP and Menderes governments. However, although 
it received the support of the conservative sections of society, the reign of the DP ended 
with the military coup of 27 May 1960. The Junta and the courts it established claimed 
Menderes was trying to undermine the secular Turkish Republic. It later sentenced 
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to death and executed him and some of his ministers in 
September 1961. The generals who orchestrated the coup believed the secular state was 
at stake and the execution of the prime minister would send a strongest message to 
others who challenged the system created by Atatürk.  To them, Menderes was allowing 
religion, which they believed had laid the foundations for the decline and eventual 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, to infiltrate the veins of the state once again. They saw 
this as a threat that would eventually break up the country.  
Contrary to expectations, the military regime and the constitution created in its wake 
were not oppressive towards religion. It focused more on civil liberties than limitations 
of rights. Therefore, governments set up in the 1960s did not take Turkey back to the 
1930s where religion was clearly not welcomed in the public sphere. In addition, from 
the 1960’s onwards, political parties that explicitly identified themselves as religious 
began emerging. Imam Hatip schools spread across the country, while more and more 
mosques were built every year by governments set up either by the RPP or Justice Party 
(JP [Tr.:Adalet Partisi, AP]) which replaced the Democrat Party. The Nurcular, 
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flourished in the 1960’s while Komunizmle Mücadele Dernegi (Association for the 
Struggle Against Communism, ASC) was also established.  
These religious schools and religious establishments did not emerge out of thin air. 
There was popular demand as they appealed to the needs of the poorer rural groups due 
to the fact that the state was struggling to realize basic development goals at the time, 
such as electricity and running water supplies to these areas. These groups were 
generally less educated and historically speaking had trust for religious establishments, 
more so than the state. In villages, as well as usual prayer spaces, imams had also been 
conducting other important rituals for centuries such as burials and mevlids.422 
Therefore, in a sense, these areas had been receiving more support from religious 
groups than the state, and this was reflected in their support for the spread of religious 
education across the country. However, it should be noted that religion was not free of 
the state domain. It was strictly controlled and, to an extent, exploited by the 
government and the state to reach political goals.  
During the heated political environment of the 1950s and early 1960’s, with the 
Berlin and Cuban Crisis shaking the stability of world politics deeply, Turkey was seen 
as a strategic asset for the West,423 though it came also to be rocked by violent 
insurgencies drawing on student movements, particularly during the 1960s. These 
mainly left-wing groups were considered less religious and more secularist and they 
established their own student organisations, while right-wing groups also began to 
organize. These right-wing groups, generally seen as more religious, such as Milli Türk 
Talabe Birliği (National Turkish Student Union-NTSU) also began organizing anti-
Communist and pro-Jihad rallies. The most important of these groups however would 
be founded by nationalist leader and a former army officer Alparslan Türkeş. His 
nationalist teachings came to be referred to as ‘Ülkücüler’ or ‘the idealists’, and is also 
the name of a group formed in 1969 which became the most fearsome representative of 
the right-wing, which did not shy away from violently clashing with left-wing 
organisations. This group followed a Turkish-Islamic agenda, declaring that Turks were 
‘as Muslim as Mount Hira in Arabia’ (the site of an important landmark in Islamic 
history) and ‘as Turkish as the Tengri Mountains in Central Asia’.  
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In 1965, Türkeş became the leader of a right-wing political party called ‘Republican 
Villagers Nation Party’ (RNVP [Tr.: Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, CKMP]) later 
renaming it ‘The Nationalist Action Party’ (NAP [Tr.: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP]) 
in 1969. He published a book titled “Dokuz Işık” (or Nine Lights) where he advocated a 
strictly nationalist agenda. Later, the youth movement of Türkeş, the ‘Idealist Hearths’ 
or (Ülkü Ocakları in Turkish) spread across the country, their members calling 
themselves Bozkurtlar (or Grey Wolves) after a well-known figure in pre-Islamic 
Turkish mythology.424 Although the youth movement was the most effective 
representative among right-wing groups, by following more of a nationalist agenda 
rather than a religious one, Türkeş failed to make a serious impact on the political arena 
in elections between 1969 and 1977and received about three % of the national votes., 
He was the only member of his party that could take a seat in the parliament in 1969 
elections.425   
However, a mechanical engineer and a successful academic named Erbakan was by 
the 1960s becoming a prominent representative of the religious section of society. It can 
be argued here that if it were not for the Cold War, the Turkish military would not have 
allowed Erbakan or the above mentioned groups to flourish since, as hardened 
Kemalists, they saw religion as a threat to the secular state. NATO membership since 
1952 meant that the Turkish military also had close ties with the USA. Therefore, it is 
arguable that the US supported a ‘religious revival’ in Turkey as a way of fighting the 
Communist threat in the country. Moreover, during these same years, the role of the 
youth movements was essential in shaping the political atmosphere in Turkey. Right-
wing groups focused on national issues and had minimal or no international contact at 
all. Their supporters generally came from poorer and more rural backgrounds. They did 
not only see communism as a threat to Turkey, but also to their traditions, culture and 
religion. This was not the case in the West. They were less interested in religion than 
the Turkish youth. On the other hand, left-wing groups had extensive contact with 
international networks. There was some rural support for these groups as well, but 
members were generally middle-class and urban settlers.    
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Necmettin Erbakan: an Islamist scholar and political leader 
After failing to persuade the JP to name him as a party candidate in the 1969 
elections, Erbakan went on to win a seat as an independent candidate for the central 
Anatolian town of Konya – also a stronghold of religious conservatism in Turkey.426 
Erbakan was a follower of the Naqshibendi order and the teachings of Sheikh Mehmet 
Zahit Kotku. Consequently, under his religious teacher’s agreement and support, 
Erbakan set up a new political party called the National Order Party (NOP [Tr.: Milli 
Nizam Partisi-MNP]) on 26 January 1970. Undoubtedly, most of his main personnel 
came from the ranks of the religious Naqshibandi order. At the time, although most 
supported the JP, some of the Nurcular also supported Erbakan. The party program of 
the NOP heavily stressed moral issues and in public statements, Erbakan made no secret 
of his nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire. But he purposefully stayed away from openly 
expressing the party’s support for a religious state. He was probably worried about 
getting banned by the military chiefs. One is left in no confusion as to his goals after 
analysing his speeches: he was an anti-Western, anti-Zionist politician who wanted to 
establish a state with Islamic moral codes. On 20 May 1971, soon after the military 
intervention on 21 March of the same year, the NOP was closed down by the 
Constitutional Court due to what they argued was Erbakan’s anti-laicist agenda 
considering that he wanted religious education lessons to be introduced into secondary 
schools, and the fact that he was enthusiastic about re-introducing the Caliphate. But to 
many scholars, Erbakan was not asking for an Islamic state that was run by Islamic 
Sharia law. According to Çakır, he was in fact telling the dominant elites of Turkey “to 
add a little bit of Islamic motifs in to the democracy games they were playing. And he 
was clearly stating that his party knew how to add it better than others.”427 
Erbakan did not give up his political fight even after the court’s decision. After 
spending some time in Switzerland, he established his second political party, the 
National Salvation Party (NSP [Tr.: Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP]). He was supported by 
Naqshabandi orders and the Milli Görüş (National Vision) which was founded by 
Erbakan in 1969. This time, he was more cautious and he focused more on moral issues, 
as well as opposing the integration of Turkey with the European Common Market. He 
saw rapprochement with the West as an immoral thing to do. His aim was to integrate 
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Turkey with the Islamic world, where he thought Turkey naturally belonged. For 
example, in his speech in Kocaeli on 13 November 1970, he declared that “the 
immorality in the country will disappear when the NSP come to power and establishes 
an honourable, moral Muslim Turkish state just like it used to be in the past.”428  
In the 1970s support for the NSP increased and after the 14 October 1973 elections 
Erbakan successfully brought political Islam partly to power in Turkey for the first time 
since the creation of the Republic. He did this by taking part in two different coalition 
governments. The first was formed with the secularist party, the RPP, in 1973 after 
which Erbakan joined a coalition with Demirel’s AP and Türkeş’s NAP in 1977.  
Erbakan also published a booklet titled “Milli Görüş” (National Vision) in 1975 which 
was later taken as the name to signify his followers and their vision for a new society. 
The booklet included a mixture of general principles and specific proposals. For 
example, it defended the rights of women to work and have the same access to 
education as men, while simultaneously insisting that their primary role was toward the 
family, particularly in their role as mothers.429 By the 1990s this was no longer a core 
tenant, since Erbakan had increasingly argued women should become more involved 
with politics in order to bank their votes. To many scholars, this change in attitude 
towards women was one of the main reasons why he was very successful at this time. 
The booklet also highlighted the importance of making opportunities available for the 
poorer and more rural parts of society. 
 During the same years, Erbakan also preached loudly against NATO and any 
connection to the EEC. He advocated close ties with the Islamic world, a withdrawal 
from NATO, and the severing of Turkey’s growing ties with the EEC.430 In one of his 
speeches Erbakan declared that his party was against the “freemasons, communists and 
Zionists” as he condemned the EEC for being a Jewish and Zionist organisation. At 
later stages, he also condemned the EEC for being a ‘Christian Club’.431 At the time, his 
remarks were not taken into serious consideration by EEC officials as his power in the 
Turkish political arena was not significant.  
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During the 1970s, in which youth groups from left and right-wing organisations in 
Turkey had violent clashes, Erbakan and his followers were also openly talking about 
bringing the caliphate back and forming an Islamic state in Turkey. They wanted 
Turkey to stay away from forming close political and economic ties with the West as 
they blamed the West for Turkey’s major political and economic problems as well as 
the unrest among the youth. In one of his speeches in the TGNA he said: 
Who are the West? Who is the IMF? We are making them big by giving them the match in their 
hand to set a fire in our country. And it’s us who goes around with water hoes like a fire fighter 
to stop to fire from one corner to another one! We must stop it and turn our face to Islamic 
World, the real world for Turkey.432 
 
   He was becoming very open about his desire for Turkey to get closer to the Islamic 
world and worries about the military were nearly forgotten. The noteworthy increase in 
his level of confidence was due to the fact that support for his ideology was widespread 
and much more powerful by the late 1970s than in previous years.  While also aiming to 
make Friday rather than Sunday the public holiday, Erbakan also initiated close 
relations with the Islamic world and put pressure on the government to provide Turkish 
passports for the expelled members of the Ottoman Dynasty.433 However, the generals 
who closely observed all the demands of left and right-wing groups showed what they 
thought of this before the end of 1980: On 12 September 1980, the third military coup 
ended the dreams of all political organisations. The coup stopped all forms of civilian 
politics in Turkey.  
 
Religious political thinking between 1980 and 1994 
Political leaders including Türkeş, Ecevit, Demirel and Erbakan were all sent to 
prison and banned from active politics after the 1980 military coup.434 Their political 
parties were also banned. While they were in prison, their affiliates set up new political 
parties under different names but largely maintaining the same goals. In this respect, the 
closed NSP was replaced by WP, and the NAP of Türkeş was replaced by Nationalist 
Working Party (NWP, [Tr.: Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi, MÇP]), while Demirel’s JP was 
replaced by True Path Party (TPP [Tr.: Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP]). Until the referendum 
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of 1987, which asked whether people in Turkey wanted previously banned politicians to 
contribute to politics once again, they all remained out of politics. But the referendum 
initiated by then Prime Minister Özal – an economic liberal and a statesman who made 
freedom of religion part of his political discourse – resulted in the lifting of the ban 
placed on the politicians and all once again regained their seats as heads of the new 
parties. 
Özal was a highly educated pro-Western politician who came from a religious family 
that followed the Naqshibendi Sufi order.435 His brother was also a politician, who 
became a member of parliament for Erbakan’s party. In a sense, Özal represented a new 
breed of political, social and economic thinkers in Turkey. This distinctive generation of 
highly educated engineers, writers, scientists and businesspeople were modern-minded, 
liberal, and pro-Western while also openly loyal to Islam and supporting of the secular 
Turkish state. They believed that as long as religious beliefs did not interfere or become 
involved in state matters they could be practiced freely in a secular society; in such a 
society, states have no official religion and have an equal distance to all religions.436    
In Özal’s time Turkey enjoyed more religious freedom. Moderate religious factions 
were authorised to set up boarding schools and private revision centres. Özal knew that 
if there was suppression of their beliefs people were likely to become more radical. He 
was also a passionate Westernizer who wanted Turkey to be part of the EU or at least 
come closer to this political entity. Therefore, although he knew that the EEC would 
reject Turkish application, he nonetheless initiated a process for Turkey to apply for 
membership of the EEC in 1987.437 With this unsuccessful application out of the way he 
had still achieved two important things: Firstly, he reassured many that, under him, 
Turkey was always looking Westward, whilst secondly, also demonstrating to the new 
generation of religious intellectuals in Turkey that a democratic and moderate religious 
politician could also be a reformer and westerniser.  
While Türkeş was seen to follow a Turkish-Islamic agenda, Erbakan pursued a more 
overtly Islamic-Turkish agenda. The difference can be explained thus: for Türkeş, being 
Turkish was the most important thing, while for Erbakan being Muslim was of primary 
concern. Therefore, Türkeş was never identified as a religious leader but rather a 
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nationalist figure. Erbakan once again came to stand as the main representative of 
political Islam in Turkey. Although Erbakan and Türkeş represented the two most 
important right-wing religious political parties, namely the NAP and the WP, Karpat 
argues that:  
They were not responsible for the national-Ottoman-Islamic resurgence but were to some extent 
its beneficiaries. They sought rather unsuccessfully to channel and use these popular currents of 
feeling to attain their own political ends.438  
 
Focusing once more on moral issues, Erbakan gained the momentum when cleared to 
participate in politics again when he began to mobilize women to support his party.439 
He also continued with his anti-Western and anti-EEC rhetoric. Whe Prime Minister 
Özal, who had ran a majority governemrnt under his Motherland Party (MP) since 1983 
applied for full membership to the EEC in 1987, Erbakan strongly criticised him. 
According to Erbakan, Turkey could not benefit from joining the EU either 
economically or politically as it was a ‘Christian Union.’ As if echoing Samuel 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations thesis of the 1990s, Erbakan declared: 
Our history is a history of 1500 years of conflict between the European and Islamic cultures.440 
 
However, the 1987 application to join the EEC was not a failure on all fronts as 
Erbakan tried to depict. As mentioned before Turkey’s application was referred for a 
detailed study and this decision re-established Turkey’s eligibility. Though even today 
some people still try to debate the geographical boundaries of Europe, the above 
decision asserted that Turkey is geographically a European country and all other 
arguments were officially null. To Erbakan, this was not a significant event but rather a 
statement of fact.441 Therefore, it can be argued that the EEC’s reluctant position 
empowered religious elements in Turkey 
Finally, in 1994, Erbakan’s changing rhetoric towards women and focusing on the 
poorer parts of society bore its first fruits during local elections when his party assumed 
control of the municipalities of Istanbul, Ankara, and twenty eight other cities. This 
success sent shockwaves throughout the Kemalist secular establishment.442 During these 
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elections, a young politician who was an active member of the NTSU since his youth 
and the former chairmen of the WP in Istanbul, Erdoğan, became the mayor of 
Istanbul.443 
 
Political Islam in Turkey between 1994 and 2001 
Following on from their successful run in the municipal elections, the WP became a 
key protagonist in the 1995 national elections, when it became the biggest single party 
in the parliament, winning 21.38 % of votes. However, just before Erbakan became 
Prime Minister, the long awaited Customs Union agreement, one of the most important 
milestones in Turkey-EU relations, came into force. To prepare Turkey for the 
conditions of this agreement, under the leadership of Turkey’s first female Prime 
Minister, Tansu Ciller, who ran with the sloagan ‘ya girecegiz, ya girecegiz’ (we will be 
member of the EU either this way or that way), the TGNA passed a package of reforms 
to comply with the EU demands on 23 July 1995. These new reforms directly impacted 
on Turkish political, social and economic life as they reshaped some of the articles of 
the Constitution introduced by the military regime in 1982.  
The changes to the articles gave associations and trade unions the right to engage in 
politics, allowed civil servants to join trade unions and parties to establish youth and 
women’s branches. The voting age was brought down from 21 to 18. Ciller seemed to 
continue the Westernisation journey from where the late president Özal had left (he had 
died in suspicious circumstances in 1993). Again, for the first time since the military 
take-over of 1980, the legacy of the coup d’état was being discarded, but the package 
was a compromise and the people who had held power during the period of military rule 
retained their immunity. Article 8 of the anti-terrorism law was also kept after the army 
had let it be known that it considered the idea of removing it ‘inappropriate.’444   
As a result, the Customs Union, which was one of the main goals of the 1963 
Association Agreement, was finally established with Turkey under the EU Association 
Council Decision 1/95 of 6 March 1995.445 Agricultural products being exempt from the 
Customs Union did not satisfy some Turkish politicians including Erbakan, as they 
argued that the only proper goods Turkey could sell to Europe was agricultural 
foodstuffs. Indeed, Turkey’s main industrial sector was agriculture in the 1990s. 
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Moreover, even though this was an economic agreement, in Turkey’s case, the Customs 
Union also had major political implications. For example, political liberalisation 
446acquired more urgency when the EU made the conclusion of a Customs Union with 
Turkey explicitly dependent on it.447 This was something that Turkey would greatly 
benefit from during later dates.  
With the Customs Union, Turkey officially declared that it would follow neoliberal 
economic policies. In this regard the Customs Union meant the culmination of Turkey’s 
liberalisation efforts to catch up with the world economy, a process that had started in 
the early 1980s, since EU rules have great parallelisms with those of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and some other international regimes.448  
However the rise of the political Islam in Turkey with WP became a reality on 8 
July, 1996, when it formed a coalition government with TPP and its leader Erbakan 
became Prime Minister.449  But then, contrary to the expectations both in Turkey and in 
the Western world, in its first months in office, the new cabinet went out of its way to 
avoid confrontation and accure respectability. The strong Islamist rhetoric employed by 
the WP in opposition, which had called for the abolition of interest, a halt to integration 
with the EU and the breaking of ties with Israel was seemingly forgotten.450 While in 
opposition, Erbakan also campaigned against the Customs Union in various forms and 
branded the agreement as a disgraceful and colonial treaty.451 The agreement was, for 
Erbakan, against what he had originally intended to do, which was to create an Islamic 
common market liking the “Developing Eight” which included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Egypt and Nigeria.452  
Conservative politicians thought that by signing the Customs Union before full 
membership “Turkey put itself in a disadvantaged position as it did not receive the aids 
other countries received during the transition period. Also any small aid was 
furthermore stopped by the Greeks” 453 (this was a common perception in Turkey that 
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the Greeks were taken in to EU to stop the Turks whenever possible). However, at later 
stages, especially when the WP came to power, Erbakan stressed that he was no longer 
against the Customs Union Agreement with the EU which he had earlier opposed.454 
His said that his desire was to make Turkey the leader of an Islamic economic block 
rather than just becoming a secondary power in the Western alliance systems. 
While Turkey-EU relations were taking a new form during the 1990’s, internal 
affairs in Turkish politics were changing dramatically as support for religious parties 
was rising, something which is noted above. In the municipal elections of 27 March 
1994, the WP party came third with 19.1 % of the vote, meaning that they nearly 
doubled their support compared to previous elections. The victory in large metropolitan 
cities such as Istanbul and Ankara was a sign that this party had now become the voice 
of not only the neglected and poor sections of the population, but also the small 
businesspeople.455 Istanbul, in particular, was very important in terms of the prestige it 
afforded to the party. Erdoğan, as the mayor of Istanbul, had huge responsibility on his 
shoulders as he himself noted in 2007, “Erbakan had to choose me as chairman of the 
party in Istanbul when I was 31 because there was not any suitable person in the party 
yet,"456 implying that his party had a lack of qualified politicians and intellectuals at the 
time to fill key posts. This was probably one of the major handicaps that such religious 
parties had. Urbanisation began to bear fruits from the beginning of the 1990s as more 
and more educated people joined the WP. 
Erdoğan, a great orator and a charismatic leader, was originally from the small Black 
Sea town of Rize, whose parents had immigrated to the Kasimpasa district of Istanbul in 
search of a better life. Supporters of the WP portrayed him as a well-spoken, religious 
and trustworthy politician figure. The opposition also agreed with most of these 
interpretations. When he made TV appearances he drew big audiences with his 
excellent oratory skills. He could debate with anyone, be they intellectuals or politicians 
and also win most of these. He would speak in the language that the majority of people 
understood, giving simple responses using football terminology like “you cannot change 
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the rules of the game during the match” when discussing the EU.457 Erdoğan was also a 
graduate of the Imam Hatip School and an openly anti-EU and pro-Islamic unity 
politician. In the 1990s Erdoğan became a household name in Turkey. 
So, although Erbakan was truely loved and respected by his followers, there was no 
daubt Erdoğan was becoming the second most important person within the party. 
Erbakan was a professor of engineering, a good public speaker with a great educational 
background. Erdoğan on the other side came from a working class background with less 
academic achievements on his CV. However he also had much, albeit a different sort of, 
charm. He was seen as a young role model for millions and soon after becoming the 
mayor of Istanbul, declared the deputy to Erbakan. Until their political break in the late 
1990s, the two spoke with the same tone and Erdoğan considered Erbakan his 
teacher.458 Erbakan, Erdoğan and other major actors within the WP raised the profile 
and support for the party significantly. 
 
Political Islam becomes a major political player 
During the 1990s the WP began using certain key discourses in their campaigns that 
they encouraged their supporters to identify themselves with. For example, Adil Duzen 
(‘just system’)459 and being against interest (‘faiz’) were two such key discourses used 
by the party. WP supporters portrayed themselves as good citizens standing against evil. 
They said this was the fight of ‘Hak’ (good/truth) against ‘Batıl’ (evil/wrong).460 Here, 
Hak represented the authentic, godly, sacred, and just system of Islam, while Batıl 
represented the materialist, imitative, and colonial system of the West. In fact, in his 
speeches Erbakan used the word Batıl461 to describe the opposition parties who 
supported Turkey’s entrance into the EU, as he saw the EU as the ‘horse of the USA’ 
that created many problems in the world, including the one in Iraq. He repeatedly 
mentioned that the West was hypocritical in their dealings on human rights and other 
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issues.462 This ideological stance separated the WP from the rest of the political parties 
in Turkey, helping the party and its supporters to clearly identify themselves as 
defenders of the Islamic good while condemning the rest as being the followers of 
Western evil. This religiously motivated, conservative and anti-western identity of the 
WP stacked in the minds of the people in Turkey including the secularist such as the 
army. However, the WP was not worried about upsetting these forces, as they were only 
gaining more support when they clearly identified themselves as the only political party 
that used references to Turkey’s Islamic heritage and past to campaign. This division in 
Turkish politics showed itself to be useful in the general election of 1995. Indeed, the 
WP won the general election of 24 December 1995 with 21.4 % of the vote. Many 
scholars such as Erick Zürcher considered this victory “a true watershed in modern 
Turkish history.”463  
However, the WP did not have enough seats to set up a government. Also, the 
political parties in opposition did not want to set up a coalition with Erbakan. As a 
result, with the encouragement of President Demirel and the army, Tansu Çiller’s TPP 
and Mesut Yılmaz’s MP formed a coalition government. However, this government 
collapsed within six months due to the fact that they had been forced to work together 
right from the start rather than agreeing on key principles or policies. 
Still, during the unstable Çiller-Yılmaz coalition, the Customs Union came into 
force. While in opposition, Erbakan had declared a political war against EU 
membership. Two members of his party at the time, future President Abdullah Gül who 
was a Member of Parliament and future Prime Minister Erdoğan, were also champions 
of anti-EU and anti-Western rhetoric. They both strongly believed that the EU would 
never accept Turkey. Gül in particular made many speeches in the Turkish Parliament 
against the EU application process and the Customs Union by referring to it as a 
‘Christian Club.’ In the TGNA Gül argued that: 
It is certain that Turkey will not be able to get in to EU…Leading European politicians and 
philosophers all say this; because the EU is a Christian Union. It is not us saying this. The 
former leader of the EU Delors and the former Prime Minister of England also say this. In the 
EU’s future predictions list for 2010, all the former Communist states are there but Turkey is not 
seen. Everything is working for Europe’s advantage, but not for Turkey’s. We are constantly 
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giving into their demands but they do not do that for us. As professor Manisalı464 says, they will 
put you in a shed in front of the rich people’s mansions. We are not saying this. Everyone else is 
saying this. Even the Customs Union is a disadvantageous institution.”465  
 
   Moreover, Erdoğan also repeated similar tropes in one of his speeches in Sakarya 
in 1990; in fact, he repeated exactly what Erbakan and Gul had said: 
The EEC? We are not getting in it! It seems like we are, but do not worry they will not take us. 
But it is important to know the reality: The EEC is a Christian Catholic states union. I am not a 
fortune teller but this is the reality. They will not accept us. We will not get in to this wok! Why? 
Because if you do not convert to their religion they will just keep you waiting at the door. Why? 
Because they might take away Cyprus and also make us accept the Armenian genocide. But we 
(the WP suporters) are going to come to power and will not ask to get in to the EEC.”466  
 
In addition to the above, in another speech where Erdoğan was speaking to university 
students about secularism in Turkey, he argued that Turkey should not be secular as this 
did not match with the ‘Turkish way of life’ and the beliefs of 99% of Turks, who were 
Muslim. There he stated that: 
You cannot become [a] secularist and [a] Muslim at the same time. You are either a Muslim or a 
secularist. When these two get together they act as opposite magnets. It is impossible for them to 
be together; this is because Allah is the creator of a Muslim and therefore Allah is the ultimate 
ruler. Then they say authority belongs to the nation without any reservation or condition 467 
which is a big lie as it does not belong to [the] people.468 
 
   Moreover, in the 1990s other members of Erdoğan’s movement, like Bülent Arınç, 
Hasan Mezarcı and Şevket Kazan, also won support with these types of speeches. The 
secularist section of society, including the military, had good grounds to think that the 
JDP might shift Turkey away from Europe and towards the Islamic world. However, as 
can be seen in later parts of this paper, when they came to power in late 2002, Erdoğan 
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cleverly used EU backing to defeat his opponents one after the other; he did this by 
becoming more European and secular that the secularists themselves.  
After the collapse of the TPP and MP government,469 (also known in Turkey as the 
ANAYOL government), president Demirel asked Erbakan to form another government. 
Erbakan and Çiller agreed to form a coalition together and Erbakan became the Prime 
Minister of Turkey on 28 June 1996. He was to be prime minister for the first two years 
and then Ciller would take over for the last two years. The new government surprised 
the Western World, as for the first time a religiously oriented party with an anti-Western 
vision had taken power in the modern Turkish Republic. The army’s imminent 
intervention as the ‘guardians of the secular republic’ was expected by many. 
Surprisingly, apart from firing some religious officers from the army, the military did 
not get as involved as expected.  
The WP was also cautious during the first months in government. Although Erbakan 
opposed the Customs Union originally, he straight away adopted a pro-EU position 
while in office. Later, he made EU accession Turkey’s primary foreign policy goal.470 
Leading figures of the party, such as Abdullah Gül and Lutfu Dogan, sought to 
distinguish between Westernisation and modernity. They thought that Westernisation in 
the Turkish context was a process of alienation from one’s own cultural values and 
history and its replacement by an empty shell that only could be a pale shadow of the 
‘other’ that it aspires to be. This was seen as the root cause of underdevelopment.471 To 
them, the fake developments and imitations were portrayed to represent modernity 
under the guise of protecting the Republic.472 As a result Turkey was being kept 
underdeveloped due to this false illusion which was presented to the masses as 
Westernisation. For the WP’s leadership, modernity was seen as a necessity for survival 
and its technological, scientific democratic and industrial elements were not seen as 
being incompatible with Islam.473   
Nevertheless, as time went by, perhaps due to the fact that Erbakan was running the 
country quite well, his government was beginning to seriously worry officers and 
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secularist elements in society, including the media. The military might have thought that 
continuation of the success in government would clearly attract more support for the 
WP in future elections. To them this created the possibility of jeopardizing the future of 
secularism in Turkey when they considered Erbakan’s previous rhetoric. So the 
secularists were waiting, on guard, to catch Erbakan conducting ‘anti-secular activities’. 
 
28 February postmodern coup; the beginning of the new game in Turkish 
politics: 
As previously mentioned, soon after forming the government, the strong Islamist 
rhetoric employed by the WP while in opposition – which had called for the abolition of 
interest and a halt to integration with the EU – was forgotten.474 The WP was becoming 
more moderate in its position towards the West and Israel. Although the government 
was getting along quite well with the military, the press – which was controlled by two 
powerful media patrons, Aydin Dogan and Dinç Bilgin (they held 66% of the media in 
1997)475 – continued to attack the WP. Journalists were fed things to write in their 
columns by the General Staff. According to Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, a close colleague of 
Erbakan, a well-known journalist at the time, who was also stripped of his member of 
the parliament status and banned from politics for five years after the 28th February 
incident476 Fatih Çekirge, used military sources (information was provided by soldiers) 
on almost two hundred different occasions to set the headlines against Erbakan for the 
national daily Sabah. On many occasions he made up lies regarding similarities between 
the religious revival in Turkey and Iran.477 Ceylan further argued that: 
One of the funniest and dramatic headlines we have ever seen was published in the daily 
Hurriyet on 10 October 1996; it read “Wind of lies”. This headline outlined 20 lies Erbakan had 
made in his speech to the nation a day before. However there was one issue with it. Indeed, 
Erbakan had not made a speech the day before after Nabi Avci and I requested he attend an 
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important national football match instead. It was very obvious that the army had prepared the 
headline long before the speech was made and gave it to Hurriyet, one of the big three daily 
newspapers of the time. They never expected the speech to be cancelled, so they went ahead and 
printed it anyway. This is how the army covertly interfered and played with people’s minds in 
Turkey.478 
 
Still, support for the WP kept rising as witnessed during the by-elections of 1996. In 
simple terms, the more the media attacked the WP, the more public support they 
received. It showed that people had lost trust in the Turkish media in the 1990s and the 
‘protest vote’ went to the ‘victimized and unwanted’. 
While the WP was trying to bring tensions down and allay the fears of secularists, 
internal and external forces continued to undermine it. Some of the younger politicians, 
such as Abdullah Gül, were trying to change the identity of the party in the minds of the 
people from one which associated it with the idea of a ‘Fundamentalist Islamic party’ to 
a ‘Democratic Muslim party’ similar to the Christian Democratic parties of the West. 
The military, on the other hand, aimed to use its increasingly close cooperation with 
Israel in order to make sure that the WP and Erbakan appeared weaker to their voters 
and not really in charge of the country. Indeed, the army was aware that Erbakan had 
gained much support by vehemently arguing that he would cut off all his relations with 
Israel. Any time the military signed a deal with Israel, or had joint military manoeuvres 
with it, this was always given much positive publicity thanks to the control of the media 
that many secularist and military elements held. Some of the activities of party members 
like those of Sevki Yılmaz, coupled with the formal visits Erbakan made to countries 
such as Iran, Egypt and Libya, provoked the ire of the military, something it made 
known in an NSC meeting in February 1997.  
As mentioned in detail in the previous chapter, the military intervened on 28 
February 1997 on the grounds that the activities of the WP were threatening the secular 
status of the Republic. The immediate cause of this was a mass rally organized on 31 
January 1997 by the mayor of a small town in Ankara called Sincan, under the title 
“Jerusalem Night”, a pointed reference to, and demonstration against, Israel. During the 
rally, the Iranian ambassador was honoured as a guest speaker, going on to tell those 
present to get rid of secularism and bring in Sharia Islamic law. Three days later tanks 
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rolled over in the streets of Sincan in a show of power by the army.479 After the meeting 
of 28th February, Erbakan had to sign documents480 the military had designed, and was 
forced to resign formally in June 1997. This intervention came to be known as the 28th 
February ‘postmodern coup’ or as the ‘Secular Restoration.’  
The above coup and the events that followed it transformed the identity of the 
religious political parties as a whole. Before this, apart from some moderate Islamists, 
most supporters of political Islam debated Turkey’s place within the EU, an 
organization they considered to be a ‘Christian Club’. They also depicted the EU as an 
evil entity that had the aim of destroying Turkey and anything related to ‘Turkishness’ 
and Islam from Europe, rather than merely welcoming it as a member. To them, there 
were historical, religious and ideological differences between Turkey and Europe that 
could not possibly be overcome simply by joining the EU. These people were, put 
simply, completely anti-EU. In addition to the Islamists, there were also some left-wing 
groups, such as the Workers Party (Tr:.Isci Partisi, IP), that saw the EU as an evil agent 
of Western imperialism. For the Common Market, their well-known statement was 
“they will be partners, we will be market.”481 
However, during the 28th February process, some moderate political Islamists started 
questioning their established anti-Western identity and began to change their attitudes 
and rhetoric towards the EU. Therefore, the military’s intervention caused the Islamists 
to revise and revolutionise their position within the political spectrum and it is for this 
reason that it is considered to be a watershed moment in the history of political Islam in 
Turkey. Nonetheless, it should be noted that many of the radical elements have not 
changed their position either during or after the military’s intervention in February. 
They unceasingly insisted that the EU was an evil project and that Turkey could be 
prosperious by getting closer to the Islamic World.  
After this intervention, which many within the largest political Islamist groups and 
institutions – namely the WP – considered a wakeup call, some reformist politicians 
began raising their voices, arguing that the WP should ‘moderate’  their views in order 
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to take part in the political future of Turkey. They did not want their party to face yet 
another closure.482 It was obvious that under such political circumstances it was 
impossible to continue with their style and method of politics. Many of these 
movements had been against the EU since the 1960s, and it had not helped them 
achieve anything substantial, apart from being continually being bullied by the military 
and the secular institutions. But now they understood that in order for them to be 
successful in Turkish politics, they needed Turkey to become a properly functioning 
democracy that respected human rights and freedom of speech. This was only possible 
by following the EU model and getting closer to this entity.483 West European secular 
countries had much better human rights records and more religious freedom than any 
religious states. They rationalized that being part of the Western world would allow 
Turkey and its people, including religious groups, to have more freedom. Consequently 
this was what they were aiming for. 
Thanks to the improvements in telecommunications and transportation systems, 
while discovering more about the Western world and its values, the Turks also started 
realising the completely different, and in a sense, backward, condition of most Muslim 
countries. Common perceptions that had penetrated the minds of people in the Islamic 
world since Ottoman times, had also pushed the Turkish people, especially the moderate 
Islamists, towards an identity shift making them move closer to Western values and 
especially those of the EU in the 1990s. Moreover, some stereotypes about the Muslim, 
and particularly the Arab world also persisted, such as the idea that the Arabs “stabbed 
the Ottoman Empire in the back during WWI by allying with the British, thanks to the 
efforts of Lawrence of Arabia”. Whilst some Arabs believed that the “Turks were 
imperialist colonisers who later on betrayed Islam by becoming secular”.484  
Beyond all those perceptions, politics moved on in Turkey as the Constitutional 
Court wanted to ban the WP even after Erbakan resigned from his post in June 1997. 
Vural Savaş, the main prosecutor at the Supreme Court, demanded the closure of the 
WP as he declared that “it had become the focal point of the criminal activities against 
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the secular state.”485 Finally, on 16 January 1998, the WP was banned by the 
Constitutional Court.486 Its leader, Erbakan, was given a five year-ban from active 
politics which later extended to a life-time ban. Most interestingly, after reading a poem 
from pan-Turkist sociologist Ziya Gokalp that included the lines “The mosques are our 
barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our 
soldiers”487 during a December 1997 election campaign, the popular mayor of Istanbul, 
Erdoğan, was also charged with ‘inciting religious hatred’ and ‘calling for the 
overthrow of the government’.488 In the end, on 21 April 1998, Erdoğan was sentenced 
to ten months in prison.489 Some other mayors and party members were also prosecuted. 
The state acted so decisively against Erbakan and the WP that even the opposition were 
not too happy about the closure of political parties and the prosecution of political 
leaders.  
Erdoğan’s imprisonment would also go on to become a national matter, as he toured 
the country before serving his sentence, explaining to people why it was wrong to send 
him to prison. While touring it became obvious that the majority of people in Turkey 
thought it the wrong decision to imprison him. During his tours, and the period leading 
up to his time in prison, it was obvious that people were already treating him like the 
leader of a party rather than just a mayor. This is probably why he was encouraged to 
move on and split from Erbakan’s party. During a particularly moving speech, to tens of 
thousands of supporters in front of the Pinarhisar Prison, just before he went inside on 
26 March 1999 he said:  
I am not saying goodbye. This is just a pause. We will continue to work on the projects we have 
worked on together in the past. The notes that will follow will bring Turkey peace, love, and 
brotherhood and will continue to unite your love.490 
 
Erdoğan served four months in prison and came out on 24 July 1999 to a hero’s 
welcome. 
The EU on the other hand kept itself away from the internal politics of the country 
during the tense times after the military’s 28th February Memorandum. However, when 
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the WP took the Constitutional Court’s decision to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) in 2001 the European Court ruled against Erbakan, a fact which 
disappointed him and his supporters. In a majority verdict of 4:3, the judges in 
Strasbourg decided that the closure had been justified on the grounds that it answered a 
“pressing social need” and, hence, did not violate the provisions of Article 11 of the 
convention.491 The Court’s conclusion regarding Article 11 of the Convention was that:  
Consequently, following a rigorous review to verify that there were convincing and compelling 
reasons justifying Refah’s (Welfare’s) dissolution and the temporary forfeiture of certain 
political rights imposed on the other applicants, the Court considers that those interferences met 
a “pressing social need” and were “proportionate to the aims pursued”. It follows that Refah’s 
dissolution may be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of 
Article 11/2. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 11 of the Convention.492 
 
Moreover, along with the plaintiffs, some international human rights organisations, 
such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), were also disappointed with the decision of the 
ECHR. HRW regarded the decision to be ‘inconsistent’ and, in another of its statement, 
argued that: 
The ECHR has heard nine cases against Turkey concerning political party bans by Turkey’s 
Constitutional Court. In all but one case (the WP case), the European Court has ruled against the 
decision to ban, finding Turkey in violation of articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention 
(freedom of expression and freedom of association), largely on the basis that none of the reasons 
given by the Turkish courts justified the banning of a political party. The judgment of the 
European Court in this case has been widely criticized for being inconsistent with its previous 
rulings on the closure of political parties, and failing to examine the lack of evidence that the 
Welfare Party was planning to overthrow democracy.493 
 
Although the judgment was practically insignificant for WP, since its leaders had 
already founded another political party called the Virtue Party (VP [TR:.Fazilet Partisi, 
FP]) even before the WP was officially closed, the decision to apply to a Western 
institution (which they had hated for so long) showed two things: one is that the WP 
must have regarded this organisation as an objective institution where it could seek 
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justice, and, second, is that it confirmed to members of the party that even the ECHR 
was not sure if Turkey needed such a radical political party. Another crucial fact that 
came out of this decision was that, even though not a body of the EU, the ECHR was 
significant t because it showed Europe’s stance on the matter.  
Prepared for its imminent demise, the leadership of the party founded the Virtue 
Party (VP [Tr:.Fazilet Partisi or FP]) before the WP was even officially banned. 
However, some younger and reformist politicians wanted to break away from traditional 
positions of the party in order to stay free from harassment by secularist forces and 
manoeuvre more easily in Turkey’s political arena. They wanted to take over the 
leadership of the party in the absence of Erbakan, who had a five-year ban from active 
politics. However, during the party congress and discussions on leadership on 14 May 
2001, Abdullah Gül lost the vote by 521 votes to Recai Kutan’s 633 votes. The VP was 
also closed down by the Constitutional Court on 22 June 2001. This was another 
watershed moment for political Islam in Turkey as Erbakan’s disciples became split 
once and for all after this closure. On July 2001, the older generation of Erbakan 
loyalists established the Saadet Partisi (SP [Felicity Party, FP]) under Kutan’s 
chairmanship. On 14 August 2001, the younger generation, led by Erdoğan and Gul 
founded the JDP. Two days later Erdoğan was elected as the JDP’s first chairman with 
Gul as his deputy.494These young politicians defied the elders of Turkey’s Islamist 
movement when they broke from the group’s traditional leadership, promising a new 
political organization that could lead Turkey to a new and more democratic future.495 
The JDP was the fifth pro- Islamist party since the 1960s. Acknowledging the problems 
he might face due to his party’s background, Erdoğan used the term ‘conservative 
democracy’ to describe his political beliefs.496 As Taspinar writes, 
Erdoğan understood that political liberalization would consolidate the JDP’s power base. To 
achieve two crucial objectives, Erdoğan put democratic reforms at the top of his agenda, seeking 
to comply with EU membership guidelines. The move earned him the support of Turkey’s 
business community, liberal intellectuals, and pragmatic middle class. It also won him political 
legitimacy in the eyes of the military. After all, European recognition had long been the ultimate 
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prize in Atatürk’s vision of a Westernized Turkey. And by giving priority to social services, the 
AKP also appealed to the impoverished underclass. Erdoğan’s strategy paid off in 2002.497  
 
Erdoğan’s trajectory from a leader with religious tendencies to one who understood 
how to ‘play the game’ of liberalization and EU accession to his benefit, was one of the 
most important outcomes of the 28 February proceedings. Moreover, the EU’s decision 
not to involve itself in events in Turkey was another reason why the religious political 
elite started seriously questioning the mistakes they were making in the Turkish, and 
perhaps global, political arena. The 1990s therefore taught two major lessons to political 
elites in Turkey. First, was that religion is undeniably one of the most important 
denominators in elections, and Islamist rhetoric brought in more votes than others – 
especially from poorer and rural areas, however, it was a not an easy field to  play with 
under the current system where this was seen as a religious exploitation by the secularist 
forces. The second lesson was that if any of these religiously motivated political parties 
wanted to come to power, and to remain there, it depended heavily on the standard of 
democracy in Turkey. It was clear that Turkish democracy was going to be improved if 
negotiations with the EU succeeded. There was no hope in improving conditions in 
Turkey by using politics which looked East.  An outlook which focused on the West 
was the only way to avoid secularist institutional intimidation.  In this sense, the 1999 
Helsinki decisions also had critical implications on the religiously motivated parties as 
it paved the way for possible membership to the Union. 
 
Justice and Development Party era:  
When early elections were announced in 2002, Ecevit’s government was on the 
verge of collapse. However, at the time the JDP was in a strange position in terms of 
leadership, with the leader of the party, Erdoğan, not allowed to participate in active 
politics due to his ban. When the JDP won a landslide victory on 3 November 2002, 
Abdullah Gül became prime Minister as Erdoğan could not be elected to parliament. 
But, thanks to the cooperation of the opposition (RPP) under the leadership of 
prominent social democrat and secularist Deniz Baykal, Erdoğan’s ban was lifted and 
during March 2003 by-elections he won a seat in the same town where he had once read 
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that now infamous poem. Gul gave his place to Erdoğan and himself became the new 
foreign minister.  
Though the heavy presence of the military continued, a cautious spirit continued to 
guide the JDP at the outset of Erdoğan’s government. As Baran argues, 
The party sought to consolidate its support domestically and abroad by cultivating an image 
of a conservative and democratic party, akin to Europe’s various Christian democratic 
parties. Gul and Erdoğan focused their public statements on economic reform and growth, 
and Turkey’s quest for EU membership. They also sustained the economic policies outlined 
by Kemal Dervis’s reform plan and sanctioned by the IMF.498 
 
    Although the leadership of the party avoided any confrontation with secularism and 
its well established institutions during their first years in power, a continuous tension 
between the secular state establishments and the party has nonetheless persisted. As 
Eligur puts forward: 
The JDP defined itself as the conservative-democratic party, unlike the centre-left political 
parties; however, it regards the secular character of the state as problematic. Thus it tries to 
redefine the state structure according to a new interpretation of secularism and democracy; an 
idea that has been supported only by the Islamic segment of the population, including the 
traditional FP.499  
 
With its liberal and democratic outlook the JDP was welcomed by the West as a 
model Islamic political party and Erdoğan, with his charismatic leadership, acted as 
more of a Westernizer than any other prime minister before him. The almost total shift 
in the rhetoric of both Erdoğan and Gul was in a sense worrying (as some Europeans 
did not believe them), but at the same time promising, for the European leadership.500 
Some people did not believe that the JDP was any different from its predecessors and 
that they were merely roleplaying until they had achieved what they wanted, which was 
to establish a religious government in Turkey. But some others believed that the shift in 
identity in Erdoğan’s political Islam was genuine, as the new liberal Muslim elites that 
followed him sincerely wanted human rights and democracy in Turkey as set by the 
standards of the EU. Fuller argued that the JDP was by far the most moderate 
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professional and successful of a long string of Islamic parties in Turkey. While 
managing Turkey better than most other mainstream parties, the JDP also wisely 
learned from the mistakes of earlier Islamist parties which, admittedly, had to operate 
under more difficult political circumstances imposed on them by the military.501 
Therefore, the JDP strongly believed that Turkey needed the guidance of the EU to be 
able to get increased human rights and democracy in order to free itself from the 
military’s pressure.   
On a different scale, Erdoğan was also playing to the internal political elites by 
portraying his party as a conservative rather than religious one. When Erdoğan held a 
press conference to launch the party, the hall was draped with a huge portrait of Atatürk 
and all those present were asked to observe a minute’s silence in Atatürk’s memory. 
After the press conference was over, Erdoğan and the other founding members of the 
party departed to pay their respects to the Anitkabir (Atatürk’s mausoleum in 
Ankara).502 This was a clear sign that the JDP, unlike its predecessors, was officially 
distancing itself from its WP roots. They were now the defenders of the laicism, 
something which offered them the opportunity to come to power. They preferred to call 
themselves ‘democratic conservatives’ rather than ‘democratic Muslims.’ In fact, MPs 
in the JDP came from a variety of backgrounds, including the Nurcus and former RPP 
and NAP members. In many ways, the JDP was a party of many coalitions united within 
one and staffed by people who did not want to see a return to coalition governments 
fighting for power in Turkish political life.  
   Similar to its shift in the idea of secularism, the JDP also focused on developing closer 
ties with the EU and the West. As argued in other chapters, the JDP needed external 
help to overcome the strongest secular institution that could threaten the party’s future: 
the military. No other power could be more useful than the EU and its reform programs 
for the JDP. Some people like Eligur argue that the JDP successfully exploited Turkey’s 
long quest for EU membership as a political opportunity to advance Islamist 
demands.503 However, the current climate in Turkey does not prove this statement 
right.504 
   The opposition also condemned Erdoğan for ‘religious dissembling’ though he 
fiercely rejected such accusation by stating that his views had changed over time. In one 
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interview he said “the world has changed and I have changed as well.”505 But these 
words did not convince the opposition. Despite its liberal conceptualisation of 
secularism and its call for consensual politics in sensitive issues, the JDP was accused 
of undermining the secular nature of the regime by being Islamist without the Islamist 
discourse.506  
This thesis believes that Erdoğan realized that it was impossible to come to power in 
Turkey with the old rhetoric of parties such as the WP, and it that it was not a negative 
development to have a properly functioning European style democracy in Turkey. 
Perhaps he thought that one way to movecloser to the Muslim World was via closer ties 
to the EU, as this was unlikely to provoke the secularists in Turkey as much. This was 
not a one way profit for Turkey, the EU was also going to benefit from this, as for many 
Muslims, the experience in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan left no room for hope in 
terms of relations between the West and the Islamic World, and the radicals 
continuously abused this fact. Navroz Udwad stated that: 
Turkey’s impending accession to the EU has the power to bridge the chasm between Islam and 
Christianity and bring hope to millions in the Islamic world … Within this tortured context, 
surrounded by a seemingly endless wave of dark news, the outcome of Turkey’s efforts to enter 
the EU are vitally important – not just to Turkey and the EU, but to us all, citizens of the world 
as we may be … The symbolism of a large Muslim population knocking patiently on the doors to 
the hitherto exclusive Christian club that is the EU should not be overlooked. In an age aching 
for understanding, for a rise above suspicion, enmity and loathing, the possibilities offered by the 
ascension of Turkey to the EU would be ground-breaking…507 
 
 Turkey occupied a different place in the Islamic world, as it was one of the few 
which had not been colonized by European powers. After WWI, almost all Muslim 
countries had been colonized by Western powers; colonized nations found it hard to 
raise their own intellectuals and therefore lagged behind in terms of technology and in 
fact, civilisation, as a whole. The history of colonization is another reason why some in 
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the Islamic world wanted to keep themselves away from the Western world, as this 
separated Turkey, a self-confident country, from the rest.  
When Muslim countries received their independence, they built nations around their 
Islamic past. In a sense, hatred of the West was a very important element of the nation 
building process in the Islamic World. In Turkey however, it was completely the 
opposite: the new Turkish state was built in almost a completely opposite way, with 
admiration for the West and being less close to the Islamic World. 
These two important differences between Turkey and the rest of the Islamic world 
offered Turkey-EU relations a unique opportunity to bridge the broken ties between the 
Western and Islamic powers. Erdoğan saw this exclusive position that Turkey occupied 
as an opportunity to establish his party on liberal, conservative, and democratic values, 
rather than just Islamic norms. As a result, after the JDP came to power, he became 
more European than any of his predecessors – including those left-wing politicians that 
had ruled before, such as Bülent Ecevit and Deniz Baykal. Although promising to solve 
major issues in the country, such as allowing the headscarf in public places and 
universities, Erdoğan’s party considered itself to be the champion of the Westernisation 
process and thus reassured many that their aim was not to shift the direction of the 
country towards the Islamic world. One of the leading members of the JDP government, 
Bülent Arinc, asserted that his party was not a threat to secularism and that there were 
no problems with the secular regime as it was established in Turkey very well. He 
argued that, “the principle of secularism, the focal point of the disagreements, is not 
disputed b anyone. The dispute originates from different interpretation of this 
principle.”508 
   On many occasions, party leaders would reassure those present about their intentions. 
However, the JDP’s persistent attempts to redefine secularism in Turkey in order to 
accommodate religion raised suspicion among the secular segments of society, who 
feared that the party had a hidden Islamic agenda.509 The JDP presented religious 
oppression in Turkey as an issue about the lack of democratic freedom in the country, 
rather than couching it in terms of religious freedom. They saw the democratization 
process as a way of giving people the right to hold beliefs. However, although they 
gained power in 2002, they did not manage to resolve the major issues surrounding 
religion until 2013 – including lifting the headscarf ban. Indeed, this was a sensitive 
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issue for people in Turkey who found it difficult to understand why there was a 
headscarf ban in public places and universities. This issue was so politicized that during 
the first half of the 1990s, the WP used it as a tool to gather more support. Therefore, 
before focusing on the JDP and EU relations, it is wise to look at the headscarf issue in 
more detail. 
In Turkey, the headscarf was banned in public places, schools and universities from 
early 1960s until the end of 2013. While the Turkish Armed Forces and secularist 
political parties such as the RPP supported this ban, the majority of political parties 
defined as conservative or right-wing, such as the MP, WP and NAP, were all against it. 
Although it not a major issue when the Republic was founded, the headscarf began to be 
hotly debated after 1951 when a student wanted to study at the theology college and 
wear her headscarf. More attention was paid to this in public debates as political Islam 
gained more popular support, especially after the 1970s. Although Özal tried to have 
restrictions lifted several times, both the president and the Constitutional Court refused 
to amend the law, and the headscarf remained banned in public institutions.  
1993 was also a crucial year for this issue, as it represented the first time this issue 
was brought to the attention of the EHRC by two students, Senay Karaduman and 
Lamia Bulut. Bulut and Karaduman, filed a lawsuit against the Turkish State as they 
wanted to have their headscarves on for photographs that would be placed on their 
diplomas. However, the Court argued that, “if a student decides to study in a secular 
school she had to obey the rules imposed by the secular institution.”510 Therefore, the 
students lost their case. However, among religious spheres in Turkey concerns were 
raised about the validity of the court ruling, since there were no other universities in 
Turkey where one could study, apart from secular ones. The court had judged Turkey 
using European standards (where there are choices available for either religious or 
secular places to study) to rule on the headscarf issue in Turkey, where, in fact, no such 
choice was available.  
During the first half of the 1990s, most universities turned a blind eye to students 
who came to college wearing the headscarf. However, the ban was strictly imposed in 
other public places. When the WP started gaining the majority of votes, this issue 
became politicized by secularists as they began arguing that the headscarf was a symbol 
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of political Islam. They also accused the WP of using this religious dress as a tool to 
gain support since they often mentioned lifting the ban on headscarves in public life.  
As the headscarf issue started occupying an increasingly prominent place in Turkish 
political debates, the secularist factions became more restless. After the February 28th 
postmodern coup, life became more difficult for people who wore the headscarf at 
universities. The army made its demands clearer after this, arguing that universities 
should ban the headscarf once and for all. After the closure of the WP, the Virtue party 
(VP) was established and Merve Kavakçı, one of its MP’s, wanted to take her oath in 
parliament on 2nd May 1999 with her headscarf on. The opposition, then led by Prime 
Minister Ecevit, did not allow her to take her oath and ejected her from parliament.511 
The debate became fuel for Islamist parties, as they promised to solve this issue once 
they were in power. First Erbakan and his parties and then, after 2002, Erdoğan and the 
JDP both made similar promises.  
Many students took off their headscarves, but many of them had already decided to 
give up studying or tried to migrate to other countries. Some students started wearing 
wigs to show sarcastic opposition to the decision. The ban became material for major 
debates among writers, journalists, politicians and academics. Some argued that it 
should be banned while others said it was against human rights and freedom of thought 
to ban it. Eventually, the ban ended up at the ECHR, as discussed above. 
As well as rejecting the WP’s claim that it was closed down illegally and that this 
was against freedom of speech, the ECHR also did not provide any solution to the 
restrictions on wearing the headscarf. In fact, in 2005, the ECHR upheld Turkey’s 
ruling against a young woman who had taken the Turkish State to the court because she 
had been expelled from the University of Istanbul for refusing to take off the scarf in 
class. The court rejected the appeal by Leyla Sahin, who argued that the state ban 
violated her right to an education and discriminated against her. The verdict was a bitter 
shock for the public, especially the Islamist elite. 512 This is because, in this instance, the 
Court decided that: 
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We agree with the majority that there has been no violation of Article 9 of the Convention in the 
present case. We have also voted for the finding that there was no violation of the first sentence 
of Article 2 of Protocol No.1.513 
 
Indeed, the decision of the Court was not welcomed by the Islamic spheres in Turkey 
as they clearly expected an opposite outcome. This again exposed a paradox that the 
Islamist elite was living in; being anti-West and anti-EU but relying on the mercy of 
European institutions for freedom of religion in their own country. Whereas, according 
to Wallach Scott “the EU has been consistent in its support for secularisation of the 
East,”514 some EU leaders openly suggested ways to solve this issue by pointing Turkey 
towards the French model. Indeed, Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee Co-Chair 
Joost Lagendijk proposed that the ruling AKP government use the French model to 
resolve the headscarf issue. According to the French model, university students would 
be allowed to wear Islamic headscarves, but elementary and high school students, and 
government employees would not.515 When Kavakçı took her case to the ECHR, the 
Court decided, in 2007, that her expulsion from the parliament was against her human 
rights. Here, the ECHR finally helped religious people feel that the Court was not 
biased against them. Perhaps the JDP being in power and introducing EU harmonisation 
reforms one after the other had impacted the Court’s decision. 
The issue also became a major problem between the devoted secularist and Kemalist 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Erdoğan during state ceremonies, 
due to the fact that Erdoğan’s wife, Emine Erdoğan, wore a headscarf. Sezer 
deliberately tried to keep Emine Erdoğan off the guest list when entertaining foreign 
dignitaries and celebrating any formal occasion under his patronage. This treatment was 
not considered inclusive, but rather, was seen as discriminatory and unfair by EU 
officials. However, Emine Erdoğan continued her life as normal which was considered 
an act of bravery and dignity by many.  Quoting a European ambassador, Amberin 
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Zaman wrote, “It's a fine line to tread, and despite the humiliation she has to endure, 
Emine is performing brilliantly.”516  
Although this issue was not solved during the first decade of JDP rule, the issue of 
Turkey becoming ‘more religious’ remained a common debate in the country. While the 
secularist elite saw the JDP as a threat to the founding principles of the Republic and 
argued that people were becoming more religious, the data suggests otherwise. For 
example, one striking point to note is that during the JDP government, contrary to what 
most people believe, the number of people wearing the headscarf decreased. Indeed, the 
Financial Times cited a survey conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu that argued: 
60 % of women wear the headscarf (in 2006), compared with 75 % seven years ago, while 36.5 
% of women do not wear any head covering, compared with 27.3 % before.517  
 
    Eventually, in late 2013, the headscarf issue was solved in the Turkish parliament as 
a majority of MPs voted to lift the ban on wearing a headscarf in public places518 a 
decision welcomed by European institutions.  
 
JDP, EU Harmonisation Packages and Religious Freedom for all in Turkey: 
After 2002, the JDP government symbolized the great transformation of political 
Islamic parties which had operated in Turkey since the 1950s. Apart from their own 
supporters, other political elites were not happy with the JDP’s moderate outlook. It was 
especially criticised by two different groups: the religious segments (mostly WP 
followers) and non-religious (secular) segments. Religious people condemned the JDP 
as being full of pretentious Muslims, while secularists condemned it for having a secret 
agenda.   
For the first group, Erdoğan and his friends had betrayed Erbakan’s legacy ever since 
they had begun championing the Europeanization programme which had been fiercely 
opposed by Erbakan and his followers in the past. As mentioned before, even Erdoğan 
and Gul had aggressively opposed the EU, considering it a Masonic Christian Club. 
However, after coming to power as President and Prime Minister of the Republic, they 
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worked to secure Turkey’s closest ever position to EU candidacy. It was Erdoğan and 
Gul who signed the European Constitution on 29 October 2004 in Rome.519 Moreover, 
it was the JDP who successfully helped Turkey to start negotiations with the EU for full 
membership in October 2005. All of these were seen as betrayals by former colleagues 
of the JDP politicians, namely the followers of Erbakan.  
On the other hand, the secularists were also worried about the JDP’s role in politics, 
believing that the JDP was using EU membership as a tool to fulfil its secret agenda. To 
them, the ultimate goal of the JDP was not to become a westernized country, but to 
create a religious state in Turkey that did not look towards the West, but rather, sought a 
place in the Muslim World. Secularists also saw the reforms instigated by the JDP as a 
cowardly way of subduing strong secularist elements in Turkey, such as the military, in 
order to pave the way for the religious fundamentalists to move more freely. Eligur 
explained this groups’ worries as follows: 
The JDP framed its Islamic agenda in terms of EU reforms packages intended to democratise the 
country. These EU demands helped the Islamist movement diminish the power of certain secular 
state institutions, utilizing a liberal tool kit calling for democratisation. Erdoğan, pointing out the 
democratisation reforms in Turkey resulting from the EU reform packages declared that the JDP 
initiated “a silent revolution” in the country.520 
 
When looking at Turkey’s relations with Islamic states, especially after academic 
turned politician Davutoğlu became foreign minister and initiated his ‘zero problems 
with Neighbours policy’,521 Turkey began to initiate very close ties with Muslim 
majority states, including Syria and Iran. The secularists saw this as a threat to Turkey’s 
founding principles of being a Westernized country. When EU negotiations slowed 
down after 2006, especially due to the opposition of France with then-President Sarkozy 
at the helm, Turkey began to engage even more closely with the non-EU states. While 
the JDP explained these policies as Turkey practising a more ‘multidimensional foreign 
policy’, secularists saw it as a dangerous shift in Turkey’s foreign relations. The 
military, which represented the staunchest and most potent secular opposition to 
political Islam until 2007, was also worried about the leadership of the ruling party and 
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their anti-secular past. They were concerned that the EU-inspired reforms would 
transfer political power to elected civilians.522 
Whatever the opposition may argue, it is certain that the JDP and its founders have 
shifted the course of political Islamist thought in Turkey. The EU is now seen as a 
modernising power that has helped people to gain more freedom in the public and 
private spheres of life, including in terms of religious freedom. If it was not for EU 
reforms, the military would have been running the government agenda and the 
headscarf would still be banned today. Again, if it were not for the EU’s support, the 
JDP would have been banned in 2008, since the Constitutional Court was pushed to 
reject the shutting down of the party due to very strong pressure from EU institutions 
and its leaders. Indeed, between May and June 2008, EU leaders issued statements 
criticising the judiciary in Turkey for even starting a closure case against the JDP.  
But it should be noted that the JDP adopted a more moderate line until it secured 
additional electoral support and reduced the military’s influence to almost nil in 2007. 
After the general elections on 22 July 2007 the JDP, having received 46.6 % of the 
votes it now seems to be in the process of abandoning its moderate line. As a response 
to the JDP mobilisation against the secular-democratic state, the Constitutional Court 
declared in 2008 that the party was a centre of anti-secular activities.523 But the result of 
the case was not all bad for the JDP as it was not banned, but instead given a financial 
penalty and warning. According to Eligur, the secular state establishment, such as the 
Judiciary, counter mobilized against the JDP, though this did not cease the party’s 
Islamic mobilisation against the secular democratic state. It seems that the JDP, during 
its second term in government, had successfully mobilized against the secular-
democratic state. And the international environment favours the JDP also, as the US 
advocated the promotion of ‘moderate Islam’ as part of its wider geopolitical 
strategy.524 Again, the EU’s support for the JDP during the closure case was significant. 
For example, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared that the 
JDP’s closure would amount to a judicial coup. Prime Minister Erdoğan supported the 
EU’s involvement in the lawsuit. In fact, the US and the EU, by criticizing the Turkish 
judiciary, acted as international elite allies of the JDP, providing it with the legitimacy 
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that the party successfully seized upon for mobilisation against those opposing it in 
Turkey. 525  
Erdoğan’s statements in support of Western involvement represented a clear identity 
shift for religious groups and their leadership in Turkey. To him, the EU and the wider 
West, including the US, were now the defenders of the JDP and thus the new moderate 
political Islam. Prior to the JDP, for religious political parties in Turkey such as the WP, 
the US and the EU represented the major evils of the world, and these parties used anti-
Western rhetoric as a tool to gain support. Now, contrary to their previous ideological 
leanings, the new political Islamic groups were using pro-Western rhetoric to gain 
support.  
Between 2002 and 2004 nine EU harmonisation packages were introduced. The first 
three came during the coalition government of Ecevit, and the last six under the JDP 
government led by Erdoğan. These harmonisation packages not only gave more 
freedom to Muslims in Turkey, they also included minority religious rights. For 
example, the Third Harmonisation Package enabled the community trusts (meaning 
non-Muslim charitable trusts) to acquire and dispose of real property with the 
permission of the Council of Ministers. With this reform (Article 4) they could now also 
acquire real property by way of gift or bequest. Following the Third Package, the Fourth 
confirmed this right (Article 3), substituting the permission of the General Directorate 
of Foundations for the permission of the Council of Ministers. Additionally, the Sixth 
Package recognized the rights of non-Muslim communities (Article 9) to build places of 
worship subject to the permission of competent administrative authorities.526 Therefore, 
the Europeanization process in Turkey helped raise religious freedom for all 
communities. 
However, as of 2013, the democratic face of Erdoğan’s JDP is once again being 
questioned by many, including the religious groups mentioned above, as well as the 
secularists. When Turkey-EU relations were almost frozen after 2006 due to France’s 
opposition to opening new chapters, Erdoğan began pursuing relations with the Muslim 
world, as well as China and Russia. Positive bilateral relations with other countries and 
regions other than the EU intensified to unprecedented levels. As the military’s 
involvement in politics had been reduced to zero, the JDP could manoeuvre more freely 
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in the religious sphere too. This is where the support and guidance of the Gülen 
movement became important, as Erdoğan was portrayed as a great world leader.527  
During Erdoğan’s time in office since 2003, foreign investment, especially from the 
Arab world, has flown into Turkey reaching an unprecedented level. While the majority 
of the world was facing the financial crisis in 2008, the Turkish economy was not 
affected greatly. This increased Erdoğan’s popularity and he won yet another victory in 
local (2009) and general (2011) elections. As a result, he started shifting his rhetoric 
back to that of the 1990s, which proved to some secularists their suspicions about him 
harboring a secret agenda. 
While the JDP is the most successful party in Turkish political history, the JDP was 
also accused by the secularists as merely a new face for political Islam. To them, 
without any powerful rivals, Erdoğan was turning Turkey into a religious state, a charge 
never accepted by Erdoğan. The widespread protests in the summer of 2013 were 
compared to the ‘Arab Spring’ by many as the police began using what was described 
by some as excessive force to supress the protests.528 However, the protests failed to 
bring down Erdoğan and the JDP. Again, in December 2013, a massive corruption 
scandal that involved three ministers’ children shook the JDP’s credibility. However, 
the March 2014 local elections and the August 2014 Presidential elections both showed 
once again that nearly half of the electorate in Turkey still backed Erdoğan and his 
party, as they voted to make him the 12th President of the Republic. However, the JDP-
initiated peace process with the PKK, developments in neighbouring Syria, and threats 
from ISIS terrorism will likely have a major impact on Erdoğan and the JDP’s future 
successes. If the Kurdish issue is peacefully resolved, he could be considered the 
‘second Atatürk.’ However, if things go wrong, he will probably be the first person that 
the Turkish people blame. 
  
Conclusion 
Islamic political thinking in Turkey started utilizing the opportunities presented to 
them by the West in general, and EU policies in particular. They clearly benefited from 
engaging with the Western world, which, for about half a century, they had seen as the 
source of evil. This global openness helped them to develop a new identity which is 
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modern minded and they are often referred to as ‘Muslim Democrats.’ With this new 
identity, Turkey has become the centre of global attention in many ways. Investment to 
Turkey boomed between 2000 and 2003, as the Turkish economy grew at a speed never 
seen before. Again, having closer ties with the West attracted millions of tourists to the 
country which then helped to create among many in Europe a pro-Turkey stance. After 
a positive image towards Turkey and Turkish people, many major sporting events were 
also awarded to Turkey.529 
Originally, Islamic political thought in Turkey had seen the EU as both the ‘enemy of 
Islam’ and Turkey. However, by the late 1990s, they have increasingly seen the EU as 
the only hope to making Turkey a functioning democracy where people can have 
religious freedom. Indeed, younger politicians from the WP party realized that the only 
way to keep their parties from being banned was to follow the secularist mainstream 
politics and, subsequently, support the Westernisation process. As a result, the JDP was 
formed with the hope of bringing moderate Islam or ‘Islamic democracy’ to power. 
In November 2002, the JDP come to power with a landslide victory. Within a year 
former anti-Western leaders like Erdoğan and Gul were in charge of Turkey. But this 
time they were more pro-EU than any of their predecessors. It was the JDP that 
introduced reform packages one after the other so as to comply with the Copenhagen 
Criteria and to prepare Turkey for EU entry. Again, it was the JDP and other former 
anti-EU politicians who successfully signed the 2005 agreement that started the 
negotiations for full membership of the EU.  
The EU’s support during the process of reforms and in subduing the military’s role in 
politics was crucial. The European Parliament considered these reforms “courageous 
and revolutionary.” It stated that these reforms signified a “strong motivation and 
political will” to converge with the EU’s standards and practices. The sheer volume and 
the speed of the reforms, as well as the consensus of support behind them, helped 
change the popular perception of the civilian government as underachieving, unstable 
and corrupt.530 
The EU again stood against the judiciary when the JDP faced closure in a high-
profile case in 2008. In a sense, we can argue that with the JDP, the EU utilized its 
powers to make Turkey more democratic and freer and open towards all religions. Then 
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the JDP used the EU to be able to bring moderate Islam to power in Turkey for three 
consecutive elections. As mentioned above, 2013 had not been very successful for 
Erdoğan in terms of peace and stability in Turkey due to two major events: the Gezi 
Protests and the corruption scandal that touched ministers in his government. These two 
incidents were expected to become major determinants of the March 2014 local 
elections and the August 2014 presedential election, considered by many as one of the 
most critical elections of all time in Turkey. The JDP’s and then Erdoğan’s victory in 
these two elections was the least desired option for the secularists, who argued that 
Erdoğan had authoritarian tendencies and that he would try to change the secular and 
western outlook of the country in order to Islamise it. In these cases, although it kept its 
distance and did not directly interfere in the elections, the EU clearly wanted Turkey to 
remain a democratic and secular state; it does not want an authoritarian Islamist state 
bordering its southeastern members, namely Cyprus, Greece and Bulgaria.  
 In both elections, the JDP and Erdoğan won landslide majorities. Erdoğan used his 
public speaking skills, as well as massive media support, to gain the votes of half of the 
electorate. First, he defeated the opposition in local elections531 and then beat the 
oppositions’ candidate for President, the prominent conservative diplomat, Professor 
Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, during presidential elections in August 2014.532 During these 
two elections Erdoğan used familiar rhetoric which presented the West and Israel as a 
threat to Turkey’s unity and wellbeing. He convinced his supporters that the movement 
headed by a cleric who lives in the US, Gülen, was supported by outside agencies and 
that they were trying to take over the government by fabricating evidence against him 
and the government. He propagated a “Red Scare”-like hysteria that a “parallel state”533 
was operating in the country. In this he meant that Gülen and his supporters were trying 
to take over the police forces, the state bureaucracy, the judiciary and the military – 
eventually the entire state – by putting people in prison using fabricated evidence. 
Erdoğan portrayed himself as the only one who could fight against this group. He 
indirectly forced the courts to release many imprisoned army personnel, journalists and 
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scholars who had been sentenced in previous court cases mentioned above, such as the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, under the suspicion of organizing plots against the 
government. Those police officers and judges who once sentenced people for 
undermining state authority and organizing plots to overthrow the government were 
now put under close scrutiny. Many of them were sacked from their positions and 
thousands of police officers were forced to change locations. They were branded agents 
of a parallel state. After 14 December 2014 the media leg of this organisation was 
targeted and many more prominent figures were put in prison under suspicion of 
working for a parallel state and spying for other countries. 
The EU and the US followed the events in Turkey closely, though without directly 
interfering. However, in many occasions politicians from both the US and the EU 
indirectly warned the Turkish government to restrain their actions against sentencing 
people without proper evidence, as this was an undemocratic practice.  Some European 
officials went so far as to ask the EU to stop membership negotiations with Turkey. 
According to Today’s Zaman, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, the vice president of the EP 
and a Dutch member of the EP Marietje Schaake argued that: 
Turkey's official statements that it wants to join the EU do not match the government's actions. 
The systematic attacks on the rule of law in Turkey must stop. The repeated actions of the 
Turkish government against journalists, editors and publishers mean that the Copenhagen criteria 
for EU accession negotiations are no longer being fulfilled. Turkey should stop its path away 
from Europe, and meanwhile, Europe must make it clear that too many boundaries have been 
unacceptably crossed.534 
 
As for Erdoğan, during his Presidential election campaign in 2014, he blamed the EU 
for being prejudiced towards Turkey and argued along the same line as EU studies 
expert Neil Nugent, that:  
An enlarged EU clearly carries more weight in its external relations and dealings. And in the 
particular case of Turkey, its accession could provide valuable bridges between Europe and the 
Islamic World.535 
  
Whether Erdoğan was merely acting and using the EU as a tool for his wider political 
agenda or not, today, thanks to the EU – and although not everyone accepts this – 
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Turkey is richer and more democratic than when compared to the pre-2002 era before 
the JDP came to power.  
Along with the military and religious parties, the EU also had a huge impact on 
another issue to be discussed in the next chapter: Turkey’s energy policies. Due to its 
good relations with the EU, Turkey gained confidence in pushing itself forward to 
become an energy transit hub for western markets. The next chapter will evaluate the 
impact of the EU on Turkey’s role as an energy corridor. 
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Chapter 5 
The EU and Turkey’s energy sector 
 
The EU, and in general the global economic dynamics, has a significant impact on 
the decisions Turkey takes regarding its energy policies. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and end of the Cold War, Turkey’s good relations with the EU and the West have 
greatly helped Turkey to become an investment hub especially in the energy sector. 
Turkey has skilfully used the EU membership prospects as a tool in its economic 
development especially during the continuous JDP governments of Erdogan after 2002.   
International economic climate after 1991 also directly affected Turkish domestic 
economic and political policy making as new import and export opportunities arisen, 
especially concerning the world energy markets. With the end of the Cold War and later 
on greater enlargement of the EU the world trade expanded significantly and this has 
busted the importance of Turkey’s geostrategic position including its large number of 
young work force. As stated by Frieden and Martins: 
Expansion of world trade strengthens owners of nationally abundant factors, such as labour in poor 
countries and capital in rich countries. Again, change in international economic environment affects 
the policy preferences and behaviour of domestic groups, and thus has an impact on national policy 
making and foreign economic policies.536  
 
Being geographically located between nearly 70% of the world’s hydrocarbon resources 
and the largest energy consumer markets, Turkey wanted to utilize its geostrategic 
position by becoming an energy hub.537 With the discovery of large deposits of energy 
resources in the Caspian region and in northern Iraq, Turkey’s new strategy is to make 
itself an indispensable partner for the EU concerning energy security by linking the 
energy producers with energy consumers through its territories. As mentioned in the 
introduction there was a great worry in post-Cold War Turkey that the West would no 
longer need Turkey and that this would mean it would not get the assistance required to 
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develop itself further. The ever increasing energy needs of the West came as a saviour 
in the 1990s and then again in the 2000s as Turkey began to promote itself as an energy 
bridge so as to regain its geopolitical role which was thought lost after the Cold War. 
 
Map of Turkey between Asia and Europe.538 
Developments in Turkish domestic politics are also closely linked with the ever 
increasing confidence Turkey had in international trade including international energy 
politics. The religious parties, opponents of the West, underwent a major transformation 
by getting rid of strong anti-Western rhetoric in 2000’s. This allowed them to benefit 
hugely from the democratic environment which finally allowed them to come to power. 
They then utilised the influence of EU, via mandatory reform programmes, to subdue 
the military which was the main driving force behind civilian politics for decades. A 
stable and more democratic environment that was mainly created in 2000’s, together 
with international economic and political demand, allowed Turkey to play more 
proactive role in international economic fields.  
In order to implement the goal mentioned above, Turkey successfully campaigned to 
build major international pipelines on its land to transport energy from producing 
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regions. From the Caspian, first the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil (BTC), and then the Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum gas (BTE- also known as South Caucasus Pipeline), pipelines were 
built with the support of the EU and the USA. From the Kurdish region in northern Iraq 
a pipeline was built to connect it with the already running Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipelines. 
Additionally, the even bigger, but partly failed, project called the Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
initiative which sought to connect Caspian gas to European markets was put forward 
with the support of the west, most notably the EU. Although the initial Nabucco failed, 
Turkey is keen to build TANAP539 that will carry Caspian, and possibly Iraqi, gas to the 
ever-growing Turkish markets and on to the European markets via the Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) as these two pipelines will be linked at the Turkey-Greece border. It 
should be noted that these multi-billion dollar grandiose projects are not only taking 
place because of their economic importance, that the role of politics is the real key for 
their successful completion. Therefore, when Turkey proposes projects which 
encompass the interest of big players such as the USA, the EU, Russia and Iran, strong 
international political and financial backing becomes crucial.  
 
Map of  Turkey's major oil and natural gas transit pipelines540 
                                                          
539 Intergovernmental Agreements were signed to build TANAP on June 26, 2012. The pipeline will leave 
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540 Turkeyenergy data analysis, Jul. 2015,  https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR 
retrieved Sep. 12, 2015 
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While becoming an energy bridge is seen as a significant tool for Turkey’s 
international relations, it is also the key to domestic developments for Turkey as it is 
heavily reliant on hydrocarbon resources. Turkey imports around 90% and 98% 
respectively of the oil and natural gas it consumes. In 2012, in terms of oil, Turkey 
imported 35% from Iran, 17% from Iraq, 13% from Saudi Arabia and 10% from Russia. 
In the same year, Turkey imported 56% of its natural gas from Russia, 18% from Iran, 
8% from Azerbaijan and 16% as LNG from different sources.541 Looking at the data, 
especially in the natural gas sector, Turkey’s heavy reliance on Russian gas is striking. 
Consequently, the primary objective of Turkey’s energy strategy is to ensure its own 
energy security while contributing to that of Europe.542 Therefore being an energy 
corridor is a win-win situation for Turkey for both its external and internal affairs. 
However, it should not be forgotten that energy is also a key element for the EU’s 
security concerns since more than half (54.1%) of the EU-27’s543 gross inland energy 
consumption in 2010 came from imported sources, who are non EU members544 such as 
Norway, Russia and Algeria. For example in 2010 about 80% of EU gas imports 
derived from these three suppliers. On present trends, if no measures are taken, energy 
import will rise to about 70% in the next 20 to 30 years. While 45% of oil imports to the 
EU come from the Middle East, 40% of gas imports come from Russia (with another 
30% from Algeria and 25% from Norway). By 2030, the overall share of gas (in total 
energy used) is expected to rise and it was considered that this would mainly be at the 
expense of nuclear energy. Overall, EU dependency on Russian gas was expected to 
increase as many Eastern European countries joined the Union.545  
Reliance on a small number of suppliers encouraged the EC to make the idea of a 
diversification of its energy supply routes a priority in energy policy. Undeniably, 
Turkey stands in a strategic position within this important scheme. Moreover, the roots 
of the EU are itself connected to energy, given that the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) treaties 
were two, of the three, first texts on which the European alliance was initially 
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founded.546 Therefore, as well the producers, the EU also needs good relations with the 
countries that act as a corridor for its energy needs.  
As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis argues that Turkey’s good relationship 
with EU is one of the main reasons behind the confidence it has in relation to the grand 
idea of it becoming an energy transit hub. For example, if it was not for EU support, 
neither Turkey, nor the energy producing countries, would have backed the BTC and 
the BTE pipelines. It is very clear that these are projects that make Turkey feel more 
confident about its accession negotiations with the EU and also its relations with the 
neighbouring energy producing countries.  
As can be understood from the above, there is no doubt that energy becomes a very 
important political tool in EU-Turkey relations. Positive relations between the EU and 
Turkey play a great part in Turkey’s aims of becoming an energy bridge for the West 
and a full member of the Union in the future. In addition to both Turkey’s and the 
energy producing countries’ gains from these projects, the EU also benefits 
economically and politically. This directly impacts Turkey’s energy policies, its 
relations with the EU and the energy producer counties.  
As briefly touched upon above, one of the main assumptions of this thesis is that 
political factors play more important role than economic factors when choosing 
transportation routes, determining resource development strategies and dealing with 
energy security issues in the Caspian and the Middle Eastern regions. For example, 
while the BTC and BTE were successfully built for political reasons, Nabucco failed 
due to political considerations. If the new initiative, TANAP, is ever to be successful it 
needs strong political backing from the EU, rather than purely financial cost-benefit 
calculations.  
The main aim of this chapter, therefore, is to outline the political and economic role 
that the EU plays on Turkey’s use of Caspian and Middle Eastern energy resources. In 
order to explain this clearly, the chapter will first look at the extent and limitations of 
the Caspian and Middle Eastern energy reserves, and then move on to analysing the 
importance of these regions for Turkey and the EU. After evaluating the impact of the 
EU on Turkey’s policies, it will also give an account of the role of other actors – 
                                                          
546 Slawomir Raszewski, ‘The EU’s External Policy of Energy Diversification in the Wider Black (and 
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notably Russia, Iran and the USA – who also have a hand in deciding the future of 
energy resources and their utility.  
This thesis believes that the so called “century’s project”, the BTC, was built just as 
EU-Turkey relations were continuously and significantly improving between 1999 and 
2006, and that the Nabucco project failed partly because the political atmosphere 
between Turkey and EU was not as good as in the pre-2006 period. Consequently, the 
EU’s impact on the success of Turkey’s idea of being an energy corridor between East 
and the West is undeniably high. To be able to test the validity of this hypothesis, the 
thesis will assess in detail the reasons why and how the currently running BTC was 
built, and what the significance of it was for Turkey and the wider world. The chapter 
will then assess the failed Nabucco project and the future of the smaller alternative to it, 
TANAP. 
 
Caspian Region: 
The Caspian Sea, with very lightly salted waters, is the biggest enclosed body of 
water on Earth.547 Politically, the region first came to the attention of the international 
community following the break-up of the Soviet Union, which opened a new era in the 
history of oil production in the Caspian and the Caucasus regions.548 The Caspian Sea 
region is a major economic asset. It has large oil and gas reserves that are only now 
beginning to be fully developed. Oil reserves for the entire Caspian region are estimated 
at 18-35 billion barrels, comparable to 22 billion in the United States and 17 billion in 
the North Sea. Natural Gas reserves are even larger, accounting for almost two-thirds of 
the hydrocarbons found in the Sea. The region also possesses possible oil reserves 
which will yield billions more barrels, something which is part of allure of the Caspian 
region.549 It has been estimated that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan together 
contained between 16.5 and 32 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and around 166 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.550  
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If properly exploited, the oil resources in the Caspian region could become the 
driving force behind a broad economic development for those involved.551 Although 
they would satisfy only a relatively small proportion of global needs, the Caspian 
resources would be of strategic importance to the overall energy balance worldwide 
and, in particular, to consumers in Europe and the Black Sea region.552 Therefore, the 
emergence of the Caspian Basin in international politics must be considered in the 
context of an approaching energy crisis, especially connected to Europe.   
In its difficulties in trying to secure its energy supply, the EU pays great attention to 
this region for the purpose of diversifying its energy supply routes. During the 17th 
Caspian International Oil and Gas Conference, in Baku, which was held on June 1-4, 
2010, many diplomats and analysts highlighted the importance of the regions’ energy 
resources for Europe. For instance, Angus Miller, adviser on Caspian energy issues at 
the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office said, “Azerbaijan is an inseparable 
component in ensuring Europe’s energy security”, while Richard Morningstar, the US 
Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Issues stressed that “we support projects to supply 
Caspian energy resources to Europe since they play an important role in Europe's 
energy security”.553 However, the main problem in the utilisation of energy resources in 
the landlocked Caspian Region is transportation, since this requires third parties to 
allow energy to be transported through their countriesd. The Caspian region has four 
major options when trying to sell its energy on the world market. The first is via Russia 
to Europe; the second is towards China and the rest of the Far East; the third option is 
towards the Indian Ocean; and, finally, the fourth is via Turkey and Iran to the 
Mediterranean. The Russian and Turkish options mean that transportation can be done 
relatively safely when compared to other options. However, due to economic and 
political reasons, these options are the ones which are in fact creating competition 
between Russia and Turkey in the fight to carry Caspian energy to energy hungry 
markets.   
In terms of its significance, the Caspian region is very important to Turkey’s grand 
strategy. Although Turkey is not currently a major oil producer, its emerging role as an 
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important oil transit country makes it increasingly important to world oil markets.554 
Again, Turkey is not a major gas producing country, though it is becoming an important 
country for natural gas markets due to its location as it lies between the largest gas 
reserves – Russia, the Caspian, Iran and the wider Middle East – and the world’s second 
largest natural gas market – continental Europe.  
Turkey itself is a rapidly growing energy market as it is does not produce enough 
domestic oil and gas resources for its own needs. Therefore, it is trying to secure its own 
energy needs from a variety of diversified routes. Though diversification of its energy 
resource partners could be seen as part of solving the above problem, the key aim of 
promoting itself as major energy hub is down to other political and economic reasons 
and the most important driving force behind the Turkish interests in the Caspian region.   
Apart from historic, cultural and ethnic links between Turkey and the states 
surrounding the Caspian region, strong support from the USA and European countries 
in favour of Turkish involvement in the region encouraged it to take make bold moves 
there. This threatened Russia’s dominance. In this respect a New Great Game555 which 
developed played a significantand positive role for Turkey’s engagement in the affairs 
of the region.  
Although many other reasons help to explain why Turkey chased an active policy 
towards the region, energy security issues should be seen as the most important motive. 
Both Turkey and EU heavily depend on exported energy resources. Therefore, the 
Caspian region is a crucially important source for diversifying their energy supply 
routes. While Turkey borders the region, the EU’s reach is limited to third party 
countries including its long term candidate for membership, Turkey. This geostrategic 
advantage puts Turkey in a stronger position as it tries to become an alternative energy 
corridor between the Caspian and the energy hungry EU, who is focused on lessening 
the risk of its overdependence on a single source, namely Russia. Hence while trying to 
meet its own fast growing energy demands safely by reaching out to several different 
regions; Turkey also tries to gain politically and economically by acting as an 
alternative energy corridor for EU. 
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In pursuing this goal, Turkey has successfully secured the BTC and BTE pipelines 
from the Caspian to Turkey with significant political and economic help of both the 
USA and the EU. The BTC became the first energy route that broke the monopoly 
Russia had over the transportation of energy resources out of the Caspian region. This 
project, which is examined in detail below, would never have been realised had the EU 
and USA not supported Turkey. For example, British Petroleum (BP), a multinational 
oil and gas company headquartered in London, is the main stake holder in this very 
highly politicised project which shows the European commitment to the project.556 
The recently cancelled Nabucco project557 was also a mainly EU-funded project that 
wanted to link Europe to the Caspian resources. Turkey, which considers the Caspian a 
key political and economic tool, continued with its own plans and decided to build a 
smaller scale pipeline from Azerbaijan called TANAP. This was to supply gas to 
southern Europe via Greece which then went on to Italy. This project was also backed 
by EU as enough gas has been discovered in Azerbaijan to fill the pipeline. Both Turkey 
and the EU also back a Trans Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan to add 
to its Southern Gas Corridor.558 As Socor writes:  
Full-scale investment approved at Shah Deniz, and supply contracts secured in Europe, make it 
possible for pipeline construction to proceed along the 3,500-kilometer Southern Gas Corridor, 
from Azerbaijan to EU territory. The cumulative investments are estimated at $25 billion in the 
offshore gas project and $20 billion in the construction of transit pipelines. This is one of the 
largest energy projects in the global energy business in terms of investment costs, technical 
complexity, territory covered and multinational participation.” 559 
 
In light of the above explanation, the Caspian region is crucially important for 
Turkey towards fulfilling its aim of becoming an energy corridor, in both the oil and gas 
sector, between the East and West. Azerbaijan’s cooperation, the key supplier of oil and 
gas to the projects so far is also significantly important to both Turkey’s and Europe’s 
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plans. Environmental risks centred on issues of shipments of oil via the Turkish Straits 
and the potential dangers this poses to the city of Istanbul are another reason behind the 
Turkish efforts to build overland pipelines on its soil. However, no matter how the 
energy is delivered via Turkey to the world market, the EU’s political and financial 
backing is the most important reason why these projects are even imagined in the first 
place. Without the EU, there is not a feasible market for Caspian gas (or even oil to an 
extent), and, again, without the EU there is no strong financial support for these 
resources. Therefore, being closer to the EU also makes Turkey closer to the Caspian 
and a more influential country in the region. It should be noted that having Turkey on 
their side allows the EU to clearly exert its influence over Caspian states much more 
easily. Therefore, it is very clear that EU-Turkey cooperation makes both sides more 
influential in the region.   
The Caspian is as important to the EU as to Turkey. World daily consumption of oil 
over the last few years has been running in the vicinity of 85 million barrels, with 
natural gas consumption put at around 300 plus billion cubic. The US accounts for 25% 
of the consumption in both categories 560  while the EU accounts for about 23%.561 As 
these two power blocks account for about 50% of global energy consumption, for them, 
the security of energy supply and diversification of energy routes becomes crucial. The 
Caspian region therefore is highly important for the EU’s energy policy. 
In terms of oil consumption, after the USA and China, the EU is the third largest 
consumer, while for natural gas consumption it sits second, after the USA.562 Thus 
overdependence on a single region comes with many security risks. As a result, these 
two biggest energy consumers supported the Caspian states to start exporting their 
resources so they could be made available to Western markets. However, as a 
landlocked region, Caspian energy could only be delivered via old Soviet routes. In 
trying to help the Caspian states gain more financial independence from Russia, the 
West pushed routes through Turkey as alternatives to the Iranian and the Russian routes. 
After cooperation regarding extracting and exporting Caspian energy resources to the 
world markets, the EU and the Caspian’s newly independent states became 
indispensable trade partners in other aspects of economic life also. Consequently, as of 
                                                          
560 Rex, J. Zedalis, Oil and gas in the disputed Kurdish territory: Jurisprudence, Regional Minorities and 
Natural Resources in a Federal System, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. IX. 
561 Sue Retka Schill, ‘IEA Task40: Biomass provides 10% of global energy use’, Biomass Magazine, Sep, 
19, 2013 http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/9444/iea-task40-biomass-provides-10-%-of-global-energy-
use,   retrieved Mar.18, 2014. 
562 Raszewski, ibid, p. 137. 
184 
 
2012, the EU became the main trading partner of the Central Asian Republics.563 
Turkey, a bridge between the two parties, also remains among the top five trading 
partners of the newly independent Caspian states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.   
The other aspect that made the Caspian region critically important for the EU was 
because most of the energy used in Europe was coming from Russia. In their debates, 
European leaders paid special attention to the Caspian energy resources development in 
order to protect themselves from overdependence on Russia. The Council of Europe’s 
parliamentary Assembly debate in 2003 identified the Caspian as a key region for 
cooperation, especially concerning energy resources. The text adopted by the Assembly 
after its 13th sitting on April 2, 2003 stated that: 
The Caspian Sea region is increasingly central to European energy security and prosperity owing 
to its rich human potential and its significant oil and gas resources. Against the prospect of 
increasingly tight supplies of these raw materials worldwide, it is vital for the countries in the 
region in particular, and for Europe and the world community in general, to pursue efforts to 
ensure maximum exploitation of these resources through the most fruitful and co-operative 
exploitation possible.”564 
 
During the same debate, as well as mentioning the financial support Europe offers 
for the development of the infrastructure, transparency in energy deals, peaceful 
agreements regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea (and the borderline of the sea 
bed), the European Council also shared Turkey’s concerns regarding the environmental 
risks that the shipment of oil posed to the Turkish Straits, especially to the Bosporus on 
the shores of Istanbul. In its concluding remarks the Council said that: 
The Assembly shares the concerns of Turkey over the major environmental risks arising from 
the disregard of the existing environmental safety norms for oil and gas tanker shipments, 
especially in the Turkish straits, and supports the tightening of the environmental safety norms 
for economic activities in the Caspian Sea and for the shipment of Caspian hydrocarbons to 
international markets, as well as the development of alternative transport routes.”565 
 
In the same meeting the EU’s diversification needs were also discussed and 
mentioned clearly as it said: 
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The Assembly also welcomes the planned East-West energy supply routes, which will enable the 
transportation of oil and gas resources from the Caspian region to the West, and the strong co-
operation between all the countries concerned. In this respect, the EU has stressed the 
importance of the transportation of Caspian oil and gas for the diversification and security of its 
energy resources in Europe.”566 
 
   The US, too, has also paid close attention to the Caspian energy resources for three 
important reasons. The first, to ensure that its own energy imports are not disrupted and 
the second, to make sure that Russia does not dominate the Caspian region as the 
Soviets did. The third reason is to prevent Iran from having a greater influence over the 
region. In 2001 the Cheney Report567 recommended diversity in both the types of 
energy used and the sources of energy in general, in order to maintain continuity of 
supply in the event of disruption; it expanded on the support to be offered to the 
Caspian basin countries, begun under the previous American administration (right after 
the Cold war).568 To be able to continue its policy the US strongly supported Turkey, as 
a key ally, so that the latter could use its ethno-cultural links with the regions to reach 
their energy resources. In this respect, US support was one of the key reasons why 
Turkey became such an important actor for the development of the new pipeline routes 
of the region and the EU. With this initiative the US was trying to make Turkey an 
important energy bridge, but it was also a means of overcoming Greek-Turkish 
hostilities by using energy as a tool. This was further bolstered with its strong support 
for Turkish membership into the EU. The Cheney Report’s recommendations for the 
Caspian included: 
 
 Supporting the BTC oil pipeline as it demonstrates commercial viability 
 Working to establish the commercial conditions that will allow oil companies operating 
in Kazakhstan the option of exporting their oil via the BTC pipeline   
 Encouraging Greece and Turkey to link their gas pipeline systems to allow European 
consumers to diversify their gas supplies by purchasing Caspian gas.569  
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As can be seen above, the Caspian region is considered a vitally important area of 
focus in terms of European and US energy security. Within this, Turkey occupies a 
specific and significant place as witnessed in debates over and over again in the 
European Council. Indeed, the Council shares Turkey’s concerns and supports an East-
West energy corridor that crosses Turkish soil. Although the Turkish route was neither 
the shortest nor the cheapest available, the political considerations made it a priority as 
Iran was under US sanctions while both the US (and the EU) wanted to ensure that 
Russia lost its tight grip over the Caspian region which it had regained since the end of 
the Cold War.  
   In the past few years the EU has paid even closer attention to the energy resources 
of the Caspian region by declaring them the priority in its policy making agenda. 
However, as mentioned before, rather than purely economic reasons forcing such 
policies, political considerations are very important too. The Market Observatory570 
argued in its 2010 report that: 
Cooperation between the EU, the Caspian region and Central Asia on energy issues is at the top 
of the EU’s political priorities as reflected in the conclusions of the European Council in March 
2007, September 2008 and March 2009. This cooperation is broad in scope and ranges from 
promoting sustainable development of energy resources, the diversification of energy supply 
routes and technical know-how to the deployment and advancement of new energy sources...”571  
 
The diversification of energy supply routes became a matter of urgency for the EU as 
a result of its overdependence on Russian supplies. One of the key reasons why the EU 
wanted to diversify its energy resources, as explained later on this chapter, was the 
reoccurring commercial disputes over natural gas transit between Russia and Ukraine, 
particularly in 2006 and 2009. These disputes not only severely affected the EU, but 
they also undermined the image of Russia as a credible energy producer.572 For the EU, 
these crises once again made the energy issue a matter of politics rather than economics. 
Although it was, economically speaking, not the best option, the Caspian resources and 
the Turkish corridor became a logical and strategic alternative to Russian energy. 
                                                          
570 The Market Observatory is a body created by the EC to get a better insight into European and 
international energy markets. It provides supports EU policymaking on energy. The observatory uses the 
Energy Market Observation System (EMOS) which hosts and analyses data relevant to the energy 
markets. 
571 Catherine Ashton, Answers to the Parliamentary Questions, Jul. 1, 2010, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-2843&language=HR. retrieved 
Feb. 21, 2014. 
572 Raszewsky, ibid., p. 138. 
187 
 
Therefore, the EU strongly supported the exploration and transportation of Caspian 
energy via routes that bypassed Russian soil as a matter of urgency.573 Since Iran was 
not considered, due to sanctions, the Turkish route became the only way to transport 
these energy resources to Western markets. However, this needed strong political will 
from the EU which did not appear to have either that, or an efficient energy policy at the 
time.574 This situation came to directly impact EU-Turkey relations as Turkey found the 
EU’s needs perfectly matched with its own energy ambitions centred on energy routes.   
 
The Middle East: 
Vast Middle Eastern energy resources are critical for both Turkey and the EU.  In 
terms of proven oil reserves, the Middle East has the largest share of the world’s total. 
By 2003, six countries (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and UAE) controlled 
62.5% of the world’s total oil reserves.575 In its 2002 report, BP Amoca stated that at the 
end of 2002 the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was estimated to have 70% 
(728.3 billion barrels) of the 1.047.7 billion barrels of world reserves.576 The majority of 
these resources are located in the countries named above. In fact, the resources in these 
countries make up more than half the world's known oil reserves577 and the Middle East 
exported 41.4% of total world oil in 2002.578 
Gas is more difficult to transport than crude oil, and thus the economics of natural 
gas in the Middle East is driven by location advantage, project economics and proven 
reserves. In contrast to its reserves, the Middle East’s gas production is limited and 
underutilized, accounting for only 8% of world production.579 Discovered 
simultaneously with oil in the Middle East, natural gas was not initially perceived to be 
as valuable as oil, Even though technology designed to exploit its fuel making 
properties was well established in the USA and Europe, the Middle East, with such vast 
quantities, barely supplied these growing energy markets at the industries outset. Middle 
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East gas production increased between 1970 and1995 from 85 billion cubic metres 
(bcm), to 315bcm. In the 1980s, researchers started developing technologies to transport 
vast quantities of natural gas to distant populations.580  Proven natural gas reserves in 
the Middle East were somewhat lower than the percentage of its oil reserves, sitting at 
39.8% of the world’s total reserves. However, this is still the largest concentration in the 
world.581  
The resources that are really significant for Turkey-EU relations are the ones located 
in northern Iraq and, to an extent, in Iran. Currently, there are two parallel pipelines that 
transport Iraqi oil via Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan called the Kirkuk- 
Ceyhan (or Yumurtalik) pipelines. Oil from the Kurdish region also joins with the 
existing Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline via the newly built Taq Taq-Kurmala Pipeline.  
Iraq’s proven oil reserves stand in the 115 billion barrel (bbl) range, which ranks it as 
between the second and the third largest proven reserves in the world.582 As far as the 
natural gas reserves are concerned, information suggest Iraq has proven reserves of 
around 112 trillion cubic feet (TcF) placing it tenth in the world with additional 
potential gas reserves of 275 to 300 TcF.583 However, Iraq currently only produces gas 
for domestic use and flares off a large amount of associated petroleum gas (APG)584 
from its oil fields, but the country is looking to ramp up exports of natural gas to fund 
reconstruction of its conflict-battered economy and infrastructure.585 
The Kurdish Region in northern Iraq is the most significant for Turkey as it has 
sizable oil and gas reserves. Nearly 23% of Iraqi oil reserves and perhaps as much as 
89% of its natural gas reserves are thought to be situated in territory claimed by the 
Kurds; much of that located in areas disputed between the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) and the central government.586 However, if the resources are 
utilized this could bring great financial benefit to all parties involved. According to 
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Durukan, with the pipelines that connect Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean; “Turkey will be 
making 3 billion dollars per year while the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and 
Central Iraqi government will be making 9 billion dollars. The KRG is expected to get 3 
billion of the 9 billion dollars revenue.”587  
Currently, the oil running through pipelines between Kirkuk in Iraq and Ceyhan in 
Turkey stands at maximum capacity, daily 1.6 bpd. However, the pipelines are 
interrupted regularly due to bombs planted by insurgents on the Iraqi side and are 
therefore not able to work at full capacity most of the time.588 Still, Turkey and the 
KRG agreed to build even larger pipeline to carry the oil form Kurdish region to 
Ceyhan. In March 2014 Turkish energy minister Taner Yıldız announced that oil was 
running between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkish Mediterranean port city of Ceyhan.589  
Presently this pipeline is running at a capacity of 300,000-400,000 bpd (about one-
sixth of Iraq’s total exports of 2.4 million bpd) though the KRG’s Minister of Natural 
Resources, Ashti Hawrami, has stated that exports will increase to 1 million bpd by 
2015, and 2 million bpd by 2019.590 Still, there have been notable tensions between 
Turkey and the central Iraqi government regarding oil exports from the KRG, as Iraq is 
worried that this might lead to the independence of KRG from Iraq. But any significant 
oil transported via Turkey to the Mediterranean is welcomed by EU countries as it 
would allow them to reach oil without the hassle of having to go further than the 
Eastern Mediterranean. 
Additionally, the KRG’s contribution to the TANAP project has become more 
evident. According to Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan has 
offered Iraq access to the Southern Gas Corridor that runs through Turkey, connecting 
the Caspian Sea to the EU so as to help Baghdad sell its natural gas to Europe. This is a 
significant development, as a possible Iraqi gas connection to TANAP would guarantee 
the pipeline would be filled with enough gas in the long term. Mammadyarov argued, 
“It's a huge project and it’s open if Iraq is also interested to deliver their own natural 
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gas.”591 This would undeniably serve both Turkey and the EU with the US clearly 
supporting the initiative in the wake of the events in Ukraine and the annexation of 
Crimea to Russia.592  
On top of the resources found in Iraq, the vast energy resources in Iran593 can also be 
utilized for Europe through the Turkey corridor. By the end of 2009, Iran accounted for 
10.3% of proven global oil reserves (making it the fourth largest producer in the world). 
At the same time, it accounted for 15.8% of proven global natural gas reserves, the 
second largest in the world after Russia.594Although there are US and UN sanctions on 
Iran, due to the scarcity of resources most countries continue buying Iranian oil and gas, 
including as China, Japan and Turkey. 595 If international sanctions on Iran are lifted, the 
EU will also use Turkish routes to get Iranian gas. Iranian energy resources will 
undoubtedly be beneficial to Turkey-EU relations and Turkey’s relations with Iran.  
With the discovery of vast oil reserves in the Middle East, the West, including 
Turkey, gradually became heavily dependent on these energy resources. As of 2014, the 
majority of the countries in the developed world are heavily dependent on the energy 
resources, mostly oil, of the Persian Gulf region. In 2006, the Middle East supplied 22% 
of US imports and 36% of the European members of the OECD’s oil imports.596 This 
overdependence is the key reason why the route through Turkey has become vital for 
European energy security.  Issues surrounding the safety of oil and gas deliveries to 
Western markets, such as piracy in the Red Sea and instability in the Middle East, make 
the pipelines from Iraq to the Mediterranean via Turkey the most favourable option. 
This situation pushes Turkey to become friendlier with its eastern neighbours. Thus, 
realizing the potential political and economic gains it will bring, Turkey has re-
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considered its uneasy relations with the KRG since “Both sides come to see mutual 
benefits in improved relations, especially in closer economic ties. Approximately 80% 
of the goods sold in KRG are made in Turkey. Some 1,200 Turkish companies are 
currently operating in Northern Iraq.” 597 
Consequently the EU’s energy needs have a positive impact on Turkey’s relations 
with its neighbours and in a sense it brings at least some stability to the region. 
Improved Turkey-KRG relations also have positive implications for both the EU and 
Turkey due to the fact that it serves both their interests (in relation to energy security) 
simultaneously.  
Collectively, the EU, as a whole, is the world’s largest energy importer, importing 
about 55% of their energy supply – approximately 84% of their oil and 64% of their 
natural gas.598 Europe mainly consumes fossil fuels and about half of the energy 
consumed in the EU is imported. Only 0.6% of the world’s oil reserves and 2.0% of 
proven natural gas reserves are located in the EU. When we look at some essential facts 
about EU energy imports one can easily understand the importance of diversification 
strategy and, therefore, the contribution Turkey might be able to make towards the 
security of European energy supplies. Due to limited indigenous hydrocarbon resources 
and rapidly rising demand, the total energy imports of the EU are constantly increasing. 
In 1995 this was only 44%, but this reached 61% in 2008599 and is expected to reach 
70% by 2030 600 (84% in gas imports). Russia’s share in the European energy marked is 
remarkable, with Europe currently importing 42% of its gas – as well as a third of its oil 
and a quarter of its coal – from Russia. Although oil remains the single largest fuel in 
the primary energy mix, demand for natural gas will grow most rapidly, mainly due to 
strong demand from power generation plantations. This will increase European reliance 
on Russian energy even further. When considering the dramatic rise and the great 
dependence on a single energy source for EU energy imports, the policy makers are 
right to think about diversifying the supply routes to prevent possible future problems 
this might create.  
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As already mentioned, the EU relies on imports for almost 80% of its oil supplies 
and indigenous oil supply is expected to fall to below 10% of consumption in less than 
ten years. Without a doubt, the EU oil supply is fundamentally a question of the security 
of supply to be expected from the global oil market too.601 Therefore, it is vitally 
important for the EU to secure its oil supply through diverse sources. In 2002, 38% of 
oil imports came from OPEC, with Norway (24%), Russia (22%) and others, including 
Kazakhstan, Mexico and Azerbaijan, making up the rest. The EU’s dependence on 
external oil supplies will continue to rise to a predicted 90% by 2020, with imports 
derived mainly from politically unstable areas, notably in the Middle East and Russia, 
whose share of Europe’s import market has also been growing in recent years. For this 
reason political stability and peace in these areas is fundamentally important for the 
EU’s energy security. It is also important for these regions to carry on producing 
enough energy, at reasonable prices, in order to meet the demands of the European 
market so that it can continue to make financial gains (as the money Europe spends on 
oil is very high). At present oil price levels the602 EU’s oil bill for imported and 
domestically produced oil stands at around €250 billion Euros per year, or roughly 2.3% 
of GDP.603  
In terms of natural gas, considered the ‘cleanest’ fossil fuel, European dependency is 
increasing more so than for oil. Therefore, for Europe, Turkey is expected to play an 
even more important role in securing European gas needs than its oil needs. Natural gas 
consumption has been growing steadily for decades within the EU, offering 
environmental as well as economic benefits. In 2006, consumption stood at around 
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515bcm per year – roughly one quarter of total EU energy consumption – and is 
foreseen to grow further, both in absolute and relative terms, towards 635bcm by 2030 
under the conditions laid down in the 2005 Baseline scenario.604 Contrary to this 
increase in consumption, EU gas reserves are limited to 14 years at current production 
rates and indigenous production continues to fall while domestic demand continues to 
rise. Against the 2005 baseline scenario consumption increase, a doubling of natural gas 
imports from the current level of 275bcm annually to 535bcm by 2030 is also foreseen. 
As of 2013, 81% of the EU’s natural gas needs will come through pipelines, while 19% 
will arrive as LNG. Again, while the EU imports 35% of its natural gas needs from 
Russia, 34% comes from Norway.605  
As mentioned before, with this speedy increase in demand overall European gas 
import dependency could rise to 80% by 2020 and over 60% of EU’s gas imports are 
expected to come from Russia. 606  Due to the figures given below, one unavoidable fact 
will continue to shape Europe’s energy policy: the EU’s lack of sufficient indigenous 
energy deposits to meet its growing demand and maintain their high standards of living. 
Consequently, Europe will continue to be heavily dependent on foreign supplies to meet 
its energy needs, especially onRussia. However the crisis between Ukraine -the transit 
state, and Russia the supplier - has caused alarm bells to ring for Europe on a number of 
different occasions. Perhaps these crises are the main reasons why the EU is desperately 
supporting the Southern Corridor.  
When looking at Turkey’s position in terms of energy, its location comes up as a 
crucially important factor. Turkey forms a natural energy bridge between source 
countries and consumer markets. It stands as a key country in ensuring energy security 
through diversification of supply sources and routes, considerations that have gained 
increased significance in Europe especially after the Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006. In this 
respect the ambitions of Turkey and the EU align – something which pushes these two 
to cooperate in the region, particularly in discussions about energy routes. This is why 
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the EC officially launched the Southern Corridor initiative in 2008 so as to ensure the 
supply to Europe of Caspian and the Middle Eastern gas via Turkey. This idea became 
one of the most important elements of the EU’s future energy security plans. It also 
pushed Turkey to change its foreign policy agendas. For example, Turkey stopped being 
hostile to the KRG as it wanted to use the vast amounts of energy resources in this 
region as a political tool in its accession negotiations with the EU. Again, the internal 
energy market dynamics in Turkey started to be regulated to meet the European 
standards due to the Southern Corridor idea. 
Turkey, the EU and the US support the creation of a Southern Corridor with the main 
aim of bypassing Russia, which currently stands like Damocles’ Sword on the edge of 
Eastern Europe. According to Heinz Hilbrecht, the Director for Security of Supply and 
Energy Markets of the EU Directorate-General for Energy, European consumers are 
interested in purchasing gas from Azerbaijan and other countries of the region, 
something which guarantees that the EU is willing to pay the highest price for it.607 On 
other occasions the former EU Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, has also urged 
Turkey to negotiate conditions for making the Nabucco gas pipeline a reality. In a 
meeting Rehn said: 
Too much time has already been wasted rather than making things happen. I encourage my 
Turkish friends to engage now seriously in the discussions in view of making Nabucco 
operational as of 2013.608  
 
Looking at the above statements, it is very clear that the EU strongly favours the 
Southern Corridor to diversify its energy supply routes. This corridor will include major 
projects such as TANAP, the Turkey-Greece-Italy Connector and TAP. These fit well 
with both the Turkish and EU aims outlined above. But to understand EU’s frustration 
in terms of diversification of its energy supply routes one must understand how serious 
the Ukraine crises were for Europe, as major gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine 
between 2006 and 2009 affected nearly two thirds of EU members, and prompted the 
EU to intensify talks on the construction of an alternative gas supply route to Europe. 
Although 40% of natural gas imports come from Russia, the EU did not previously 
worry much about its reliance on Russian gas, until January 2006 that is. This is when 
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Gazprom, Russia’s state controlled energy giant, temporarily cut off supplies going 
through Ukraine due to disagreements on the price of the gas sold to this country.  
Gazprom accused Ukraine of stealing Russian gas from the transit pipelines that 
delivered supplies to Europe through its territory. When the pressure dropped in gas 
pipelines in many European countries including Austria and Hungary, doubts were 
raised about Russia’s reliability as an energy supplier. Soon after, an alarmist debate 
about the security of Europe’s future energy supply began in earnest. Russian policies 
towards Ukraine were seen in Europe as unacceptable. Many European officials viewed 
it as an attempt to use energy resources as a political weapon to blackmail a 
neighbouring consumer state that depended heavily on Russian supplies. Even those 
who did not worry that the Kremlin may one day use gas as a political weapon against 
EU were increasingly concerned about persistent underinvestment within Russia. Any 
growth in Russia’s gas output is gobbled up by the fast-growing domestic market. 
Although this is already limiting Russia’s export capacity, it has nonetheless made 
ambitious plans to sell more energy to China, Japan and the US.609 
After these incidents, officials arguing that Turkey was the necessary energy corridor 
to help reduce European overdependence on a single source began to raise their voices 
in the EU. Turkey saw this situation as an opportunity to push forward with its own 
agenda. Having the largest part of the multinational BTC pipeline safely running 
through its soil, Turkey felt confident that it could provide the same secure environment 
for another major pipeline. 
The result of major gas disputes has been that energy-poor Europeans have finally 
become aware of possible negative consequences of their dependence on imported 
hydrocarbons. Moreover, they have become increasingly uncomfortable with an energy 
game in which the producers set the rules.610 Energy security thus became a core issue 
in the EU’s foreign policy agenda. A report issued by the European Commission in 
March 2006 carried a strong warning about European overdependence on limited 
energy supplies. It suggested a clear policy on securing and diversifying its suppliers of 
energy, especially for gas, by building new pipelines – thus opening up a fourth corridor 
– from different sources into the heart of the EU. 
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In particular, the new Ukrainian crisis611 (as well as old issues between Ukraine and 
Russia) made the idea of diversifying energy supply routes even more vital for the 
future energy security of the EU. While EU officials wanted more alternatives, Turkey 
increased lobbying for a major pipeline to cross its territory as it believed that this 
would be mutually beneficial for both the EU and Turkey.  
As mentioned above, Russia already provides substantial amounts of energy for the 
EU and in the near future it is expected 60% of the European gas imports will come 
from Russia (it is important to note that Turkey also depends on Russian energy as 
much as Europe does). Russia, the world’s largest exporter of natural gas and the 
second largest exporter of oil, after Saudi Arabia, has used these resources, thanks to its 
the advantage of being Europe’s neighbour, to become the EU’s major partner, thus 
making Europe dependent on its natural gas supplies. It is very obvious that Russia will 
remain the EU’s single biggest gas supplier for a long time. But the Europeans want 
their additional future demands to be met by a broader range of producers. When the 
European Commission published its energy policy package in January 2007, it put the 
diversification of sources of supply at the top of the priority list and the Caspian and 
Central Asian regions are essential to these plans.  
Europe has already been importing oil from the Caspian region (bypassing Russia) 
through the BTC though in terms of gas, until now, Europe has only been able to import 
from Central Asia and the Caspian via Russian territory (the Turkey-Greece 
interconnector breaks this monopoly, but the quantities are so far low).612 Gazprom has 
a monopoly over all gas pipelines, which turns gas imports from other countries into 
Russian gas at the border. This setup provides the Kremlin with political clout and 
Gazprom with windfall profits: it buys Turkmen gas for $100 per 1,000 cubic meters 
and sells it to Europe at 2.6 times that rate.613 Consequently, Caspian states are 
desperately on the lookout for alternative transportation routes.   
In April 2008, the Turkmen president told a high-level EU delegation that he was 
committed to developing a mechanism for sending Turkmen gas directly to Europe, and 
he offered to supply 10bcm as early as 2009. Privately, many officials are sceptical that 
either the volumes or the political commitment will materialize in such a short time and 
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they were right as it did not happen at the time of completion of this research.614 But his 
efforts are not going to get rid of the agreements already in place. As a result, Russia 
has no problem in continuing to supply from Turkmenistan. While this monopoly is a 
problem for Turkmenistan, for Russia, the transport monopoly will only become more 
important if and when its own gas production falls short of domestic and European 
demand. It could then use Turkmen and other Central Asian gas to make up for 
shortfalls – but not if these countries have good alternative outlets.615  
There have been many proposals to build a variety of pipelines to pump the rich 
energy resources out of this landlocked region.616 However, none of them, except the 
BTC, have been successful due to the involvement of the great powers and their 
political agendas. In the global energy game, Russia is against any pipeline that could 
damage its monopoly over the exportation of energy resources from the Caspian 
Region. The EU and US on the other hand are in favour of projects that break the 
Russian monopoly, but against any that crosses Iranian territory. Turkey is also against 
pipelines that cross Armenian territory as ‘the football diplomacy’617 seems to have 
failed. 618   
It is also wise to assess the importance of the European gas markets to the Russian 
economy as the majority of its gas is sold to Europe. Energy security analysts such as 
Belyi state that energy dependency is not one sided, but in fact mutual, between the EU 
and Russia. While the EU desperately needs Russian gas, Russia equally needs an EU 
which is willing to buy its gas. If the political problems continue to affect the flow of 
gas between Russia and Europe, the West will need to find alternatives. Hence, Russia’s 
former Cold War enemy, the US, has now become involved in securing European 
energy supplies by offering its own resources. Because of ongoing problems involving 
Russia and Ukraine619, Belyi argues that, 
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In the longer term, Gazprom, as well as any other gas supply company, will find it difficult to 
argue that Russia is a reliable energy supplier. Although the current crisis has not yet affected 
any supply-transit flows, a general perception of risk has accelerated. The US has already 
promised to supply LNG to some European terminals, in particular to the planned terminal in 
Klaipeda (Lithuania), to ensure Baltic energy independence.”620  
 
     It is widely known that Russian president Vladimir Putin uses Gazprom as a 
foreign policy tool against Ukraine and, in a wider sense, against the EU too. However, 
he must also know the importance of the European markets for Russia’s economic 
stability as 60% of Gazprom’s revenues come from Europe.  In this context renowned 
German energy specialist Claudia Kemfert argues that, 
Russia is not likely to cut gas supplies to Europe as it heavily depends on energy deliveries to 
Europe. Some 60% of Russia's state income is due to oil, gas and coal sales - and a large part 
of that goes to Europe.621 
 
 The US plan to transport energy to Europe, though it is more expensive to carry 
natural gas in the form of LNG, can still be considered as an alternative to Russian 
pipelines. But, it is evidently clear, that in the long run LNG can never replace the 
significance of an alternative pipeline route which both the EU and Turkey envisage 
bringing non-Russian gas to Europe. Compared to Russia, as an ally, Turkey has shown 
its reliability to the West ever since WWII and thus decision makers have fewer 
question marks, apart from ones relating to financial issues, when considering the 
Turkish option.  
In this context it is clear that EU needs to diversify its energy resources, and so does 
Turkey. In light of the above explanations it is evident that Turkey-EU relations are 
geared towards promoting Turkey as a regional power and European dependency on 
exported energy gives Turkey the confidence to act like a major player in the energy 
market. Turkey’s own heavy dependency on exported energy resources is also directly 
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solved via EU backed projects. Therefore, the EU has a great impact on Turkey’s 
energy concerns. Good relations between Turkey and the EU also indirectly affect the 
regional developments as the energy producers have confidence in the Western markets. 
Consequently, it is mutually beneficial for both Turkey and EU to cooperate in energy 
sector as they need to broaden their energy supply routes to establish themselves as 
influential powers. It is particularly important for Turkey due to the fact that close 
cooperation in the energy sector might lead to other collaborative works directed 
towards full EU membership. 
However, in order for Turkey to become an energy transit hub, major pipelines 
connecting energy resources with the European markets have to be built. These 
pipelines are grandiose projects that have problems both before and after they are built, 
relating to political, financial, security and infrastructural issues. As mentioned above, 
politics play a greater part than any other issue when choosing the direction of pipeline 
routes. Without a strong political will from the EU, it is nearly impossible to build such 
pipelines. 
Whether Turkey could handle such big projects like TANAP is answered by the fact 
that it is already running the BTC. For policy makers, any future pipeline will surely 
have similar issues to the BTC considering the highly politicized nature of the region. 
Therefore, the BTC has become the standard for any future international energy project 
involving Turkey. That is why this thesis decided to explain the BTC in detail so as to 
bring to the fore the types of challenges a pipeline might encounter from beginning to 
end.  Having analysed this aspect, the other projects Turkey is attempting to undertake 
will be more easily understood.  
Below, I first look at the BTC pipeline in order to shed light on the transnational 
pipeline network which has been built linking Turkey and Western markets.Secondly, 
debates surrounding the now-cancelled Nabucco will be assessed in order to understand 
why it failed. After this, the TAP/TANAP will be looked at briefly before making 
concluding remarks regarding the EU’s impact over Turkey’s energy policies. 
 
BTC Pipeline as a model for other Turkish routes: 
On 4 June 2006, a British tanker, Hawthorn, left the Turkish port of Ceyhan, carrying 
the first Caspian oil to be exported via the Mediterranean. This oil had been transported 
from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan Port in the 
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Mediterranean through a pipeline running from Baku in Azerbaijan via Tbilisi in 
Georgia to the marine terminal in Ceyhan in Turkey. With an estimated investment of 
$3 billion, the BTC project involved the development, financing, construction, and 
operation of a dedicated crude oil pipeline system. The 1,768 kilometre pipeline,622 is 
buried throughout its length as it passes through Azerbaijan (442 kilometres), Georgia 
(248 kilometres), and Turkey (1,070 kilometres).623 The problems faced in securing this 
level of investment were numerous.  
Lord Browne, the chief executive of BP, described the pipeline’s construction as a 
major historical event which “reintegrates significant oil supplies from the Caspian into 
the global market for the first time in a century.”624 In the words of Daniel Yergin: 
Eventually, after years of wrangling, the BTC pipeline would link historic Baku, on the Caspian 
Sea, to a Turkish port on the Mediterranean- in part, a twenty first century parallel to the route 
pioneered by the Nobels, Rothschilds, and Samuels in the late nineteenth century. This pipeline, 
by providing an alternative to shipping oil through the Russian pipeline system, would help to 
underwrite the position of those newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.625   
 
The BTC crude oil pipeline, which required a total of 10 million barrels of crude oil 
to be filled in from Baku to Ceyhan end,626 was completed in 2005, as part of a project 
to utilise the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian region. It is the second longest oil 
pipeline in the former Soviet Union after the Druzhba pipeline. This pipeline has many 
similarities to the failed Nabucco and the now proposed TANAP; it saw very strong 
political involvement from various regions, it is very long, it crosses through three 
different countries including some unstable regions, construction took a long time and it 
was built against Russia’s will by a consortium of eleven members. Even though it only 
supplies 1% of global demand it was strategically very important and as such was 
strongly backed by the USA and the EU.627 
In the early 1990s, the countries in the Central Asia and Caucasus regions gained 
independence and the Caspian Sea emerged as a potentially significant energy 
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reservoir.628 As mentioned above, the full utilization of the basin's energy resources has 
been slowed down by the disagreement on choosing the politically and economically 
appropriate pipeline routes. The BTC route was strongly supported by Turkey from the 
outset, for both economic and political reasons. Economically, Turkey stood to benefit 
from massive foreign investment and increased employment as a result of its transit 
state status, and from the rentals for the section of the pipeline which passed Turkey, as 
well as from the increased oil supply necessary to meet its own growing domestic 
needs. Politically, control of the pipeline would bring Turkey increased international 
influence and prestige, particularly with Western powers such as the EU and the United 
States. However, it would never have been realised without huge sums of direct foreign 
investments.  
The newly independent, energy rich, Caspian states lack the resources to fund 
construction projects. While they are strong from the point of view of oil potential, they 
are afflicted by infrastructural weakness leading to slow economic growth, and a degree 
of international vulnerability.629 Due to the region’s relative geographical isolation, 
building new infrastructure to deliver its oil to consumers would be very expensive.630 
The Turkish government therefore faced the challenge not only of securing political 
support from other states for the BTC pipeline, but also of convincing energy 
companies to make a substantial investment in the project.  
As has been noted, the break-up of the Soviet Union led to discussions about the 
building of new pipelines to transport the Caspian energy resources.631 The big question 
was which routes those pipelines would take. There were two main geographic focuses: 
one was the North Caspian basin; and the other, the South Caspian.632 The oil 
companies started to look for the most suitable way of transporting the energy 
resources. Numerous routes were proposed, leading in all directions.  
It was not merely economic, or even environmental considerations, that were at 
stake, but political influence too. The fact is pipelines offer more than economic 
benefits and trade possibilities. They form strategic cores of power along which 
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communications, transportation and other infrastructure corridors develop. The state or 
alliance that controls such corridors may potentially also hold sway over the region. 
Thus, as will be seen, Turkey’s strategic position as a transit country, friendly to the 
West, has increased Turkey’s importance for Western countries. For example, the 
proposal of the BTC pipeline as an alternative to a pipeline through Iran has been 
heavily supported by the US and EU who are both keen to contain Iranian influence in 
the region.  
The region’s bountiful oil production potential has meant that a number of oil export 
pipelines have been proposed and the construction of some of these has already 
finished.633 Rough terrain, ethnic violence, bureaucratic infighting, and individual 
ambitions need to be accounted for along the way.634 These resources are distinguished 
in terms of their strategic significance, economic feasibility and technical complexity. 
More importantly, these routes involve uneven political and environmental risks and are 
often viewed within a framework of win-lose situations and alliance making strategies.  
One reason for Turkey’s support of the BTC pipeline project was due to the other 
possible routes which could be used to transport hydrocarbon resources from the 
Caspian region and Central Asia. These were seen as politically unattractive for Turkey, 
and also to the Western powers, in particular the US. The main routes for transporting 
oil and gas from the Caspian region and Central Asia run in five directions – the 
Western route through Turkey, and others through the Southeast, the North, South and 
East. All other routes, except the one through Turkey, were seen as unsuited to the 
political aims of the EU and the US. This, therefore, had a direct positive impact on the 
success of the Turkey route. 
Western states had strong reservations on the potential China, Iran, Russia or 
Afghanistan routes due to political considerations. The USA, for example, did not want 
any further Russian monopoly over energy resources in the region.635 Additionally, the 
war in Afghanistan discouraged companies from investing in this route. The shortest 
route for Caspian resources however remains via Persian Gulf routes, where it could 
transport oil to Asia, a region where the demand for oil is projected to grow faster and 
command a higher price than the Mediterranean markets that most of the competing 
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pipelines would serve.636 However, to a degree, US sanctions (and since June 2010, a 
new round of UN sanctions) have deterred potential investors and, as Bahgat points out, 
Baku never seriously contemplated exporting its main strategic resource through Iran 
with whom it is involved in a territorial dispute over South Azerbaijan.637 In addition to 
US sanctions, as Larrabee and Lesser write, Iran lacks the resources to be a major 
regional player which perhaps prevents any major investment flowing into this country.
 
638 Lastly, although pipelines are now being built between Central Asia and China, 
which was seen as a huge market for Kazakh oil,639 at the time of the decision about the 
export routes of the Caspian energy, the West also had some concerns about the 
possibility of the eastern route through China being utilised. This was another reason 
why BTC was seen as the better option.  
Exploring the feasibility of the above routes, it is clear that the BTC project had 
wider political contentions behind it when compared to economic ones. Most 
importantly, US and EU policy aimed for an East-West axis, or a new ‘Silk Road’, 
which would exclude Iran and Russia. By pursuing this policy, the US, backed by 
European states, wanted to cut down the dependence of the Caspian states on Russia as 
well as removing the dominance of Russia and Iran in the region. Countries such as 
Turkey and Georgia have used US-Iran and US-Russia tensions to push for what may 
seem less than optimal routes through their territories with a view to gain business and 
strategic advantage.640 Especially in Turkey’s case using the pipeline as a political 
leverage in its EU accession negotiations.  
 
What is the importance of the BTC pipeline for Turkey? 
The BTC pipeline is more than a pipeline for Turkey as it provides political, financial 
and environmental benefits. Unlike neighbouring Russia and Iran, Turkey is a consumer 
of Caspian energy, and the economic benefits to Turkey should not be downplayed. 
However, it also has broader strategic ambitions and hopes that it can use the West’s 
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strategic interest in the Caspian region to bolster its own hand with the West641 – 
especially with the EU during accession negotiations. Realising that control of energy 
transport routes can be almost as important as control of energy supplies, Turkey had 
great hopes invested in the BTC route. As mentioned before, since the end of the Cold 
War, Turkey’s main aim has been to provide the principal export route for the Caspian 
and Middle Eastern energy resources to the Western markets. The BTC, therefore, 
offered this opportunity to Turkey.  
For the Turkish Government, the BTC pipeline has been seen as a project primarily 
of political importance. In fact, the issue of direct economic benefits to Turkey was 
barely mentioned in the initial discussions. Despite the absence of strong economic 
arguments in favour of the project, the strategic and security advantages of the BTC 
pipeline were widely recognised by the public too. It was supported by a majority of the 
public, and has encountered no perceptible political opposition.642  
Turkish officials believed that a pipeline across its territory would bolster Turkey’s 
political standing in the international arena, particularly with the US which more than 
any other Western state has been the biggest promoter of the Baku-Ceyhan route.643  
Naturally, possessing the ‘energy card’ during EU negotiations was also considered an 
important element of the pipeline. This was especially relevant as Turkey’s geo-
strategic significance appeared to have declined somewhat in the immediate post-Cold 
War era.644 Turkey did well, in a sense, to promote for itself a major role for American 
policy-makers as a dependable ally in a highly unstable region extending from the 
Middle East to the former Soviet Central Asia. Still, its importance was clearly not 
comparable to the Cold War era. This changed with the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
which marked a turning point in many ways. According to Bahgat, since 2001, a top 
priority of White House administration has been energy security.645 Kalicki also notes 
that: 
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One needs to bear in mind the fact that the US Government has raised the nation’s energy 
security to the level of top priority which means that the US international policy in the energy 
sector, including in the Caspian region, has become one of extraordinary importance.646  
 
US strategy in the region could be defined as the availability of “multiple pipelines”, 
which means that the already existent pipelines should be supplemented with new 
ones.647 Turkey’s proximity to the former Soviet states therefore took on new 
significance for US policy-makers. Turkish foreign policy in the post-War era had been 
conservative and isolationist, but US support for Turkey's involvement in its bordering 
regions played an important part in changing Turkish policy to a more activist role in 
the region.648  Bahgat also argues that in Transcaucasia, the main US goals were to 
increase stability, speed-up democratization, introduce a free market economy (and 
make sure that it operates smoothly), increase commercial activity, control nuclear 
weapons and encourage human rights standards.649 The principal priority can be defined 
as blocking the spread of influence of existing radical regimes and preventing the 
creation of new ones. According to Aras, the US policy also aimed at seeing the Central 
Asian Republics succeed so they would not be replaced by anti-Western radical regimes 
which may threaten international peace and security.650 
As explained above, US policy has been in favour of constructing the BTC pipeline 
based on the desire to limit Russian and Iranian regional influence and leverage over 
energy supplies.651 Therefore, when energy security became a top priority, the 
importance of Turkey for the US increased significantly. An intergovernmental 
agreement in support of the BTC pipeline signed in November 18, 1999 by Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey, was described by then US President, Bill Clinton, as one of his 
most important foreign policy achievements that year.652 Consequently, we can argue 
that by successfully operating the BTC on its soil, Turkey has regained its significance 
in international politics following the end of the Cold War. It has also been noted that 
                                                          
646 Jan Kalicki ‘Caspian Energy at the Crossroad,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol.80, No.5, 2001, pp.120-134.  
647 Necdet Pamir, ‘Is There a Future of the Eurasian Corridor?,’ Insight Turkey, Vol. 2, No 3, 2000, p.40. 
648 Kemal Kirisci, US-Turkish Relations: From Uncertainty to Closer Ties, Insight Turkey, Vol.2, No.4, 
Oct.-Dec.2000, 37-64. 
649 Bahgat, ibid., pp.24-25. 
650 Bülent Aras, ‘US –Central Asian Relations: A View from Turkey,’ MERIA Journal, Vol.1, No.1, Jan. 
1997. 
651 Ziya Onis, ‘Turkey and Post-Soviet States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence,’ MERIA 
Journal, Vol.5, No.2, Jun.2001, http://www.rubincenter.org/2001/06/onis-2001-06-07/,  retrieved Jan. 4, 
2010. 
652 Baran, ibid., p.107. 
206 
 
Turkey recuperated its political strength in the region by actively participating in the 
‘war on terror’. Again, relations between Turkey and the EU have been strengthened 
much further during the last decade when Turkey was given the go ahead to become a 
candidate for full membership of the Union on 3 October 2005. Lately, in the European 
Parliament, the debate on energy security has also been heavily tainted by the issue of 
Europe's energy dependency (especially gas) on Russia.653 During these debates Turkey 
continuously emerges as a strategically important partner for the EU. Indeed, in one EU 
policy paper relating to energy policy, issued in 2000, Turkey was designated an 
“energy corridor”, meaning the fourth artery for Europe that should be developed.654 
Gareth Winrow argues that it was originally a US strategy in order to circumvent Iran 
and Russia. Now the EU seeks to diversify its resources and build new pipelines.655 
BTC clearly showed Turkey to be a reliable and secure transit country, and the obvious 
option is to build another secure route through the country for future projects. The EU 
knows that once it is built, there will be no concerns regarding the safety and security of 
TANAP. Therefore, BTC has had wider implications for Turkey in terms of its relations 
with the EU. The construction of another major pipeline such as TANAP, or Nabucco, 
which crosses its territory will add further leverage to Turkey. Most importantly, if 
Turkey realizes this importance, it will also have a better bargaining positioning in EU 
accession talks.  
Turkey considers itself as one of the most important actors supporting the 
independence of the smaller Caspian states; it thus considers itself to have a stake in 
their socio-economic viability. For its part, Ankara perceives its rivalry with Iran and 
Russia over the location of the routes of the Caspian oil and gas pipelines as a struggle 
between the forces of the good (i.e. Turkey) and the less good (i.e. Russia) which try to 
destroy the nascent new states. Turkey is convinced that neither Russia’s nor Iran’s 
policy toward these states is conducive to furthering Turkey’s national interests or the 
interests of the smaller Caspian states.656 
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Past history and present interests combined to transform Turkey’s relationship with 
Russia at the end of the twentieth century into a complex affair fraught with 
contradiction. Russia and Turkey have a historical rivalry over the Caspian and the 
Caucasus regions since the time of the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Russia does not 
want Turkey to penetrate into the Caspian nor Central Asia where Russia has 
traditionally played the dominant role for centuries. As Leeuw argues, the main fear for 
Russia is losing control over the oil tap of its former subordinate states and therefore 
control over political developments in the region.657  
In the 1990s the ambiguities in the relationship surfaced as joint Russian-Turkish 
commercial and military interests’ were noticed to be better than regional and economic 
rivalry. As a result, the relationship between the two was defined by close, if varied, 
cooperation, commingled with competitive unilateral steps specifically designed to 
undermine the other’s interests; though without ever quite pushing matters to crisis 
levels.658 However, Moscow still harboured hegemonic ambitions in the region. The 
Russians were determined to maintain and, if possible, extend their influence in both 
Central Asia and the Caucasus.659 Russia also continued to oppose US interests in the 
region. Russia was therefore one of the biggest opponents of the BTC pipeline due to its 
geo-strategic importance. Indeed, Harris writes that geography has predisposed Russia 
and Turkey to a history of conflict and the BTC was the result of it.660 The BTC is 
therefore important to Turkey as a key element in its power struggle with Russia in the 
region. 
Iran’s influence in Caspian politics on the other hand looks limited at the moment. 
The US has successfully pursued a policy of isolating Iran, and the secularist Muslim 
elite in Central Asia and the Caucasus have little sympathy for Iran’s brand of radical 
Islam. Iran’s tense relations with Azerbaijan are also an obstacle to Tehran’s ability to 
play a larger regional role in the Caucasus. The idea of reuniting Azerbaijan with the 
South Azerbaijan (in Iran) is still considered a danger to Iran’s unity. Any conflict 
between Iran and Azerbaijan would directly affect Turkey too, since strong public 
opinion would likely force Turkey to support Azerbaijan.  
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Nonetheless, Russia’s efforts to intensify ties with Iran in recent years have been 
viewed with concern in Ankara. According to Larrebee and Lesser, Iran and Russia 
share the same interests in preventing the expansion of US and Turkish influence in the 
region. This has been an important growing collaboration between the two countries. 
Both have sought to block the construction of the BTC pipeline and prevent Ankara and 
Washington from expanding their influence in the Caspian basin.661 Even though they 
are potentially competitors in the oil and gas market, Russia and Iran cooperate in the 
nuclear field that has also attracted very close scrutiny from the US.662 
Moscow had hoped to become Turkey’s main natural gas supplier through the “Blue 
Stream” gas pipeline, while Iran had hoped to supply Turkey with Turkmen gas through 
its own pipelines. Iran not only wanted Caspian oil and natural gas to pass through its 
territory to foreign markets – rather than through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey – but 
it also feared that the two projects would strengthen Azerbaijan. Soon after the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) agreements were signed in 
November 1999 for the construction of the BTC pipeline, Russia and Iran sought to 
undermine the economic rationale for the project. The Russian gas company, Gazprom, 
suddenly (likely at the urging of the Russian government) reached an agreement with 
Turkmenistan in December 1999, after two years of haggling, to buy Turkmen natural 
gas at $36 per 1,000 cubic meters, and to purchase a large share of Turkmenistan’s gas 
in the year 2000. The aim was to deter Turkmenistan from moving ahead rapidly with 
the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline.663  In an effort to persuade major oil companies not to 
proceed with BTC, Iran cut the cost of its oil swaps with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
and Azerbaijan by 30%, beginning in the year 2000. As Iran’s  deputy oil minister 
for international affairs, Hosseini, stated, “the reduction would give Iran the upper hand 
in competing with political alternatives for the export of Caspian crude.”664 In addition 
to the above a further political rationale for the BTC pipeline, for both Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, was the desire to avoid transporting energy through Armenia.  
Azerbaijan has been engaged in a bitter territorial dispute with neighbouring 
Armenia since 1988 over the Azerbaijani area of Nagorno-Karabakh. The dispute 
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developed into a full-scale war and resulted in the occupation of over 17% of 
Azerbaijan’s territory, the ethnic cleansing of over a million people (the overwhelming 
majority of which were ethnic Azerbaijanis) and the deaths of over 30,000 people on 
both sides.665 In support of Azerbaijan, Turkey also closed its borders to Armenia, a 
move it vowed to enforce until the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is solved.666  
Turkey’s relations with Armenia also remain strained by the legacy of the on-going 
dispute concerning the issue of whether the word ‘genocide’ is an apt way of describing 
the death of Armenians during World War I. Turkey strongly disputes the genocide 
claims made by Armenians and has provided greater access to Ottoman archives to 
prove the calims wrong and be more transparent though the issue remains 
contentious.667 Nonetheless, a protocol was signed on 10 October 2009, in Switzerland, 
to begin working on ending their disagreements, none of the issues relating to the 
Armenian claims about the WWI are touched upon due to the opposition from internal 
dynamics within both Armenia and Turkey. As a result of these conflicts, during the 
negotiations for the routes, it was vital for Azerbaijan and Turkey that the BTC would 
not go through Armenia.668  
 
Other Political Benefits of BTC for Turkey in the Region:  
Turkey also expects political benefits from the pipeline project on a more local level. 
Celik writes that the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a number of 
independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus meant that, for the first time in over 
a century, Turkey was free to forge relationships with the fifty million people of Turkic 
origin in the region with whom the Turks of Turkey shared strong ethnic, religious, 
cultural and linguistic ties.669 Indeed, there is a degree of sentimentality in the Turkish 
attitude to the newly emergent Turkic states. Carley notes that in the late 1980s, Turks 
from highest level officials to businessmen and scholars began to visit the region, where 
they were enthusiastically received both officially and popularly, amid cries of 
“Kardeş!” (‘brother’/‘sister’). There was also a revival of the Pan-Turkic ideology 
which traced its routes to a movement in the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth 
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century670 when Ismail Gasprinski a Jadidist (reformist) in the Russian Empire fought 
for ‘unity in language, in religion and in action’ of the Turkic people from Macedonia 
to the Great Wall of China.671   
Political opportunism also played a role in Turkey’s choice to take an active interest 
in the future of the newly independent Caucasus and Central Asian states. The US did 
not have a well-defined policy towards the region when the small republics gained their 
independence from the Soviet Union, and Turkey quickly stepped in to offer itself as an 
official bridge between the US and the new states.672 Turkey suggested that its linguistic 
and ethnic links to the region, combined with its own secularist and Western-oriented 
political and economic policies, made it the ideal intermediary between the US 
Government and the governments of the new republics. Although this policy had 
limited success, Carley writes that the US soon began to take the lead to conduct its own 
policies in the region. The US supported Turkish intervention in the region as it 
favoured Turkey to its neighbouring rivals of Russia and Iran.673  
As Baran notes, the BTC pipeline project has had an enormous impact on Turkish 
relations with all the key actors in the region, including the south Caucasus states of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, and the Central Asian republics.674 As Mammadov 
says “it is a kind of Silk Road project, linking the East with the West.”675 Moreover, 
Solak argues that:  
Through the BTC Turkey is helping to keep the regional peace. By being part of the BTC project 
Turkey improved its image in the region as well as its political power. By supporting this project 
Turkey is helping the Transcaspian countries to improve their relationships’.676 
 
To verify his point, the relations between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan can be given as 
a good example. Until Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev made a landmark 
trip to Baku, marking Kazakhstan’s decisive move towards joining the BTC pipeline 
project, bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan had shown few signs of 
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progress. Therefore one can argue that through BTC the Caspian countries can improve 
their relationships too.677 
One reason for Turkey’s interest in the Caspian region, and its support for the BTC 
pipeline, was that it expected to receive economic benefits from the pipeline beginning 
in 2006. Firstly, Turkey benefits from the rent as it has gained between $140 and $200 
million annually from transit and operating fees. This amount will increase, after 16 
years, up to $300 million per year. The higher amount is based on the pipeline’s 
maximum capacity of 50 million metric tonnes per annum (MTA), which is 
approximately 1 million barrels per day.678  
The Turkish economy suffered hugely in the 1990s from the loss of revenues caused by 
the closure of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline that had been transporting Iraqi oil to 
Ceyhan. Following the First Gulf War, the pipeline was closed in August 1990 under 
UN Security Council resolution 661.679 The vast investment made for the port became 
useless. Local business suffered as much as the state itself. The BTC pipeline came as a 
saviour that enabled Turkey to re-establish Ceyhan as an oil port. It is particularly suited 
for the purpose, as large tankers can easily and efficiently load cargo for transportation 
to world markets. Turkey will also benefit from the increased supply of hydrocarbon 
resources. Despite being in the perfect geostrategic location, Turkey is faced with the 
serious long term strategic threat which is energy dependence. Lacking major oil and 
gas reserves of its own, as of 2003 Turkey is dependent on imported supplies for nearly 
71% of its energy, a figure which is expected to increase to over 75% over the course of 
the next decade.680 As stated above, Turkey expects to face an energy shortage in the 
near future caused by increased domestic oil consumption. So, there is no doubt that the 
pipeline would be important in dealing with the expected upsurge in demand.681  
Turkey’s European neighbours will also benefit from the energy resources, in terms 
of increasing the total amount of oil and gas available for import, improving Turkey’s 
prestige in the region. Winrow writes that although Russia will continue to dominate the 
European market, Europe’s long-term energy security needs could be met if Turkey 
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becomes a key energy transit state.682 In addition, the existence of an alternate energy 
resource to Russia will be important; this has particularly been the case in Europe since 
January 2006, when Russia threatened to close the gas taps for Ukraine over price 
disputes.683  
The building of the pipeline and the infrastructure also brought significant economic 
benefits to Turkey through increased employment. During the construction of the 
pipeline about 15,000 people were employed, following a commitment from BP to use 
local labour for around 70% of the construction force. 684 This was a great opportunity 
for unemployed people in the relatively poor area of eastern Turkey.685  
In addition, the development of the Ceyhan terminal also brought increased 
employment and other opportunities for Turkish business. The total rebuilding of 
Ceyhan began in 2002. A 2.6 km long reinforced concrete loading jetty supported by 
496 steel piles was erected, capable of handling two 300,000 deadweight tonne tankers 
simultaneously. Seven new storage tanks, each with a capacity of 150,800 cubic metres 
were constructed on the site, together with state-of-the-art facilities such as a control 
room for loading ships and a back-up control room capable of operating the whole BTC 
route in an emergency. The main contractor was a Turkish company, Tekfen, and 12 
million man hours were worked by its employees to complete the refurbishment of the 
port.686 This investment in Ceyhan will have long-lasting consequences for the Turkish 
economy. As Robin Knight has reported, “[the] Ceyhan marine terminal has been 
transformed into a Mediterranean energy hub that supplies crude oil to world 
markets.”687 
Environmental concerns should not be overlooked when considering the reasons for 
the Turkish Government’s support of the BTC pipeline project. Oil transported through 
shorter pipelines to Black Sea ports must by necessity be shipped through the Bosporus 
in order to reach world markets. However, Turkey strongly opposes any further increase 
of tanker traffic in the Straits. If there was an explosion of an oil tanker, or a large oil 
spill, around Bosporus, this would be a great catastrophe for Istanbul as the home for 
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more than 12 million people and the major economic and cultural centre of Turkey.688 
As Ünlü writes, it has been difficult for the Turkish Government to prevent tanker 
traffic through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles due to Article 2 of the Montreux 
Convention 1936, which says that “In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy 
complete freedom of transit and navigation in the straits, under any flag and with any 
kind of cargo.”689 In 1994 however the Turkish Government implemented new 
regulations for passage through the Bosporus,690 but both Greece and Russia declared 
the regulations as unacceptable and to be violating international law.691 
Since 1950, 200 major accidents have been recorded.692 For example, in 1979, the 
Romanian tanker, Independenta, collided explosively with a Greek freighter, shattering 
windows onshore and spilling more than 93,000 tons of oil and diesel fuel.693 Again in 
1991, the Lebanese vessel, Rubinion 18, struck one of the bridges crossing the Turkish 
Straits, sinking with its cargo of 20,000 live sheep to the sea floor. The noxious 
decomposition that resulted was so strong that no marine wildlife had returned to the 
area as of 1996.694 
According to statistical information published by the Turkish Government, 
approximately 50,000 vessels travel through the straits annually.695 The statistics say 
that the volume of maritime traffic is expected to increase even more in the near future 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the opening of the Danube Canal in September 1992 
linked the Rhine and Danube Rivers and thereby created a route between Rotterdam and 
the Romanian city of Constanta on the Black Sea coast.696 Other factors include the 
increase in traffic from the Volga Don and Volga Baltic Canals, the economic recovery 
of the Russian Federation (leading to an increase in the number of trade vessels in the 
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Black Sea), and the increase in the population of Istanbul leading to a higher volume of 
traffic transporting local people from one side of the city to the other.697  
Most importantly, the utilisation of oil resources (and perhaps gas in the shape of 
LNG) from the Caspian region will increase the volume of traffic in the Turkish straits, 
as the oil is shipped from the Black Sea to the world markets. Tanker traffic in the 
Bosporus increased dramatically when shorter pipelines started to carry oil from the 
Caspian Basin to the Black Sea ports of Supsa and Novorossiyk in 1997, as there is no 
other route for tankers out of the Black Sea. Already half of Russia’s total oil exports of 
between 30 and 35 million tonnes per year travel through the Bosporus, and it is 
estimated to increase gradually in the future. This could potentially double the current 
shipments of oil through the straits if it was all to be transported via the northern routes. 
The increased traffic through the narrow and overcrowded Turkish straits linking the 
Black Sea and the Mediterranean would become unsustainable.  
It is therefore vitally important for Turkey to find an alternative to transporting 
Caspian energy via the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The availability of Ceyhan as a 
Mediterranean port could help solve this problem. Akiner writes that “the incalculable 
advantage of avoiding the Bosporus” was one of the crucial factors tipping the balance 
for the BTC pipeline.698 If the Caspian gas is carried to the Black Sea ports to be 
exported as LNG it has to travel through the Bosporus as well. Therefore, any other 
transit pipelines will prevent further increase in the volume of tanker traffic that crosses 
through the needles eye by removing the option of building LNG terminals in Black 
Sea. 
 
Challenges for Turkey 
Significant obstacles, both non-political and political, had to be overcome before the 
pipeline was built. As Akiner notes, the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey, with strong support from the US administration and the EU countries, favoured 
a line from Baku via Tbilisi to Ceyhan. However, it was less easy to obtain the support 
of investors. Akiner writes that “The energy companies – and it was they, not the 
governments, who would be investing in the project – were more hesitant.” 699 
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Geographical problems were the main non-political obstacles for the BTC pipeline. 
The Caspian is one of the stormiest seas in the world, due to the specific characteristics 
of the atmospheric process on the sea; thus the oil fields within the sea must be very 
well structured.700 It was also very difficult to agree on a route due to difficulty of the 
landscape. Akiner notes that many analysts doubted the economic sense of this route, 
which measured some 1,760 km, much of it running across difficult and dangerous 
terrain.701 There was also a risk of theft from the pipeline. Although BTC is buried 
under ground, other pipelines and fuel storage risk being attacked by petty thieves, who 
try to drill holes in the pipeline and steal fuel. This has taken place on many occasions 
in the past and although it does not pose a major threat to the pipelines, it presents a 
problem for the political leadership of the country and to the environment.702 One 
example of this kind of activity is Chechnya where much illegal tapping of the pipeline 
has taken place on many occasions.703 
There were also environmental concerns. The Caspian Sea is highly polluted by 
hydrocarbon pollutants. In addition, sea level rose and desertification of the surrounding 
Caspian region greatly affect the environment.704 The chief environmental concern was 
that in Georgia, the pipeline would skirt one of the country’s most famous national 
parks.705 As Akiner writes, not only is this area ecologically sensitive on account of its 
rich biodiversity, but also because it is part of the catchments area of the Borjomi 
Springs, in Central Georgia, the source of a highly popular mineral water. This water is 
greatly prized throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)706 and 
accounts for 10% of Georgian exports. If there were to be a spillage from the pipeline, 
not only would it harm the environment, but it would destroy the reputation of Borjomi 
mineral water. This would deal a shattering blow to the local economy and put many 
people out of work.707  
There is also a danger of ruining the Caspian’s unique ecosystem, which could soon 
lead to an irreversible environmental catastrophe. As a result of the development of 
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offshore oilfields there is an aspect of ecological danger that is the threat of the 
complete destruction of sturgeon and other aquatic forms of life, fish and plants. The 
development work for the Azeri Chirag and Guneshli oilfields in particular has 
produced a concentration of hydrocarbon waste in an area where large shoals of 
sturgeon spend the winter months. The recent development of the oil industry affects 10 
million people living around the Caspian Basin, whose life is bound up in the fishing 
industry.708 
As Sultanov points out, protection of biological diversity through the BTC has 
created a challenging issue in Azerbaijan.709 Moreover, around the various pipeline 
pumping stations it is very likely that environmental pollution will result.710 The waste 
waters are formed as a result of washing up pump filters and this will create huge 
environmental pollution over the fauna, wildlife species and flora on the routes of the 
pipeline.711 
However, the environmental challenges were tackled by the interested parties. 
Akiner says that “even though there are still major concerns over pollution, over fishing 
and the fluctuating level of the sea, some progress was made in matters of 
environmental security.”712 The Almaty Declaration on Environmental Cooperation in 
the Caspian (May 1994) was an important step towards the formulation of a joint 
approach towards these problems. The launching of the Caspian Environment 
Programme in May 1998, funded by the Global Environmental Facility and the EU, 
with additional support from the private sector, institutionalised a multi-sectoral plan of 
action to address environmental and bio resource issues. In 1998-2002, trans-boundary 
analytical studies were produced, as well as strategic action programmes. This created a 
framework within which to undertake projects that were regionally and thematically 
interlinked.713  
The problems of land acquisition have also been tackled as part of the project. From 
the outset, the BTC Company sought to develop a basis of mutual respect and 
understanding with the affected communities in the hope of establishing good, long 
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term relationships.714 A programme of social and environmental investment will ensure 
that the peoples of the three host nations also share in the benefits.715 
There is also a regular and ongoing dialogue with other key stakeholders in relevant 
countries including regulators, the scientific community and domestic non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as with organisations such as the World 
Bank and international NGOs.716 Again, while working on the BTC project, BP and its 
partners opened an Enterprise Centre in Baku to help small and medium sized local 
companies to develop their business in the oil and gas industry.717  
The most serious social and ethnically motivated threat to the BTC came from the 
restive Kurdish community concentrated in Turkey’s eastern borders as the pipeline 
crossed through the problematic areas.718 The organisation called the Kurdish Human 
Rights Project that was founded and based in Britain in 1992, had also actively been 
working against the project.719 There were complaints about the failure to bargain with 
local communities, inadequate compensation, expropriation without compensation and 
discrimination in BTC employment practice.720 However, it seems that the BTC 
Company had calculated all the complaints beforehand and most local people were, in 
the end, very happy with the pipeline721. 
Moving on to political obstacles, Akiner writes that poor governance is seen as a 
serious threat to the stable and prosperous development of the region.722 As in so many 
other resource-rich countries, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, autocratic regimes 
were established.723 One of the issues that usually develop out of poor governance is 
corruption. Therefore, one of the immediate problems that foreign investors in the 
Caspian states had to come to terms with was the level of corruption amongst senior 
                                                          
714 BTC Project Executive Summary for ESIA, Nov. 2002, pp.1-6. 
715 The First Oil Celebration Issue, p.8. 
716 BTC Project Executive Summary for ESIA, pp.6-8. 
717 The First Oil Celebration magazine, p.4. 
718 R.Hrair Dekmejiand and Hovann H. Simonian, Troubled Waters, the Geopolitics of the Caspian 
Region, (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2003), p.45. 
719 International Fact Finding Mission Report, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline -Turkey Section, Kurdish 
Human Rights Project Platform, The Corner House, Jun. 2003, pp.60-62. 
http://www.baku.org.uk/publications/Tu_FFM.pdf,  retrieved, Jun. 18. 2011. 
720 Ibid., pp.63-64. 
721 Environmental and social impact assessment, Baku –Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil Pipeline Azerbaijan 
Vol.2: Environmental and social route maps, Dec. 2002. 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp-country/en_az/pdf/ESIAs/BTC-ESIA/BTC-ESIA-Azerbaijan-
environmental-and-social-route-maps.pdf, retrieved, Mar. 24, 2010. 
722 Akiner, ibid., p.370. 
723 Ibid., p.371. 
218 
 
officials.724 Reports from organisations such as Transparency International and Freedom 
House indicated that, at the end of the first post-Soviet decade, the incidence of 
corruption in the Caspian states ranked among the highest in the world.725 One example 
of such corruption can be seen in the infamous ‘Kazakhgate scandal’ which started with 
the arrest in New York on 30 March 2003 of James Giffen, a consultant and close 
associate of President Nazarbaev. An American citizen, Giffen was arraigned as a result 
of an extensive US grand jury investigation. The charges laid against him included 
receiving an estimated $115 million in illegal commissions and fees from Western oil 
companies between 1995 and 2000, thus violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(the US law banning bribery of foreign officials).726    
The past ten years show the ease with which conflicts in the Caucasus tend to spill 
over into the territory of other countries. This has been the case for the Chechen 
conflict, spilling over into the territory of Georgia and into Dagestan in Russia. 
Azerbaijan is not protected from this and should political or criminal groups destabilize 
the situation in one region of the Caucasus, the risk that a conflict may spill over into 
Azerbaijan cannot be ignored.727 In turn, this could threaten the stability of the country’s 
energy infrastructure. The most recent event which created political turmoil in the 
region was the Russia-Georgia war over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, an issue 
which is yet to be fully resolved. Indeed, the Transcaucasus – which consists of the 
three republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia – is particularly unstable, greatly 
complicating oil projects in the area. In the Caucasus, including the Russian sector 
between the Caspian and the Black Sea, no less than eight areas are suffering sporadic 
violence or continuing conflict with at least four others at risk of instability.  
One of the most important problems of the Caspian Sea resources is the Nagarno-
Karabag dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia that led to a long war in the 1990s.728 
The Nagorno-Karabakh war and the associated political manoeuvrings of all involved 
have had a detrimental effect on oil development and export projects. Although a cease-
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fire has held since May 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan are still far from reaching 
settlement. The tenuous nature of the cease-fire, deeply embedded ethnic hatreds, and 
the failure of both governments to control renegade extremist groups in the region 
would probably make companies and banks balk at the prospect of financing a pipeline 
venture in the region. Turkey is also directly linked with the Karabag dispute as it 
closed its borders with Armenia causing major financial problems for both Armenia and 
the areas of Turkey bordering Armenia. Even though aforamentioned protocols signed 
between Armenia and Turkey in Switzerland, following the stage of “football 
diplomacy”, signalled some sort of progress, unfortunately no further developments 
took place.  
Georgia, which is thought to be the pipeline junction (as it is geographically 
positioned between energy suppliers of the Caspian and the consumers) and has the 
BTC pipeline running through its territory, is also unstable due to disputes among the 
various ethnic groups in its territory.729 The Russo-Georgian war in 2008 also made 
Georgian territory especially vulnerable as the wounds of the war have yet to mend.  For 
Turkey, although, at the time of writing this thesis, the risks are very low due to an 
active effort by the JDP government to make peace with the PKK in a democratic 
manner, this group – designated a terrorist organization – could still potentially pose a 
problem for the security of any pipeline running through Turkey.730 However, over the 
past decade, Kurdish terrorism has abated and, in addition, the Turkish government has 
offered to provide security for any pipeline running through its territory.731 So far there 
has been no major threat from the terrorists to the pipeline.  
According to Shimizu, the oil deposits of the Caspian Sea can be seen as both a 
powerful tool for the Caucasian Republics’ economic development, and a weapon, 
which could change the balance of power in the region.732 Armenia especially has deep 
concerns about the future oil development in Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan is intent on 
turning the region’s situation into one more favourable to itself. 
The general political instability of the region deters potential investors, not only 
because of existing tensions and disputes, but because of the risk that further disputes 
may erupt in the future. For example, although not very likely, a possible US led 
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mission to achieve regime change in Iran. Riches points out that if war were to break 
out in the region, “there will be delays in implementation, disruption of operations, 
financial burden and damage to companies reputations”.733 This is a strong deterrent to 
energy companies, given the amount of investment required to develop a means of 
distributing Central Asia’s energy reserves.  
Yet the BTC pipeline was built, in spite of all these obstacles. Akiner writes that a 
key factor was the fact that by the turn of the century it had been established that the 
ACG reserves were of sufficient magnitude to ensure the commercial viability of the 
route through Turkey. At this point, BP, the operator of the ACG and Shah Deniz 
Production Sharing Agreements, took the lead in driving forward the BTC pipeline.734 
Kazakhstan’s commitment was also a major boost for the BTC as the Kazak foreign 
minister İdrissov clearly stated that Kazakhstan supports future contribution to the BTC 
pipeline with Kazak resources.735 Although regional cooperation was important, it is 
appreciated that the political and economic backing of the USA and the EU were of the 
utmost importance at every stage of this pipeline.  
Considering the political, social and economic interests placed on it, the BTC 
pipeline is of incalculable importance to Turkey. The economic benefits from becoming 
an energy transit state, together with the investment in the Mediterranean port of 
Ceyhan, were in addition to the benefits of being able to supply its own domestic energy 
market. There would also be an easing of traffic through the Bosporus. 
The political benefits were even greater. Turkey’s international standing with the US 
and Europe would be improved, as would Turkey’s position as a regional power. 
Turkey was able to recover some of the geo-strategic importance that it had lost at the 
end of the Cold War. The pipeline set a precedent for other major pipeline projects such 
as Nabucco or TANAP to be built from the Caspian via third party countries.  
There were environmental, social and political challenges to the building of the 
pipeline, however, these were overcome by the vast benefits promised by the outcome. 
Apart from the commercial viability of the BTC route the advantage of avoiding the 
Bosporus was another key factor. 
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(London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p.162. 
734 Ibid, p.366. 
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The BTC opened on the 14th of July 2006 with great expectations for Turkey, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. It is not yet very clear if the BTC will meet these high 
expectations for the next 50 years. However, for Turkey, the project has already had 
some successes. According to Turkish President Erdoğan, the BTC, which he calls the 
New Silk Road, meant that “Turkey became much more important for the EU”, 736  
while also noting the importance of the BTC for the security and the stability of the 
region.  
There have been gains for Turkey in terms of employment and foreign investment 
too. At a more local level, property and land prices in Ceyhan rocketed after 2005;737 
local people profitted if they managed to sign a deal with major companies connected 
with petroleum products.  
Turkey has also won a political victory over her rivals for influence in the region, in 
particular Russia and Iran. The BTC project created an environment which meant that 
cooperation in the region was more beneficial than competition. Perhaps it is due to the 
success of the BTC that the European leadership started thinking about building more 
pipelines through Turkey to feed European energy needs. Perhaps it was because of this 
political and economic backing that the Nabucco deal was signed in Ankara on July 13, 
2009.  
Although it did not come to fruition due to a variety of different reasons, for over 5 
years, it excited people who were working on the topic of Eurasian energy politics. Due 
to the amount of planning and negotiations invested in Nabucco, Turkey also pushed for 
the building of a smaller version of this pipeline called TANAP. Below, I will give a 
brief outline of the Nabucco project before moving on to explain why it failed and what 
other alternatives were offered by Turkey to the European energy networks.   
 
The idea of diversifying European energy supply: The fourth energy 
corridor 
After envisaging many nightmare scenarios over the transportation of gas through the 
Ukraine, the European Commission decided to open a fourth energy corridor, ‘the 
Southern Corridor’ with the support of the USA. This corridor will have three major 
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pipelines including Nabucco (now replaced by a smaller scale TANAP), Turkey-
Greece-Italy Interconnector (ITGI) and TAP.738  
Within the Southern Corridor, the new grandiose project for the diversification of the 
energy supply of the EU was the cross continental gas pipeline of Nabucco, which 
connects the Caspian and Middle Eastern energy resources with Europe through 
Turkey. Strongly backed by both the EU and the USA, this project was seen as a rival to 
the Gazprom-led South Stream Project which is a proposed gas pipeline to transport 
Russian natural gas through the Black Sea to Bulgaria and further to Italy and Austria. 
Russia was against Nabucco and tried passionately to keep Europe (mainly East and 
Central Europe) within its orbit to continue its method of doing business. On the other 
hand, the Central Asian/Caucasian states have been signalling for years that they seek 
other outlets. As Norling argued at the time: 
The Nabucco pipeline, connecting Turkey with continental Europe, is the essential link to realize 
these emerging opportunities and tie these states to Europe.739 
 
In December 2003, the European Commission awarded a grant totaling 50% of the 
estimated total eligible cost of the feasibility study including market analysis, and 
technical, economic and financial studies for Nabucco. On 28 June 2005, the joint 
venture agreement was signed by five Nabucco partners. The ministerial statement on 
the Nabucco pipeline was signed on 26 June 2006 in Vienna. On 12 September 2007, 
Jozias van Aartsen was nominated by the European Commission as the Nabucco project 
coordinator. 740 
After a very enthusiastic start, there were years of delay, before the project was 
finally aborted in June 2013 due to complications on transit issues and the availability 
of enough gas to supply the pipeline. The transit issues were the main concerns at the 
start of talks as they were linked to the Turkish EU accession process. As Winrow 
                                                          
738 It has to be noted that during the process of writing this thesis there have been several changes to the 
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writes, there is a general sense in Ankara that the Europeans are demanding various 
concessions from the Turks without offering anything in return – blocking the opening 
of the energy chapter for example. On the other hand, there appears to be a feeling 
among officials in Europe, and among some energy companies, that if Turkey wants to 
be a full member of the EU it should immediately sign up to European norms and 
regulations. Misunderstandings and breakdowns in communication appear to have 
further clouded the picture.741  
Finally on July 13, 2009, EU governments and Turkey signed a transit agreement for 
the Nabucco gas pipeline, which clearly aimed to reduce Europe's energy dependence 
on Russia. Transit countries of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria signed 
the accord in Ankara, giving the €7.9 billion project a major political boost. After the 
signature of the agreement, Barroso, the President of the European Commission said: 
We are starting to confound the sceptics, negotiations once seemed irrevocably blocked, but now 
we have an agreement and I believe this pipeline is inevitable not impossible.742  
 
He later added that: 
The Nabucco project is of crucial importance for Europe's energy security and its policy of 
diversification of gas supplies and transport routes. The signature will show that we are 
determined to make this pipeline a reality as quickly as possible. I am extremely pleased that 
Turkey and the Member States of the EU have reached an agreement based on the principles of 
mutual solidarity, mutual equality and interdependence."743 
 
The EU’s Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs also showed his appreciation after 
the signature of the agreement in Ankara by stating that Turkey and the EU have found 
the right balance in the Nabucco intergovernmental agreement. He expressed his views 
further by saying: 
Let’s hope that this is a starting point for further fruitful cooperation in our bilateral relationship, 
between supplier and consumer countries and to give all players the freedom to pursue their own 
interests, within a secure legal framework.744 
 
Many politicians, including Turkey’s then Prime Minister Erdoğan, connected the 
Nabucco project with Turkish membership to the EU. During the Nabucco Summit in 
                                                          
741 Gareth Winrow, ‘Problems and Prospects for the “Fourth Corridor”: The Positions and Role of Turkey 
in Gas Transit to Europe’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Jun.2009, p.23. 
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Ankara, after mentioning Turkey’s progress in adjusting its domestic energy market 
rules with those of the EU during the negotiation process, Erdogan argued that: 
It is a historic moment. The Nabucco project will lay the groundwork for further improvement of 
Turkey's relations with the EU in energy as it shows that Turkey belongs in EU. We are taking 
an important step for our countries, friendship and peace, and the welfare of upcoming 
generations. This project raises Turkey's importance in energy security and being the fourth main 
natural gas artery in Europe is among our main targets.”745 
 
Nabucco was seen as a significant project. According to the agreement, the pipeline 
would be constructed both from the Turkish-Georgian and Turkish-Iraqi border 
(centring in the Turkish gas hub city of Erzurum) to the Baumgarten Hub in Austria. It 
was anticipated that the lifespan of the pipeline would be 50 years. The route of the 
3300 km (potentially up to 4000 km depending on the feed line concept) meant that the 
Nabucco Pipeline would stretch from Turkey to Austria, crossing Romania, Bulgaria 
and Hungary.746 The proposed diameters of the steel pipes were 56 inches wide and 20 
to 36 mm thick, buried at a minimum of 1m below the surface. There were going to be 
two control centres as well as in-country control centres in each of the countries that the 
pipeline crossed.747 
The construction of the pipeline was scheduled to start at the end of 2011 and the 
first gas was expected to flow at the end of 2014. In the first construction phase, a link 
was to be built between Baumgarten in Austria and Ankara in Turkey. When this phase 
was completed, existing pipeline links between the Turkish-Georgian and Turkish-
Iranian borders were to be used to allow the pipeline to start operating.748 The capacity 
would, however, be limited to 8bcm. The second construction phase was supposed to 
start in 2012 and last until the end of 2013, when the links between the Turkish border 
to Georgia and Iran were expected to be completed.749 
After completion it was expected that the full discharge capacity of 31bcm per year 
would be reached by 2020 at the earliest. Half the gas would be used by shareholding 
nations; the rest would be offered for sale. Estimates suggested that in the high scenario, 
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16 out of 31bcm per year would be supplied to Europe, and in the low case scenario, 
13.5 out of 25.5bcm per year.750 
As mentioned before, if built, although not greatly significant in terms of capacity, 
Nabucco would have been the fourth main gas supply corridor for Europe. The 
importance of Nabucco was not the amount of gas it would supply to Europe, but the 
fact that it would have opened an alternative corridor to European markets. Although 
the gas transported at full capacity would account for less than 5% of the EU’s 
forecasted demand by 2030, the project resonated well with a continent-wide agreement 
to increase the number of pipelines that connect Europe with non-European fields. 
Therefore, top EU officials always showed their support on different platforms for the 
construction of the pipeline. As written by Pogany: 
Expansion and diversification of the transmission network is taken as a precondition to reducing 
overdependence on any given supplier and any specific route, above all the one that crosses 
Ukraine.751 
 
If successfully built Nabucco was going to be a significant project for Turkey. As 
argued before, having control over another strategically important pipeline would 
increase Turkey’s international influence. As seen in the BTC’s case, it is evident that 
the benefits of having a pipeline are greater than its drawbacks.. Thus, although 
Nabucco did not go ahead, Turkey came up with an alternative: TANAP. This was also 
to be used as a strategic tool. However, it should be noted that, without the support of 
the EU for such projects, the energy suppliers would not be as keen to build their 
pipelines through Turkey against the wishes of other powers in the region, such as 
Russia. This is because it is felt that Turkey pays more attention to its own interests 
rather than the gains of suppliers.  
Although Turkey could sufficiently maintain the security of a long range pipeline, 
many Turkish officials, including Prime Minister Erdoğan, saw Nabucco as something 
of a political tool rather than merely a pipeline. This has created some resentment in 
Europe as they would prefer EU negotiations should not be mixed up with energy 
issues. Some European officials have also been uncomfortable with remarks made by 
Turkish officials about Turkey becoming an international energy trade hub, rather than 
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just a physical energy hub at the time of the Nabucco project. This relates to the idea 
held by European negotiators who thought that Turkey would re-sell 15% of the gas that 
was transported through its territory; However, BOTAS752 made it clear that it was not 
their intention to become a trading hub for the near future using Nabucco753. Turkish 
officials were also not pleased with the suggestions of Van Aartsen, the EU’s 
coordinator, who wrote in his activity report about natural gas hubs where, instead of 
arguing for Turkey to become a single hub, he proposed the somewhat unrealistic aim 
that four alternative natural gas hubs should be developed for the southern, or fourth, 
corridor in Azerbaijan, Romania, Greece and Austria.754 
Turkish officials have noted, somewhat optimistically perhaps, that even without 
Nabucco, the realisation of the ITGI and/or the TAP, could still make Turkey part of a 
fourth gas corridor.755 However, it should also be noted that, in order for Turkey to 
become an energy hub, its domestic pipeline grids need to be upgraded and extended to 
meet the new demand. If TANAP and other proposed projects are constructed Turkey 
has to invest around €6 billion to handle the increased volume of gas. Therefore, in a 
wider sense, these projects would help Turkey improve its own domestic energy grid. 
However, on 26 June 2013, after almost a decade of work on the Nabucco project, it 
was cancelled and TAP won the bid to carry Azeri gas to Europe via Turkey. This was 
deemed to be more profitable for the Azeris. Gerhard Roiss, chief executive of the 
Austrian energy company OMV, made the announcement which formally ended 
Nabucco stating that “The Nabucco project is over for us. The question of whether that 
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is a fig leaf for a political decision I leave to you to judge.”756 Roiss questioned whether 
higher gas prices could really be achieved in austerity-plagued Greece or already well-
supplied Italy, both of which lie on the TAP route, in a clear reference to the fact that 
politics played a greater part in the decision making process than economics.  
The Nabucco pipeline, sponsored by the EU, had already been reduced in length in 
summer 2012 from the original 3,900 km to 1,300 km. The eastern section, which was 
to have run from Azerbaijan across Georgia and Turkey to the Bulgarian border, was 
abandoned. Instead, TANAP, which will be linked to TAP on the Turkey-Greece border 
(funded by Azerbaijan and Turkey) is due to come into operation in 2018.757 The 
consortium did not rule out Nabucco West (the original Nabucco) indefinitely, saying 
they might consider this at a later date when more natural gas is developed in the 
Caspian region or if more countries join the supply chain. But the importance of EU 
support to any such projects became very clear.   
Although the failure of Nabucco was a blow to Turkish objectives, Turkey continues 
to pursue its aim to become the energy bridge for Europe through the building process 
of TANAP and its active engagement with the Middle East and Caspian regions in 
selling their reserves to Western markets. Of course, the EU is still the most crucial tool 
in making sure Turkey’s dreams are realised, since Europe is the only real market for 
the gas carried in these pipelines. 
 
Alternative to Nabucco: TANAP 
The TANAP project intends to transport natural gas which is produced in the Shah 
Deniz II field and others in Azerbaijan (but possibly also from neighboring countries) 
through Turkey to Europe. Azerbaijani natural gas is absolutely essential to the 
development of the Southern Corridor. As noted previously, Azerbaijan will supply all 
the natural gas for the TANAP pipeline and the forward project to Europe (at least in the 
short term). 758  
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the governments of Turkey 
and Azerbaijan on December 24, 2011 in Ankara. The companies appointed upon a 
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joint consortium dedicatedly constituted for this project by both countries comprise of 
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), and Petroleum Pipeline Corporation of 
Turkey (BOTAS) and/or Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO).759  
It is expected to cost $7 billion and will transport 16bcm of gas each year from 
Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, with the most gas volume going to Europe. 
Deliveries of Azerbaijani gas are expected to begin in 2017 while project planning 
started in 2013. Although the volume of the gas is less than the original Nabucco 
project760, TANAP still officially represents the opening of the coveted ‘southern gas 
corridor’ to EU states.761 
As noted before, Turkey plays a key role in the EU’s energy security equation and its 
possible role in linking the energy resources of the east with Europe is frequently 
mentioned in official EU documents concerning energy. According to Cehulic at al., 
Turkish interests were revealed by two key agreements, concluded at the end of 2011, 
the first was signed on December 27, 2011 for the construction of TANAP that aims to 
transport Azeri natural gas from Shah Deniz II across Turkey to Europe. The second 
agreement, which was cancelled in December 2014 in favour of the Turkish Stream, 
was signed in Moscow on December 29, 2011, and called for cooperation in the field of 
natural gas though the construction of the South Stream pipeline.762 
The first agreement with Azerbaijan stated that Turkey would be able to use 6.6bcm 
of the 16bcm of natural gas that will flow through TANAP for its own needs. This 
would eventually help Turkey to diversify its own energy needs as Azerbaijan has 
proved to be a more reliable energy partner than others, especially Iran. Azeri gas will 
also be cheaper than Iranian gas which Turkey buys via a ‘take-or-pay’ pricing rule that 
forces them to buy a pre-agreed amount of gas whether it uses it or not.763 Under the 
initial terms, Azerbaijan would own 80% of the pipeline and Turkey the remaining 
20%.  Later on, BP, which is going to be generating the Shah Deniz natural gas, will be 
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included in the process as a third partner.764 The pipeline is going to  extend the 
transportation infrastructure for natural gas coming from Shah Deniz II across Turkey to 
Europe, as well as Turkmen, Kazakh, and even Iranian natural gas, provided if 
favourable conditions for expanding the market can be created.765  
As well as political backing, both projects need concrete financial support in order to 
be completed. It should be noted that despite great political support from the US and the 
EU, Nabucco was halted. As Cain et al. have argued, the fate of Nabucco, 
suggests an important lesson for international relations in the 21st century that regional 
politics when combined with commercial interests and local market development can trump 
geopolitical resource competition.766 
 
When focusing on the diversification and reliance on Russian energy it should also 
be made clear that Russia has been a reliable partner for Europe in terms of energy for 
many decades. However, disruptions to Russian natural gas deliveries to Europe affect 
and worry Russia –especially in terms of finance- as much as the EU. For example, 
Russia is not happy with the interruption of its energy deliveries to Europe and it blames 
Ukraine for undermining the safe transportation of Russia gas to Europe.  
Apart from Russia, the EU also relies heavily on Norway and Algeria. For a great 
political and economic entity like the EU, it is crucial that there are more than three 
main supply routes. In case of interruption from one corridor, others must be available 
to substitute.  
Therefore, the Southern Corridor initiative is not only aimed at curbing the reliance on 
Russia, but also preventing any other transportation issues that the EU might face in the 
future, as no one can guarantee that one day Algerian or Norwegian deliveries will not be 
interrupted by political or other issues.  
However, many people agree that in evaluating the energy concerns of Europe the 
problem of the EU not being able to speak as a single voice features as the most important 
issue. EU states try to protect their own interests rather than the collective interests of the 
union in general. This was also identified by the EC in official documents with 
Commissioner for Energy, Günther Oettinger, who noted that: 
The EU energy policy has made real progress over the last several years. Now, the EU must extend 
the achievements of its large internal energy market beyond its borders to ensure the security of 
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energy supplies to Europe and foster international energy partnerships. Therefore, the Commission 
proposes today a coherent approach in the energy relations with third countries. This needs to 
improve internal coordination so that the EU and its Member States act together and speak with one 
voice.767 
 
The EU decided to take further action to deal with this issue and, at the time of 
completion of this research, started moving towards the Energy Union with the initiative 
of the President of the EC, Jean-Claude Junker. The official document stated: 
The EU's energy strategy is driven by three main objectives: providing secure and reliable 
energy supplies; creating a competitive energy market that ensures affordable energy prices; and 
creating sustainable energy by lowering greenhouse gas emissions. But today, achieving these 
objectives is made more difficult by the fact that the EU internal energy market is not yet 
complete; there is a lack of energy interconnectors between EU countries; and some countries 
remain entirely dependent on one external energy supplier. We need to create a European Energy 
Union that will pool our resources, connect our networks and unite our negotiating power with 
non EU countries. If we are united, achieving the goals of Energy Union will be faster, cheaper 
and more efficient.768  
 
The EU leaders who agreed on a new energy and climate target for 2030 outlined the 
priorities of the Energy Union as:  
 Ensuring security of supply for Europe 
 Deeper integration of EU national energy markets 
 Reducing EU energy demand 
 Reducing carbon emissions from the energy sector 
 Promoting research and development in energy769 
 
The Energy Union idea will definitely have a positive impact on Turkey’s energy 
policy as most European countries want to open the fourth corridor via Turkey.  
As the EU is so keen on developing the Southern Corridor, with the support of the 
US, it actively encourages Central Asian states to cooperate in energy deals. For 
example, in September 2011, the Council of the EU approved opening talks with 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to facilitate an accord on building a trans-Caspian gas 
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pipeline. Such a link would provide additional gas to ensure adequate supplies for the 
planned Southern Corridor pipelines. Hailing this decision, EU Energy Commissioner 
Oettinger stated that “Europe is now speaking with one voice.”770 
So long as the EU acts as one, supplier and transit countries feel more secure in their 
dealings with it. Future proposed projects connecting energy resources to Europe will 
only come to fruition if there is strong political and financial unity and backing as they 
all have the same implications as BTC had before it was finally built.  
Conclusion 
Energy security is one of the most important issues the EU faces in the future and 
diversifying energy supply routes has therefore become an important policy matter for 
it. Worried about relying on few sources, the EU actively started looking for more 
routes to supply its ever increasing energy needs. Turkey, due to its geopolitical 
positioning, seemed like the natural energy bridge between the energy producing 
regions of the Caspian and the Middle East and Europe.  
Turkey wants to use Europe’s energy needs as a tool during its accession 
negotiations as its location is its greatest asset in this game. For Turkey, energy is not 
only an economic issue, but a political bargaining tool enabling it to have influence over 
relations with the EU and with energy producing countries. Becoming an indispensable 
energy partner for the EU would definitely boost its bid for full membership of the 
union.. While Turkey has been promoting itself as a trustworthy partner of the West 
since the end of the WWII, new worries about Russia’s growing contribution to 
European energy consumption has meant that the EU has also began to see Turkey as an 
alternative route to meet its consumption demands. Having proved itself to be a safe 
transportation country by successfully running major projects like BTC, Turkey seeks to 
build more international pipelines to enhance its aim to become an energy bridge. Being 
a major transit country not only benefits the EU, but also Turkey’s own increasing 
domestic consumption. Turkey’s influence over the Caspian and the Middle Eastern 
region also rises if it can facilitate the safe delivery of energy resources to Western 
markets. In this sense, every pipeline is considered as a political and economic win for 
Turkey. 
Of course, strong US backing is as important as EU support for Turkey’s aim 
considering that the former is trying to weaken the influence of Russia and Iran in the 
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region while trying to boost the prominence of its long lasting ally – Turkey. The US 
clearly supports a closer partnership between the EU and Turkey. This policy then plays 
a key role in Turkey’s quest in Eurasian energy politics. 
As implied before, any future pipeline connecting eastern energy reserves to the 
West via Turkey needs to be checked against the BTC pipeline, considering they are 
likely to have numerous similarities with any future pipelines in terms of political and 
economic issues. Although the now-cancelled Nabucco pipeline and the BTC would 
have transported different items (one gas and the other oil) both projects had plentiful 
similarities in terms of physical, social and environmental conditions. 
Political factors were the driving force behind the choice of route in both cases. BTC 
was not the best option, but it was chosen by the US, the EU and Turkey against the will 
of less powerful forces at the time. When looking at the TANAP pipeline, it is very 
clear that its benefits in financial terms are not as great as many hoped considering it 
would only meet 5% of European gas needs. However, it is a strategic choice rather 
than an economic one, as was the case for BTC.  
Support and opposition to both pipelines exhibit great likenesses too. Russia was 
against the BTC and is against any other Caspian pipeline that bypasses its territory. 
While the US and the EU both supported the BTC and they are both in favour of 
TANAP because it weakens Russia’s grip over the Central Asian states and its role in 
Europe’s energy policy. In addition to the technical similarities, another important 
similarity between the two pipelines is their heavy financial cost; due to this, both 
projects were supported by consortiums.  
All in all, BTC’s success encouraged European countries and international 
companies to support other projects involving Turkey. While these projects push 
Turkey closer to the EU and make it an important regional power, the EU will also 
surely benefit from them by diversifying its energy resources. Furthermore, projects 
such as BTC will boost the economy and political clout of energy producing regions 
too. Therefore large scale energy projects Turkey is trying to take on will eventually 
help every party involve in them including Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan and European 
countries. They will not only bring more wealth to the producers and consumers but 
also to transit countries. Additionally Economic income from the energy projects will 
no doubt help positive political developments to flourish among the involved countries 
as well. In Turkey’s case, using the EU candidacy as a tool to become an energy 
bridge/hub will clearly boost its domestic political, economic and social developments. 
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Chapter 6 
Overall Conclusions 
 
The aim of this thesis was to explain the impact of the EU on Turkey’s domestic 
evolvement in three areas: religious political thinking, military-civilian relations and 
energy policy. The objective was to highlight key changes that have come about, in the 
areas mentioned above, as a result of Turkey’s ever closer relations with the EU after 
the 1990s. The overall conclusion is that Turkey has successfully utilized the EU 
candidacy as a tool for its domestic developments. Although Turkey-EU relations 
appear to have been a non-progressive and endless affair ever since the beginning in the 
late 1950s, in reality, the relationship is moving and progressing, however slowly this 
may appear.  
Turkey started its application process for membership to the EU in the late 1950s. 
This was made official with the Ankara Agreement in 1964 which expressed Turkey’s 
desire to be part of the European Community. Although there have been disruptions to 
this relationship, due to the international rivalry between the USA and the USSR during 
the Cold War, Turkey always found itself closer to the West. Finally, in 1987, under the 
leadership of Özal (despite knowing that it would be refused) Turkey applied to become 
a full member of the Union. The intention here was, as the Cold War was ending, to 
signal that Turkey would continue to pursue policies aligned to the West by getting 
closer to the EEC.  
As expected, its application was refused but Turkey’s request was referred to the 
Commission for what became a protracted study. This confirmed Turkey’s eligibility on 
geographical and political grounds. With this, the argument that Turkey was not in 
Europe was discredited once and for all and Turkey again started pushing for closer ties. 
Finally, in 1996 the Customs Union was put in place. Turkey was the only country that 
became part of the Customs Union before it becoming a member of the EU. Although 
the government pushing for closer ties with the EU, not everyone in Turkey wanted this.  
Starting from the early 1970s and gaining momentum in the 1990s, religious political 
thought in the country, mainly led by Erbakan and his followers which included the 
current President of Turkey, Erdoğan, initially totally disagreed with Turkey’s 
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membership application to EU. To them the EU was a Zionist Masonic conspiracy and a 
Christian club that was trying to destroy Turkey. They would rather have sought 
partnership with the Islamic world. But, as Islamic political groups were not in power, 
the EU turned a blind eye to their rhetoric.  
Again, while Turkey was trying to be accepted as a potential member of the EU, 
military civilian relations were not on a par with European standards. By virtue of the 
fact that it had a historical impact on the foundations of the Republic, the army gave 
itself the responsibility of protecting it against internal and external threats. But by 
doing this the army directly and indirectly interfered in the political system four times 
after 1960.  
The military used excuses such as those centered on the loss of civilian authority and 
the “religious fundamentalist threat” to the secular Republic for its interferences. 
Whenever it took power or issued warnings to the civilian government religious 
political parties were closed. Some of their leaders were sent to prison for their beliefs 
and some were banned from politics altogether. Therefore the army became the biggest 
hurdle preventing Islamic political parties coming to power. The heavy presence of the 
army in politics was not only a problem for the civilian government but it also posed a 
great worry for the EU as this was against European democratic norms. However, there 
was a great paradox here because the military ostensibly represented the secularist 
Westernized outlook in Turkey. The military had economic power via its influence in 
big industries, and also the media. By using its supporters in the media while portraying 
itself as the only trustworthy institution, the religious parties were represented as a 
symbol of backwardness. Although Islamic political parties gained great momentum 
after the 1990s, with their strong anti-Western rhetoric, it was impossible for them to 
come to power in Turkey as the military viewed as a threat to the secular Republic.  
Realizing this problem, some of the younger politicians in these religious parties, 
such as Abdullah Gül and Erdoğan split from Erbakan and began to rethink their image 
and views towards the west and secularism in order to avoid the ire of the military. They 
began to see the merits and the benefits of European democratic norms. To them, the 
only way to overcome the intimidation of the military was to take away the main tool 
from them – that is, the idea that military was the bastion of westernization and 
secularism. Consequently, under the leadership of Erdoğan, religious political thinking 
in the country started developing a different character and they underwent an 
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ideological transformation. In this respect Erdoğan set the goal of EU membership as 
the most important goal for his party and for Turkey.  
Both Islamic political thinking and the EU agreed on the unacceptability of military’s 
presence in politics. As a result, Erdoğan decided to deploy Europeanisation reform 
programs to diminish the power of the military in civilian politics. In order to meet the 
Copenhagen Criteria, the so-called “harmonization packages”, some of which were 
already introduced by the Ecevit government after the Helsinki decision in 1999, were 
now rapidly passed one after the other. These packages touched every aspect of life in 
Turkey, including the democratization of institutions and the removal of the military’s 
presence in civilian politics. These changes suited to the desires of both the Islamic 
political groups and the EU. 
Under the strong leadership of Erdoğan and the JDP, reform programs were 
introduced in order to allow Turkey to be recognized as a candidate for full membership 
to the Union. The economy was functioning much better than ever before, and Turkey 
also began following an active foreign policy. By initiating good neighborly policies 
with its surrounding regions, Turkey wanted to assert itself as an energy bridge between 
the energy producing countries of the East and the energy hungry consumers of the 
West, which included the EU. Indeed, the EU, which heavily depends on the energy 
resources of only a few countries, including Russia, put the energy security issue and 
the diversification of supply routes at the forefront of its agenda. This has become 
particularly so ever since the major crisis related to the energy transit dispute broke out 
between the Ukraine and Russia. Turkey, aware of the European quest for an alternative 
energy corridor, wanted to utilize its geostrategic positioning by contributing to 
Europe’s energy security via building major international pipeline networks such as 
BTC and TANAP. The idea of Turkey as an energy corridor clearly suited its goal of 
becoming a member of the Union as well. It also suited the European needs.    
The EU responded to Turkey’s efforts positively by officially making it a ‘Candidate 
Country’ in 2005. This was the most important stage in Turkey-EU relations since 1964. 
And by this time the EU had had a major impact on Turkey’s religious political 
thinking, the military’s presence in civilian politics and on Turkey’s energy politics. 
However, since then relations have not gone from strength to strength or resulted in 
membership. 
There are various reasons to explain why things did not go the way they did with 
Eastern European countries after the end of the Cold War. Historical memories have 
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been identified by this thesis as the main catalysts. It is very clear that the history 
between many EU states and Turkey have impacted their relationship more so than 
anything else. Negative legacies of interaction have helped establish cultural biases in 
people’s minds that are very hard to get rid of. Both Turkey-sceptics and Euro-sceptics 
misused historical facts to justify their agendas and work produced by this group 
compiles the majority of the literature in the field. In everyday life there are many 
symbols that remind the European public that the Turks were once the Muslim invaders 
of Europe. These symbols are plentiful, especially in countries like Austria, Greece, 
Bulgaria, Italy and Malta where there is a general sense that interaction with the 
Ottomans was negative. 
In addition to this, Turkey’s bilateral relations with individual countries such as 
Cyprus, Austria, Greece, Germany and France have also undermined the accession 
progress. The Cyprus issue has been one of the main constraining elements of Turkey-
EU relations. Turkey supported the UN plan (also known as the “Annan Plan”) that 
aimed to reunite the island, separated since the 1974 Turkish intervention. During the 
2004 24 April referendum on reunification on the island, 76% of Greek Cypriots voted 
no, while 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour.771 With this referendum Turkey 
showed its willingness to solve the problem in order to get closer to EU membership, 
while Greek Cypriots continued to complain about the Turkish presence on the island 
and voted against the unification plan. As a result, the Cyprus issue will continue to 
create problem for Turkey’s EU membership aspirations. 
Moreover, both Turkey and the EU have different expectations from one another as 
well as undisclosed suspicions about each other. Turkey thinks it has been treated 
unfairly by the EU as it sees itself as no less democratic and developed than the newest 
members such as Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. It wants the EU to treat Turkey as at 
least equal to those countries. Again, Turkey remains worried about the fast spread of 
Islamophobia in Europe (and the way European countries are dealing with it) and its 
negative impact on Turkey-EU relations. Turkey contributed to the solidarity march in 
Paris after the tragic incident involving the Charli Hebdo magazine, with Prime Mister 
Davutoğlu attending. Erdoğan has, nonetheless, also criticized the Western leaders for 
not being supportive to other countries threatened by terrorism, such as Turkey, Syria, 
Nigeria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali and Somalia by arguing that, 
                                                          
771‘Cyprus spurns historic chance,’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3656753.stm, retrieved 
Dec.23, 2014. 
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The issue of terror cannot be resolved with an understanding that your terrorist is bad my 
terrorist is good. Terror is terror in every country and it is very bad. We must treat all instances 
of terror across the world with the same approach.772  
 
Erdoğan also expresses on many platforms that there is a deliberate association of 
‘terror’ and ‘Islam’ – which is a religion of peace – in much of the Western media that 
creates more anti-Islamic sentiments across the world.773  
On the other hand, the EU often argues that Turkey needs to improve its records on 
human rights and freedom of speech. It has signalled on several occasions that some 
controversial cases in the country do not meet “European standards”.774 The contentious 
Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and Odatv cases, and other similar trials, have often been 
cited as the main examples of this. The imprisonment of journalists, academics, 
politicians, sports people and military personnel was heavily criticized by the EU for 
what they saw as lack of concrete evidence and a lack of transparency.775 
 Dismissing the EU’s accusations as baseless and deliberately subjective, the 
government, then led by Erdoğan, always maintained that these trials were right and that 
they were in fact making Turkey more democratic by getting rid of threats to civilian 
authority. However, half the people in Turkey thought these trials were scandalously 
unjust. To these people, the trials were a “Gülenist plot” to the secular sections of the 
society as complainants, the security personnel and the judges all happened to be close 
to the Gülen organisations. In defending these cases, Erdoğan was backed by Gülen and 
his major media and bureaucratic networks inside and outside the country. The EU, 
which was against the court case that aimed to ban Erdoğan’s ruling JDP in 2008 was 
also worried about these trials as it was not satisfied with the way they were handled. To 
the EC the cases were polarizing the Turkish people and the politics. In the 2012 
Progress Report for Turkey the EC stated that “Concerns persisted over the rights of the 
defense, lengthy pre-trial detention and excessively long and catch-all indictments”776 
                                                          
772 Joint Press Conference of President Erdoğan and President Keita of Mali, TRT Haber TV, Feb. 02, 
2015 
773 ‘Time to Crack Down on Islamophobia Turkey’s Erdoğan tells EU,’ The Express Tribune, Jan. 6, 
2015,  http://tribune.com.pk/story/817701/time-to-crack-down-on-islamophobia-turkeys-Erdoğan-tells-
eu/  retrieved Jan.25, 2015. 
774 Daren Butler, ‘Turkey’s Ergenekon Conspiracy trial approaches endgame,’ Reuters, Dec. 12, 2012 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/11/us-turkey-ergenekon-idUSBRE8BA0TY20121211,  retrieved 
Dec.19, 2014 
775 The government also, now, thinks these trials were the work of “dark forces” called the parallel state. 
776 Butler, ibid. and the Turkey Progress Report 2012, Oct.10, 2012, p.7  
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People who were on the other side of the political spectrum were worried that they 
too would be targeted. This led to major self-censorship in social and mass media as 
many were worried of being accused of being anti-government. Some people compared 
these incidents to the times of the Red Scare in USA in 1950s where allaged soviet 
supporter communists were rounded up and tried. Therefore, during 1950’s there was a 
widespread hysteria over a communist threat pumped up by people like Senator Joe 
McCarty, Richard Nixon and George Kennan. In that instance, there was a major “witch 
hunt” where people from different backgrounds, including politicians, writers, artists 
and journalist were accused of being communist, although proper evidence was lacking. 
Thousands of people lost their jobs and many ended up in prison. Scientists Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg were even executed during the time of the “Red Scare”. Year later it 
was discovered that many people who were accused of being communist while dealing 
with the “enemy within” campaign were actually innocent, though by this point, their 
lives had already been ruined. As Yesil explains the situation Turkey after 2008 writes: 
The scope of the so-called Ergenekon crimes has been so liberally expanded that anyone who 
criticizes the JDP is now fearful of being labelled an Ergenekon conspirator.777 
 
Nonetheless, things have changed, especially after the 17 and 25 December 2013 
scandals when senior ministers of the JDP government, their family members, business 
people, bank managers and even Erdoğan and his family were linked to an allaged 
corruption scandal.778 These accusations were made by the same judges and the security 
officials who had tried and sentenced those in the aforementioned trials. Following on 
from these two scandalous corruption cases, some senior ministers and advisors to 
Erdoğan publically announced that previous cases against military personal, politicians 
and journalists were the work of “dark forces” in Turkey and part of the now commonly 
referenced “parallel state”. This parallel state was described as a conspiracy that sought 
to infiltrate and then take over the Turkish state. Thus the majority of the people serving 
long term prison sentences as a result of the previously mentioned cases were all of a 
sudden set free after the December 2013 scandal. In a sense, the EU was proven right 
after Erdoğan and senior members of his government issued their statements about 
problematic elements of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases. By then these trials 
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had led to much hardship and eight people lost their lives; some died in prison of natural 
causes while others committed suicide as a form of protest at what they saw as wrongful 
sentencing.779  
The government accused the Gülen organisations of being behind these trials and 
labelled them as part of the “parallel state” that wanted to take over the state by 
overthrowing the democratically elected government through the use of engineered 
trials supported by forged evidence. Such evidence was produced by Gülen’s massive 
network within the police, judiciary and bureaucracy which was established over 
decades. Not surprisingly, Erdoğan began a vicious war against the group, beginning 
with harsh criticisms during mass rallies across the country attended by millions. 
Arrests and the forceful removal of police officers, judiciary personal and many 
bureaucrats followed. After local election victories in March 2014 and then in the 
August 2014 presidential elections the fight between Erdoğan’s supporters and the 
Gülenist organisation escalated further.  
These latest clashes between the government and the Gülen movement in Turkey that 
goes on as of December 2015 are not helping to ease the EU’s worries regarding 
freedom of speech and human rights issues in the country. One of the harshest warnings 
was given to Turkey in a motion released by the European Parliament entitled 
‘European Parliament resolution on freedom of expression in Turkey: Recent arrests of 
journalists, media executives and systematic pressure against media’, where it was 
stated that the EP, 
Condemns the recent police raids and the detention of a number of journalists and media 
representatives in Turkey. Underlines the importance of press freedom and respect for 
democratic values for the EU enlargement process, and affirms its belief in the need to continue 
the accession negotiations with Turkey. Highlights the need for more engagement between 
Turkey and the EU, particularly on the rule of law and reforms in the area of fundamental rights. 
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the 
Commission, and the Government and Parliament of Turkey.780 
 
                                                          
779 For the list of the people who died during these trials: http://www.ilk-
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These warnings, understandably, were not welcomed by the government and 
President Erdoğan as they fanned the flames of the government’s worry about Gülen’s 
international links and the EU’s involvement in Turkey’s internal affairs. To Erdoğan 
and his followers the “National will” is locked in a fight against an international 
conspiracy and there is no way back from fighting the “parallel state”. He has even 
indicated that there will be an international arrest warrant issued against Gülen who 
resides in Pennsylvania, USA, so that he can be extradited back to Turkey.781  
June 7th 2015, general elections did not go as Erdogan expected as his former party 
did not get the majority support. He wanted to achieve a parliamentary majority that 
will grant him American style presidency. A coalition government was not formed 
among the four parties, including the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (PDP [Tr.: 
Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP]) due to different demands they all wanted to 
impose on each other.782 Erdogan finally declared Turkey to go for the snap elections in 
November 2015. Expectation was that PDP and NAP would lose some votes to JDP to 
make this party again the ruling party in Turkey. He was proven right at the end. 
Recent international developments in the Middle East after the Arab Spring have also 
added to the hysteria in Turkey that the EU can only tolerate a weak Turkey that listens 
to what it is told to do. Differing opinions on how to deal with Syrian Civil War and the 
mass scale refugee crisis it has generated is linked to this. While Turkey wanted to 
create a no-fly zone in Syria to take care of the refugees on the Syrian border with the 
help of international organisations, the West has resisted such calls without a proper 
explanation. As a result, millions of Syrian refugees fleeing the civil war crossed the 
Turkish border in search of a safe shelter. This of course created and will be continue to 
generate a political, social and, most importantly, heavy economic burden for Turkey.  
The issue of DEASH783 (Ad Dawlah al Islamiyah fil ash Sham), also known as ISIS 
(Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham) is also seen differently in the EU and Turkey. 
Turkey promoted an international intervention that would involve both land and air 
forces while the Western countries thought that air strikes alone could end the terror and 
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brutality of this group that has spread across Syria and Iraq. So far US led international 
airstrikes have proven to be useless in halting the gains of this group as it expands its 
political and economic grip, thanks partly to the participation of foreign Jihadists in 
their cause. 
The next big issue between Turkey and the EU is the post-Egyptian coup context, but 
this goes all the way back to the immediate aftermath of the revolution that saw the end 
of Mubarak’s decades in power.784 Turkey criticized the west for not being truly 
democratic due to their lack of support for the legally elected President Mohamed 
Morsi. Morsi was ousted by a coup led by military head Abdel Fattah el-Sisi who later 
became president on 8 June 2014.785 Western powers did not only keep quiet about this, 
but also seemingly showed support for him.   
There are also serious differences of opinion about Israel’s policies in Gaza in 
particular and more generally in Palestine. Turkey, especially after the JDP came to 
power, began asserting the idea that Turkish people have a historical responsibility to 
take care of Palestine due to the Ottoman legacy in the country. On different platforms 
Turkey has condemned the Israeli blockade on Palestinian territories and has lobbied 
internationally to stop further occupation of Palestinian territory. In this respect, while 
Turkey has wanted to show support for Hamas, the political Islamic organisation in 
power in Gaza  after it won democratic elections in 2006 – elections which the West 
initially also supported - after Hamas’ victory the West decided to continue its hostile 
stance towards the group by keeping it on their list of terror organisations786. 
As can be seen from the above, there are a lot of issues between Turkey and EU. 
These issues make it very hard to reach a middle ground. Additionally, while the 
historical legacies continue to effect current relations and policy makers’ somewhat 
deliberate attempt to find more differences rather than focusing on the similarities, this 
relationship will never end with the desired goal.  
                                                          
784 Turkey supported the Islamic Brotherhood Movement and its leader Mohamed Morsi as they come to 
power in after winning the elections. However about a year later Morsi was ousted by the army led by the 
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785 Henry Dsouza, The Age of Neo-Imperialism: essays on contemporary global history, (Bloomington: 
Authors House, 2014), p.101. 
786 Rafaa Ben Achour, ‘On the Need to Respect Democratic Principles to Combat Terrorism,’ in Pablo 
Antonio Fernández Sánchez (ed.), International Legal Dimension of Terrorism, (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), p.21. 
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In truth the EU does not really want Turkey to become a member but cannot 
officially end the negotiations as it would send a negative message to the rest of the 
Muslim world. Nor does it want Turkey to ally itself with any other power such as 
Russia, Iran, China, or, most importantly, the wider Islamic world. The EU is happy to 
ensure Turkey remains a democratic country that looks to the West as an ally. Turkey 
protects the EU’s south-eastern borders while offering it a safe energy transit route 
through its territory, thus it is crucially important for the EU’s political and economic 
security (the recent immigrant crisis Europe face evidently proved this right).  
It is also very clear that Turkey no longer has any real intention of becoming an EU 
member as it does not believe that this can happen. It is no longer desperate to proceed 
further with accession negotiations. People are in the mind-set that the EU is not 
Turkey’s friend but instead almost a foe. At the same time, Turkey has no intention of 
ending the negotiations due to the fact that being closer to the EU represents a 
favourable image for Turkey in the eyes of its neighbours and the Islamic world at large. 
It is beneficial for Turkey to be seen as a candidate country. Overall, Turkey is a better 
place to live in now than before the 2000s and this is due to its desire to join the EU.  
All told, both Turkey and the EU have reached a clear conclusion that their accession 
negotiations are mutually beneficial and there is more to gain than to lose by continuing 
them, albeit at a very slow pace. They also realise that ending negotiations may produce 
unexpected losses. Turkey and the EU will want to continue with their relationship as 
no side dares to end it outright. However, if there is no major change in the politics of 
particular EU member states such as France, Germany, Austria and Cyprus, and the 
politics of Turkey too, then the latter will have to continue to wait for a long time (if it 
does not form other major alliances) to became a member of the Union – if in the near 
future the EU remains united that is. Turkey, potentially a regional superpower, with its 
cultural and historical links to the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, Iran and 
Central Asia can assert its own agenda while cooperating with the EU. On the other 
hand the EU might want to offer Turkey a ‘privileged partnership’ rather than full 
membership, though this is likely to be refused by Turkey.  
To conclude, the chief question this thesis posed at the beginning was “if it is not a 
properly accomplishing and progressive relationship, then what do Turkey and the EU 
want from each other and how much impact has this relationship had on the evolution of 
domestic politics in Turkey?” In light of the detailed evaluations in this thesis, the 
answer to this question is that although not resulting in Turkey’s membership of the EU, 
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Turkey-EU relations have nonetheless been part of a generally progressive relationship. 
Both Turkey and the EU want to continue relations and neither wants to see ties severed 
completely. This relationship has had major impacts on the evolution of Turkey’s 
domestic politics, especially concerning religious parties, the military’s position in 
civilian affairs and energy politics. It can clearly be said that EU candidacy have been 
cleverly used as a tool by Turkish governments to improve the domestic political, 
economic and social conditions. 
The EU impacts since 1990s have largely been very positive for Turkey as a nation. 
There is no doubt this relationship helped Turkey to become politically a more 
democratic and economically more developed country in the recent years. And it will 
surely be more realistic and beneficial for Turkey to continue its quest to become the 
full member of this Union than giving up on it if the EU is going to stay as a union in 
the near future. EU will surely be considering its status as a Union especially with the 
major refugee crisis and threats of terror it is facing as a result of the problems accuring 
in the Middle East and Africa. Moreover Turkey with a properly functioning democracy 
and flourished economy will also be a great asset to the wellbeing of the EU and the 
Eurasian region as a whole as it holds a key position in between the West and the East. 
Turkey would rather be an energy corridor for the West than an immigration corridor as 
it was clearly expressed by the policy makers. However the same policy makers also 
implied that it depends on how the EU as a whole responds to Turkey’s quest for the 
full membership.   
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Appendix: interview questions and responses 
 
Interview with more educated group 
Questions asked: 
What do you know about Turkey-EU relations and how do you know this?  
Do you think Turkey and the EU really want to integrate with one another?  
Do you consider Turkey as a European country and will Turkey become a member of 
the union one day? 
Do you think religion plays part in Turkey-EU relations? 
Are there historical memories hanging over the relationships between Turkey and the 
EU?  
Will Turkey be good for European energy security? Why is this good for Turkey? 
What makes you think the way you think? 
 
Answers (generalised): 
It is seemingly ever lasting relationship and it will not last soon as the EU does not even 
know what to do with itself. 
It is a positive thing if Turkey becomes a member of the Union. 
Historical legacies are established deeply within the European and Turkish culture that 
it is hard to get rid of the effects of them. Christian heritage plays great part. 
It is a strategic relationship. Although Turkey will not become a member, by being a 
candidate of the EU it is developing its own democracy. For the EU, it is better to have 
a Turkey as an ally than it merely being a neutral country. Both countries need better 
dialogue and integration in terms of financial issues and mostly concerning the energy 
security issues. 
The EU will of course accept Turkey if it fulfills the required criteria in every aspect, 
but it will take time.  
Turkey is as developed as some of the EU members. There must be religious element in 
the reasons why it is not allowed to join.  
The EU has a great history and culture. Turkey will add to the EU’s great diversity. 
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Interview with less educated group 
Questions asked: 
Do you think Turkey should be a member of the European Union? 
What do the EU and Turkey want from each other?  
Will Turkey be good for European energy security? Why is this good for Turkey? 
Do you think Turkey’s religion plays part in Turkey-EU relations? 
Is there a major impact from history on Turkey-EU relations? 
What makes the people in this group think the way they think? 
Answers (generalised): 
Turkey should not be a member because the EU cannot handle more immigrants and the 
EU will destroy Turkey’s culture 
Turkey is a pleasant, beautiful and relatively cheaper destination for European tourists. 
It has a good culture; people are friendly, the food is good. It must be a member. 
The EU wants to use Turkey as a buffer zone and Turkey wants to exploit its financial 
strength. 
Cooperation on energy will be good for both sides. 
Yes, history is important. Turks are Muslims and they are mostly the enemies of 
European countries and Europeans are the arch enemies of the Turks and Muslims. EU 
is a Christian organization.  
